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ABSTRACT
For fiscal years 2008 through 2010, manufacturers and service providers that adopted
lean operations outperformed companies that did not adopt lean operations. Using nonparametric tests and a matched-pairs design, lean companies had greater returns on both net
operating assets (RNOA) and total assets (ROA). Lean companies also experienced better
operating cash flows and cash adequacy than non-lean companies. The profit margins and
financing-assets ratios were marginally better for lean companies than non-lean companies.
Several working-capital measures, however, were not significantly different. Lean companies
also experienced higher total-inventory turnover and raw-materials inventory turnover than nonlean companies. Although work-in-process inventory turnover did not differ significantly
between the two groups, the test for that hypothesis contained the fewest number of matched
pairs due to fewer companies reporting values for work-in-process. Lean companies experienced
lower days’-sales in inventory and marginally higher finished-goods inventory turnover than
non-lean companies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Research Problem
For producers of goods and providers of services, lean describes a way of doing “more
and more with less and less – less human effort, less equipment, less time, and less space – while
coming closer and closer to providing customers with exactly what they want (Womack and
Jones 2003 p. 15).” The origins of lean operations come from Japan, most notably from the
automobile manufacturer, Toyota, and the Toyota Production System (TPS) (Liker 2004 p. 6).
This dissertation was designed to determine whether companies that have adopted lean
operations (“Lean” companies) have achieved the benefits promised by the theory. In other
words, are Lean companies better off financially as compared to companies that have not
implemented lean operations (“Non-Lean” companies)?
During Japan’s reconstruction period in the aftermath of World War II, Taiichi Ohno and
his colleagues from Toyota, including Shigeo Shingo, determined that their challenge was to
create continuous-flow production in small lots of dozens or hundreds of units, instead of
millions of units. “This is the general case because the humble streams – not the few mighty
rivers – account for the great bulk of human needs.” Through Ohno and his associates, Toyota
achieved continuous-flow, low-volume production by learning to changeover tools quickly from
one product to another and by “right-sizing” (miniaturizing) machines so that different
processing steps (e.g., molding, painting, and assembly) could be conducted immediately next to
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one another (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 23). The TPS classified 14 fundamental principles into
four categories:
Philosophy (Long-Term Thinking): Base management decisions
on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-term
financial goals.
Process (Eliminate Waste): Create process ‘flow’ to service
problems. Use pull-systems to avoid overproduction. Level out the
workload (Heijunka). Stop when there is a quality problem
(Jidoka). Standardize tasks for continuous improvement. Use
visual control so no problems are hidden. Use only reliable,
thoroughly tested technology.
People and Partners (Respect, Challenge, and Grow Them):
Grow leaders who live the philosophy. Respect, develop, and
challenge your people and teams. Respect, challenge, and help
your suppliers.
Problem Solving (Continuous Improvement and Learning):
Continual organizational learning through Kaizen. Go see for
yourself to thoroughly understand the situation (Genchi Genbutsu).
Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all
options; implement rapidly (Liker 2004 p. 6).
A more detailed description of the TPS’ fourteen fundamental principles is set forth in Appendix
A.
In their seminal book, Lean Thinking, James Womack and Daniel Jones identified five
principles that are the foundation of a Lean company: (1) value; (2) value streams; (3); flow; (4)
pull; and (5) perfection. To become a Lean company, an organization first precisely specifies
value for each of its products and/or services from the customer’s perspective, rather than the
company’s own perspective as the producer. Specifying value involves the identification of both
value-added and non-value-added (wasteful) processes. Second, a Lean company defines the
value stream for each product, service, or family of products/services (Womack and Jones 2003
p. 10). That is, a Lean company identifies each and every action that is necessary to transform its
products and/or services from: (a) concept to launch; (b) customer order to delivery; and (c) raw
2

materials to finished goods (or services) in the hands of customers (Womack and Jones 2003 p.
276). Typically, a value stream consists of a group of related products that utilize the same
sequence of production processes (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 297).
To accomplish the third lean principle, a Lean company makes value flow without
interruptions. Achieving continuous flow requires the removal from the value stream of all of the
actions that do not create value (from the customer’s perspective). Fourth, a Lean company
allows customers to pull value from it – instead of trying to push value onto the customer – by
producing only what the customer is buying right now (and no more). And fifth, a Lean company
always pursues perfection. A Lean company improves its value streams through repeatedly
evaluating its processes, analyzing results, and implementing changes (i.e., continuous
improvement). Maskell and Baggaley propose an additional lean principle, empowerment, a
system of measurements and controls that provide employees with the information and authority
to take necessary improvement actions (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 297).
Lean advocates claim that an organization’s successful transformation from being a
traditional producer to being a Lean company not only will increase productivity dramatically,
but also significantly reduce errors, inventories (raw materials, work-in-process and finished
goods), accidents, production-space requirements, time and cost for product development, lead
times, and overall costs (Womack and Jones p. 295). Despite requiring little capital investment,
lean transformations can help organizations escape cycles of stagnation and provide resources for
research and product/service development (Womack and Jones p. 295).
An organization’s transformation from a traditional producer to a Lean company likely
will be a lengthy and difficult one, however. It takes several years to become a mature Lean
company and requires a total culture change and strong commitment from every level of the
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company, but particularly from the CEO who must lead the transformation. Most American
companies that attempt a lean transformation, but fail to achieve and/or sustain the benefits do so
because of the failure of the CEO and/or top management to commit fully to lean principles.
CEOs want to delegate improvement activities, partly because they
are timid about going out on the shop floor or to the engineering
area or to the order-taking and scheduling departments to work
hands-on making improvements. As a result, they never really
learn anything about change at the level where value is really
created. They continue to manage in their old by-the-numbers
manner, which kills the improvement activities they thought they
started (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 133 – 134)...
Commitment from the very top of a company is especially critical during the early years of a
lean transformation when the financial-reporting results required by generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) – particularly those based upon absorption costing of inventory –
frequently are negative when compared to results from the years immediately prior to a lean
transformation. Among the typical results from the early stages of a lean transformation are:
Revenue that stays the same, although there may be some reduced
backlog that brings revenue in quicker; Costs stay much the same,
although overtime and scrap costs may reduce a little; Operating
profits may go down owing to the impact of reduced inventory on
cost-of-sales; Cash flow from operations may increase owing to
inventory reduction; other financial indicators have not improved,
or have worsened; Sales per employee have stayed the same;
average cost per unit sold has increased due to increased costs
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 52).

Just-In-Time Production versus Traditional Batch-and-Queue Production
W. Edwards Deming stressed that every person and/or step in a process – whether it be a
manufacturing or other process – should be treated like a customer and be supplied with exactly
what that step needs at the exact time it is needed. That is, a subsequent process is the customer
of its preceding process. W. Edwards Deming was a prominent engineer, statistician, professor,
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and manufacturing consultant, the latter role most prominently occurred in post-World War II
Japan. Beginning in 1941, however, Deming taught courses in America that were based upon
Walter A. Shewhart’s methods of statistical quality control (or statistical process control) to
various persons, including engineers, inspectors, businessmen, and government employees
(Walton p. 6 – 16).
For just-in-time (JIT) production to work properly, the preceding process must do what
the subsequent process specifically directs (Liker 2004 p. 23 – 24).
JIT is a set of principles, tools, and techniques that allows a
company to produce and deliver products in small quantities, with
short lead times, to meet specific customer needs. Simply put, JIT
delivers the right items at the right time in the right amounts. The
power of JIT is that it allows you to be responsive to the day-byday shifts in customer demand (Liker 2004 p. 23).
JIT is one of the pillars of lean manufacturing. To facilitate JIT production, factories typically
reorganize their layouts by grouping machines according to the expected sequence-of-operations,
instead of by the similarity-of-function, thereby dramatically reducing the total travel time for
raw-materials, work-in-process, and finished-goods inventories (Johnson and Kaplan p. 215).
Although it had been practiced in Japan for decades prior thereto, JIT was reintroduced to
the United States in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Post-World War II America experienced a
tremendous economic boom that included unparalleled demand for consumer goods with limited
competition. In the prior decades, American manufacturers had been practicing industrial
engineer, Frederick Taylor’s, scientific-management practices of work standards/rules that were
based upon “time-and-motion studies to break jobs down into simple steps to be performed over
and over without deviation by different workers.” After the war’s conclusion, American
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manufacturers generally prioritized production quantity over production quality (Walton p. 8 –
9).1 Thereafter, Dr. Deming went to Japan (Walton p. 9 – 10).
JIT-production represents a significant departure from the traditional batch-and-queue
production system that developed in the United States throughout the twentieth century. To
maximize capacity, traditional batch-and-queue manufacturers typically try to keep every worker
and every machine as active as possible. All too frequently, however, batch-and-queue
manufacturing pushes output from one process to the next, regardless of whether the next
process is ready for the output and/or whether that output meets quality standards (Johnson and
Kaplan p. 214 – 215). While a batch-and-queue production system may contribute to the
maximization of localized, standard-cost efficiency measures, it can do so at the expense of
overall company performance.
Few non-accountants comprehend a standard-cost, profit-and-loss (income) statement.
On a standard-cost income statement, cost of goods sold and gross profit are expressed in terms
of what they would have been if pre-determined standards for materials, direct labor, and
overhead had been achieved by a company. The respective differences between a company’s
actual performance and these applied standards – expressed in terms of up to eight variances –
then are added to, or deducted from, gross profit (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 94). The eight
standard-costing variances are: materials price variance, materials usage (or quantity) variance,
labor rate variance, labor efficiency variance, variable overhead spending variance, variable
overhead efficiency variance, fixed overhead spending variance, and fixed overhead volume
variance.
1

“Although a few control charts lingered here and there for a time, particularly in defense industries, for the most
part the techniques taught by Dr. Deming and his colleagues were now regarded as time-consuming and
unnecessary, and they faded from use. By 1949, Dr. Deming says mournfully, ‘there was nothing – not even smoke
(Walton p. 9 – 10).’”
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Production and purchasing managers know that they want to avoid unfavorable variances.
Accordingly, a manager can engage in conduct that is detrimental to the overall company in
order to improve the variance(s) for which that manager has responsibility and/or upon which
some portion of his or her compensation is based. Examples of this dysfunctional managerial
behavior include a purchasing manager’s negotiating price reductions, thereby, sacrificing the
quality of raw materials/components and/or causing increased scrap (Cunningham and Fiume
2003 p. 95), or a production manager’s increasing labor hours in order to improve overhead
absorption, thereby unnecessarily increasing inventory and consuming valuable cash, space, and
other resources (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 110 – 111). It is better for a company to have a
low labor-efficiency than it is for a company to build products that it does not need (Maskell
2009 p. 27). Unneeded and unwanted (i.e., overproduced) inventory also frequently has to be
sold-off at severely reduced prices, is written-off as obsolete, and/or results in layoff-and-hire
cycles (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 95).
One of the immediate goals and benefits of JIT and lean operations is the significant
reduction of all inventories. In addition to the resulting lower carrying costs, financing costs, and
money tied up in materials, inventory reduction frees up tremendous amounts of floor space.
Through the minimization of work-in-process inventories, manufacturers metaphorically can find
another factory inside their old factory (Johnson and Kaplan p. 215). In contrast, by maintaining
higher-than-necessary inventory levels, manufacturers hide production problems: “quality
problems, bottlenecks, coordination problems, obsolescence, ‘shrinkage,’ and supplier
unreliability, among others” (Johnson and Kaplan p. 215). The implementation of both JITproduction and lean operations forces managers to fix problems, instead of burying them under
buffers of inventory (Johnson and Kaplan p. 215 – 216). Lean operations and lean accounting
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represent the current evolution of the JIT philosophy. Whereas JIT methods initially may have
been viewed by American industry as being limited to production activities and/or inventory
management, lean operations and lean accounting comprise a more holistic system.
Lean operations are not limited to manufacturers. The principles can be applied to
service-providing companies. Furthermore, for a manufacturer, lean principles are not limited to
production activities. Instead, lean principles apply to research and development, design and
engineering, management, sales, administration, accounting, and other production and office
functions. For service and office processes, lean principles encourage waste-elimination in a
similar way as they do in manufacturing processes. That is, a substantial portion of service,
office, and other processes are non-value-added from the customer’s perspective. Lean
companies seek to eliminate wasteful transactions, the service- and office-process equivalent of
waste (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 77).

Hypotheses
Two seminal studies compared the financial performance of JIT-adopting manufacturers
during its re-introductory period in the United States against the financial performance of
manufacturers that had not adopted JIT-production: Balakrishnan et al. (1996) for the period
from 1985 to 1989; and Kinney and Wempe (2002) for the period from 1977 to 1995. Both
studies were event studies that used a matched-pairs design, but they found conflicting results as
to the impact of JIT-adoption upon traditional return on assets (ROA). While Balakrishnan et al.
(1996) did not find a significant ROA response to JIT-adoption, Kinney and Wempe (2002)
found that JIT-adopters had an improved ROA relative to non-JIT companies.
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Return on Investment (ROI) has the same basic formula as traditional ROA: net income
divided by average assets employed. Whereas companies tend to utilize ROI to analyze returns
below the company level (e.g., for investment centers or value streams), ROA typically is a
company-level measurement (i.e., for total assets). Although Lean companies tend to eschew
most traditional external, financial-reporting measures, ultimately, if a lean transformation is
successful, these results should be achieved.
If a company is constantly improving its processes, the results in
the ROI will come. This focus on improving the individual
elements of the process, by eliminating waste and increasing
velocity, has great impact on the bottom line, but only when we are
not focused exclusively on that bottom line (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 40).
This study examines companies’ returns on net operating assets (RNOA), in addition to
traditional ROA and profit margin. Traditional ROA includes “financial assets in its base and
excludes operating liabilities, so it confuses operating and financing activities” (Nissim and
Penman 2001). RNOA “distinguishes operating profitability from the profitability identified with
the financing activities” (Nissim and Penman 2001). RNOA is a similar ratio to the return on
invested capital, however, RNOA underscores the fact that operating liabilities reduce the net
operating assets employed (Nissim and Penman 2001). RNOA is measured by dividing
Operating Income by lagged Net Operating Assets (Operating Assets minus Operating
Liabilities): OIt ÷ NOAt-1.
Although the RNOA formula appears to be simple, the components of the RNOA
equation are more complex. Accordingly, the RNOA components have been broken down into
three series of equations as follows, one each for Operating Income, (lagged) Operating Assets,
and (lagged) Operating Liabilities. Operating Income (OI), the numerator of RNOA (hereinafter,
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equation series 1), equals the sum of Comprehensive Net Financial Expense, Comprehensive Net
Income, and Minority Interest in Income:
1(a)

OI = NFE + CNI + MII, where

Net Financial Expense equals Core Net Financial Expense plus Unusual Financial Expense:
1(b)

NFE = Core NFE + UFE

Core Net Financial Expense (Core NFE) equals after-tax Interest Expense plus Preferred
Dividends minus after-tax Interest Income:
1(c)

Core NFE = XINT x (1 – marginal tax rate) + DVP – (IDIT x (1 – marginal tax
rate))

Unusual Financial Expense (UFE) equals the difference between the lagged Marketable
Securities Adjustment and the current Marketable Securities Adjustment:
1(d)

UFE = MSAt-1 – MSA

Comprehensive Net Income (CNI) equals Net Income minus Preferred Dividends plus the CleanSurplus Adjustment to net income:
1(e)

CNI = NI – DVP + CSA, and

The Clean-Surplus Adjustment to Net Income (CSA) equals the sums of the differences between
the current and lagged Marketable-Securities Adjustments and the current and lagged
Cumulative Translation Adjustments:
1(f)

CSA = (MSA – MSAt-1) + (RECTA – RECTAt-1).

Accordingly (after cancelling out the appropriate components algebraically), Operating
Income (OI), the numerator of RNOA, is measured as Net Income plus after-tax Interest Expense
minus after-tax Interest Income plus the change in Cumulative Translation Adjustment plus
Minority Interest in Income:

10

1(g)

OI = NI + (XINT x (1 – marginal tax rate) – (IDIT x (1 – marginal tax rate))) +
(RECTA – RECTAt-1) + MII

Lagged Net Operating Assets (NOAt-1), the denominator of RNOA, equal the difference
between lagged Operating Assets and lagged Operating Liabilities (all balance sheet numbers for
the following sequence of calculations for H1 are lagged): NOAt-1 = OAt-1 - OLt-1, where
Operating Assets (hereinafter, equation series 2) equal the difference between Total Assets and
Financial Assets:
2(a)

OA = AT – FA, and

Financial Assets (FA) equal the sum of Cash and Short-term Investments and Investments and
Advances-Other:
2(b)

FA = CHE + IVAO

Operating Liabilities (hereinafter, equation series 3), equal the difference between Operating
Assets and Net Operating Assets: OL = OA – NOA, where
Net Operating Assets (NOA) equals the sum of Net Financial Obligations, Common
Stockholders’ Equity, and Minority Interest (balance sheet):
3(a)

NOA = NFO + CSE + MIB, where

Net Financial Obligations (NFO) equals the difference between Financial Obligations and
Financial Assets:
3(b)

NFO = FO – FA;

Financial Obligations (FO) equal Debt in Current Liabilities plus Long-term Debt plus Preferred
Stock minus Preferred Treasury Stock plus Preferred Dividends in Arrears:
3(c)

FO = DLC + DLTT + PSTK – TSTKP + DVPA, and
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Common Stockholders’ Equity (CSE) equals Common Equity plus Preferred Treasury Stock
minus Preferred Dividends in Arrears:
3(d)

CSE = CE + TSTKP – DVPA.

In addition, the study also examined traditional ROA, measured as Net Income divided
by average total assets (NI – [AT – ATt-1]) and Profit Margin, measured as Net Income divided
by Sales (NI ÷ SALE). Accordingly, stated in the null:
H1a0: Lean companies’ returns on net operating assets will be equal to Non-Lean companies’
returns on net operating assets.
H1b0: Lean companies’ returns on total assets will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ returns on
total assets.
H1c0: Lean companies’ profit margins will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ profit margins.
In the alternative:
H1aA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ returns on net operating assets and
Non-Lean companies’ returns on net operating assets.
H1bA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ returns on assets and Non-Lean
companies’ returns on assets.
H1cA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ profit margins and Non-Lean
companies’ profit margins.
"There are probably many better indicators of the company's short-term performance than
its quarterly earnings. Certainly, cash flow is important; we would want to know the pattern and
structure of the company's cash receipts and cash expenditures (Johnson and Kaplan p. 17).”
Resulting from inventory reduction, improved cash flow from operations is one of the typical
financial results even in the early stages of a lean transformation (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p.
52). "The expensing of costs of production as incurred makes value-stream profit essentially
equivalent to period cash flow (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 59).” Some prior research has not
12

found there to have been superior cash-flow performance by either JIT or lean-adopters;
however, those studies can be distinguished from the current one. Fullerton et al. (2003) looked
at 54 self-identified JIT-adopters – but no non-JIT companies – and examined whether the degree
of JIT implementation, as measured by ten factors, affected certain financial-performance
measures, including cash-flow margin. 2 Boyd et al. (2006) used data-envelopment analysis
(DEA), a form of linear programming, on a very limited sample of 18 survey-identified Lean
companies, but did not include any non-Lean companies. Ahmad et al. (2004) used survey data
to examine the perception of financial results, including cash flow from operations, of managers
from 86 JIT-adopting companies, most of them manufacturing managers.
This study examines three different cash-flow measures: (a) cash flows from operating
activities, scaled by lagged total assets (OANCF ÷ ATt-1); (b) the cash-adequacy ratio, measured
as cash flows from operating activities ÷ current liabilities (OANCF ÷ LCT); and (c) the
financing-assets ratio, measured as cash flows from operating activities divided by the absolute
value of cash flows from investing activities (OANCF ÷ |IVNCF|). However, for sub-hypothesis
1(c), the financing-assets ratio, the study only analyzed those companies that had negative net
cash flows from investing activities, since those companies were in an investing position rather
than a disinvesting position. Stated in the null:
H2a0: Lean companies’ cash flows from operating activities will be equal to Non-Lean
companies’ cash flows from operating activities.
H2b0: Lean companies’ cash-adequacy ratios will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ cashadequacy ratios.
H2c0: Lean companies’ financing-assets ratios will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ financingassets ratios.

2

Fullerton et al. (2003) calculated cash-flow margin as income, net of extraordinary items, depreciation, and amortization divided by sales.
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In the alternative:
H2aA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ cash flows from operating activities
and Non-Lean companies’ cash flows from operating activities.
H2bA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ cash adequacy ratios and Non-Lean
companies’ cash adequacy ratios.
H2cA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ financing-assets ratios and NonLean companies’ financing-assets ratios.
Although capital plans typically focus on property, plant, and equipment (PPE), other
areas such as accounts receivable, inventory, and working capital are large users of cash and
funding. Rarely, however, do companies have “top-level” improvement targets on workingcapital performance measures (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 147 – 148). Days’-sales
uncollected (or accounts receivable days outstanding) can be improved by close attention to
customers' compliance with sales terms. “The capital savings can be fundamental to a company's
ability to grow (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 148).” There is an absence of significant
academic research on the impact of lean adoption on these working-capital performance
measures.
Accordingly, this study examines several working capital measures and other liquidity
ratios: (a) net working capital, measured as the difference between current assets and current
liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets ([ACT – LCT] ÷ ATt-1); (b) working-capital turnover,
measured as sales divided by average net working-capital (SALE ÷ [(ACT – LCT + ACTt-1 –
LCTt-1] ÷ 2); (c) the current ratio, measured as current assets divided by current liabilities (ACT
÷ LCT); (d) the acid-test ratio, measured as the sum of cash, short-term investments, and
accounts receivable divided by current liabilities ([CHE + RECT] ÷ LCT); (e) accounts
receivable turnover, measured as net sales divided by average net receivables (SALE ÷ [(RECT
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+ RECTt-1) ÷ 2]); and (f) days’-sales uncollected, measured as 365 days multiplied by net
receivables and divided by net sales (365 x RECT ÷ SALE). Stated in the null:
H3a0: Lean companies’ proportionate net working capital will be equal to Non-Lean companies’
proportionate net working capital.
H3b0: Lean companies’ working-capital turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean companies’
working-capital turnover.
H3c0: Lean companies’ current ratios will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ current ratios.
H3d0: Lean companies’ acid-test ratios will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ acid-test ratios.
H3e0: Lean companies’ accounts-receivable turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean companies’
accounts-receivable turnovers.
H3f0: Lean companies’ days’-sales-uncollected will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ days’sales-uncollected.
In the alternative:
H3aA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ proportionate net working capital
and Non-Lean companies’ proportionate net working capital.
H3bA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ working-capital turnovers and NonLean companies’ working-capital turnovers.
H3cA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ current ratios and Non-Lean
companies’ current ratios.
H3dA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ acid-test ratios and Non-Lean
companies’ acid-test ratios.
H3eA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ accounts-receivable turnovers and
Non-Lean companies’ accounts-receivable turnovers.
H3fA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ days’-sales-uncollected and NonLean companies’ days’-sales-uncollected.
Instead of trying to “optimize” the level of inventory based upon company resources – for
example, by using Economic Order Quantities (EOQ) – Lean companies examine and improve
the conditions that have caused them to maintain higher inventory levels: (a) as protection
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against bad-quality materials and manufactured goods; (b) the long set-up times on much U.S.
equipment; and (c) the uncertainty of delivery from suppliers (Johnson and Kaplan p. 213 – 214).
Lean proponents assert that a significant reduction in inventory levels is one of the immediate
benefits of a lean transformation. For Lean companies, inventory level and inventory turnover
are key metrics of success (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 148).
Although previous research has looked at various inventory turnover measures in either
JIT or Lean contexts, their respective methodologies can be distinguished from the current study.
While Huson and Nanda (1995) found that inventory turnover increased, their study looked only
at JIT-adopters (55 companies) during the period 1977 through 1992. Also, looking at JITadopters only (74 companies), Biggert and Gargeya (2002) found that JIT-adoption reduced
inventory-to-sales ratios for total inventory and raw-materials inventory, but not for work-inprocess or finished-goods inventories. Comparing 44 matched pairs, Chang and Lee (1995)
found that each of the finished-goods, raw-materials, and work-in-process inventory turnovers
improved for JIT companies over Non-JIT companies; however, only two single years were
compared to another (1984 and 1990). Furthermore, for the first such year, the Non-JIT
companies had better performance than the JIT-adopters for all the respective inventory
turnovers. Comparing 60 JIT and 40 Non-JIT Toronto-centric plants, Callen et al. (2000) found
that: (a) the JIT plants utilized less work-in-process inventory and finished-goods inventory than
Non-JIT plants; and (b) greater experience with JIT further reduced work-in-process inventories,
but not finished-goods inventories. However, Callen et al. (2000) was limited to two industries,
one metropolitan area, and one single year of financial data (1990).
Here, inventory turnover was examined for each of total inventory (INVT), raw-materials
(INVRM), work-in-process (INVWIP), and finished-goods (INVFG) and was measured as cost

16

of goods sold divided by the average inventory for each of the respective inventory categories:
(COGS ÷ [(INV + INVt-1) ÷ 2]). Days’-sales in inventory is measured for finished-goods
inventory as: 365 days multiplied by the quotient of ending inventory and cost of goods sold
(365 x [INVFG ÷ COGS]). Stated in the null:
H4a0: Lean companies’ total-inventory turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ totalinventory turnovers.
H4b0: Lean companies’ raw-materials inventory turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean
companies’ raw-materials inventory turnovers.
H4c0: Lean companies’ work-in-process inventory turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean
companies’ work-in-process inventory turnovers.
H4d0: Lean companies’ finished-goods inventory turnovers will be equal to Non-Lean
companies’ finished-goods inventory turnovers.
H4e0: Lean companies’ days’-sales-in-inventory will be equal to Non-Lean companies’ days’sales-in-inventory.
In the alternative:
H4aA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ total-inventory turnovers and NonLean companies’ total-inventory turnovers.
H4bA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ raw-materials inventory turnovers
and Non-Lean companies’ raw-materials inventory turnovers.
H4cA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ work-in-process inventory turnovers
and Non-Lean companies’ work-in-process inventory turnovers.
H4dA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ finished-goods inventory turnovers
and Non-Lean companies’ finished-goods inventory turnovers.
H4eA: There will be a difference between Lean companies’ days’-sales-in-inventory and NonLean companies’ days’-sales-in-inventory.
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Motivation/Contribution
Using traditional batch-and-queue production methods typically results in companies’
maintaining significant inventories of raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods. Not
only do significant inventories tie up valuable capital and other resources, they hide problems in
production processes that otherwise could be revealed and improved by a Lean company that is
striving for continuous-flow production. Companies that use traditional financial-reporting
practices for managerial-accounting purposes frequently make important decisions without
knowing the true costs of their products. Through the use of standard-costing variance analysis,
traditional management frequently makes decisions that maximize localized performance
measurements at the expense of a company’s overall performance.
Proponents of lean operations and lean accounting believe that they have solutions for the
problems caused by traditional batch-and-queue production and the use of traditional financialaccounting practices for management-accounting purposes. Although a number of lean metrics
are non-financial, ultimately, a successful lean transformation should impact a company’s
financial-performance measurements. This study contributes to the accounting literature by using
archival data to examine financial-performance measurements that proponents of lean operations
and accounting assert ultimately will be improved as a result of having implemented lean
practices.
Early literature in this field addressed the effects of JIT-production and covered periods
of time before the more recent lean evolution. There is a conflict in that literature with regard to
the impact of JIT-production on traditional return on total assets. This study examines return on
total assets, as well as an additional measure, return on net operating assets, which does not
confound operating and financing activities. The improvement of operating cash flows, another
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principal financial-performance measurement according to proponents of lean, so far has not
been supported widely with archival data in peer-reviewed accounting literature. This study
examines operating cash flows from numerous angles, using archival data. Additionally, this
study examines several working-capital measurements. Furthermore, with respect to inventory
levels and turnover, principal financial-performance measurements that lean proponents assert
will improve as a result of a successful lean transformation, this study addresses both the
conflicts and design limitations that may limit the findings of prior literature.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION
A full review of the relevant prior literature is presented in chapter 2. The complete
methodology used to test the hypotheses is included in chapter 3. Chapter 4 reviews the data
analysis and research results. Finally, chapter 5 gives an overview of the conclusions drawn
from this research.
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CHAPTER II
PRIOR RESEARCH
Balakrishnan et al. (1996) found no significant return-on-asset (ROA) response to the
adoption of JIT manufacturing. Their sample consisted of 46 matched pairs of public companies,
the treatment group for which publicly had disclosed the adoption of JIT production during the
period from 1985 to 1989. It is important to note that returns had declined market-wide during
the period of study. Companies having fewer WIP-inventory turns during the year of JIT
adoption exhibited a smaller decline in ROA post-JIT adoption; however, similar results did not
occur for total inventory. Balakrishnan et al. (1996) analyzed returns for a period of three years
before adoption, the adoption year itself, and three years after adoption (four years, if available).
Furthermore, JIT-adopting firms that had a diffuse customer base had a superior ROA response
than those with a greater customer concentration (Balakrishnan et al. 1996).3 Firms with higher a
proportion of committed costs did not exhibit a smaller ROA response than firms with lower
proportions of committed costs at the time of JIT adoption, using the ratio of depreciation to
cost-of-sales as a measure of committed costs. Callen et al. (2000) criticized Balakrishnan et al.
(1996) for having categorized as JIT, companies that had implemented JIT practices in a minority
of their manufacturing business. In one example, a company that had three JIT plants and nine
non-JIT plants had been labeled as a JIT Company (Callen et al. 2000).

3

Customer concentration was characterized pursuant to then SFAS 14, Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise (FASB [1976]), later replaced by SFAS 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information (FASB [1997]).
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Contrary to Balakrishnan et al. (1996), Kinney and Wempe (2002) found that JITadopters improved their ROA performance relative to non-JIT companies. Profit margin
(income/sales), rather than asset turnover (sales/average total assets), was the primary source of
the ROA improvement (Kinney and Wempe 2002). Smaller JIT-adopting companies did not
experience improved financial performance, thereby, somewhat reconciling the Kinney and
Wempe (2002) study with Balakrishnan et al. (1996), the latter of which largely examined small
public companies. Relative to their non-adopting counterparts, JIT-adopters: (a) enjoyed an
inventory-turnover increase six to eight times greater than that of non-adopters; (b) reduced
inventory-to-total assets more substantially than did non-adopters; and (c) improved both the
profit-margin and asset-turnover components of ROA. Kinney and Wempe (2002), which
included 201 matched pairs of public companies for the years from 1977 to 1995, compared
financial-performance changes from a three-year pre-adoption period to a three-year postadoption period. On average, JIT-adopters improved ROA relative to non-adopters. This relation
did not vary with the concentration of the adopters' customer bases (Kinney and Wempe 2002).
Huson and Nanda (1995) found that JIT adoption led to an increase in earnings per share.
After the adoption of just-in-time manufacturing, inventory turnover increased by almost 24%.
Analysis of financial statements showed that even though manufacturing costs per unit increased
after JIT adoption, this increase was offset by a reduction in interest expenses and other
financing costs previously needed to service larger inventory levels. There was also a significant
reduction in employees per sales dollar. The study, which included 55 JIT companies – but not
non-JIT companies – for the years from 1977 to 1992, compared companies’ financial
performance for the four-year pre-adoption period to the four-year post-adoption period (or 1992,
whichever was earlier). Like they did to the Balakrishnan et al. (1996) study, Callen et al. (2000)
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also criticized Huson and Nanda (1995) for their failure to “limit their sample to firms composed
entirely or even primarily of JIT plants.”
Fullerton et al. (2003) analyzed the effects of the degree of JIT implementation, overall
and over time, for three measures of profitability: return on assets, return on sales, and cash-flow
margin. 4 Fullerton found a positive relationship between firm profitability and the degree to
which waste-reducing production practices had been implemented, including reduced setup
times, preventative maintenance programs, and a uniform workload. Survey responses provided
the measures for a company’s degree of JIT implementation, which broke down 10 JIT factors
into three categories: JIT-manufacturing (6), JIT-quality (2), and JIT-unique (2). The degree of
JIT implementation revolved around the implementation of 10 practices: focused factory, group
technology, reduced setup times, total productive maintenance, multi-function employees,
uniform workload, kanban, JIT purchasing, total quality control, and quality circles. Companies
that had implemented a higher degree of JIT-manufacturing practices had significantly higher
ROA post-JIT adoption compared to pre-JIT adoption. Beyond that, evidence did not support the
proposition that the degree of JIT-manufacturing practice implementation affected long-term
financial returns. Due to their higher implementation costs, the benefits of JIT practices were
realized only over time. Results suggested that there were improved returns for JIT-unique
investments over time (post-adoption year 3), even for a modest implementation. Although a
negative relationship to profit existed for firms that implemented higher degrees of JIT-unique
practices, results suggested an improvement from significantly lower pre-adoption profitability

4

To test profitability over time, the self-identified JIT companies had to have financial data available for two years
prior to JIT adoption and three years after adoption. This limitation reduced the number of JIT companies from 95
to 54. Cash-flow margin equaled income net of extraordinary items, depreciation, and amortization ÷ sales.
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levels. Furthermore, the lower inventory levels had a significant effect on ROA and ROS, but not
on cash-flow margin.
Biggert and Gargeya (2002) found that the respective ratios of total inventory to sales and
raw-material inventory to sales had decreased post-JIT adoption, but no comparison was made to
non-JIT companies. However, no statistically significant change occurred for the respective
ratios of work-in-process inventory to sales or finished-goods inventory to sales. The study,
which included 74 predominantly very large companies during the period from 1975 to 1995,
compared the differences between two sets of two-year averages for the inventory-to-sales ratios
– years one and two compared to years six and seven.
Using a non-parametric technique of data-envelopment analysis (DEA), an application of
linear programming, Boyd et al. (2006) found that there were improvements to net sales,
EBITDA, EBT, and net income after lean-systems implementation.5 Improvement came in the
first year after implementation with further improvement coming in the following year.
Comparing the pre-adoption years with all three post-adoption years, the results were significant
at α = 0.10. When comparing the pre-adoption years to just years 2 and 3 post-adoption,
however, the results were significant at α = 0.01 for all variables except gross profit. The study
was limited to 18 survey-identified, lean-adopting companies and focused on the lean-adoption
year, the two years pre-adoption, and the three years post-adoption.
Comparing two single years of data to one another – 1984 (pre-adoption) and 1990 (postadoption) – Chang and Lee (1995) found that there were no significant differences in
performance between JIT companies and non-JIT companies in: (a) sales per employee; (b)
operating profit margin; or (c) return on investment. Although the sample of non-JIT companies
5

Since DEA disallows negative values, all negative values for EBT and cash flows were adjusted upward by a constant sufficient to make the lowest value slightly positive.
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had better pre-adoption performance for each of finished-goods, raw-materials, and work-inprocess inventory turnovers than their non-JIT counterparts, the JIT companies improved in each
of the respective inventory turnovers relative to the non-JIT companies. The study matched 44
pairs of survey-identified JIT companies and non-JIT companies; however, the sales and revenue
volumes of the JIT companies were much larger than those of the non-JIT companies.
Using a single year’s data (1990) from privately owned, Toronto-centric, manufacturing
plants from two industries, Callen et al. (2000) found that JIT manufacturing at the plant level
(i.e., as opposed to at the company level) was associated with greater productivity, inventory
usage, lower total costs, and higher profits.6 The success of JIT plants was found to have been
related to the length of their experience with JIT manufacturing, process quality, and leanness. In
order to have been classified as JIT, the plant had to have employed a global JIT philosophy.
Production managers classified their plant as JIT or non-JIT based on a narrow definition that
emphasized the stockless-production aspect of JIT (or the ideal of zero inventories). Then, JIT
plant managers were asked the extent of the plant’s use of each of 17 JIT techniques on 5-point
Likert scales. Both a minimum sum of 51 total points and a plant's using two thirds of the 17 JIT
techniques at least half the time were required for a final JIT classification. The final sample
consisted of 60 JIT and 40 non-JIT plants. JIT plants utilized significantly less work-in-process
inventory and finished-goods inventory in comparison to non-JIT companies. Unlike work-inprocess inventory, experience with JIT showed no significant impact on finished-goods
inventory. JIT plants were significantly more profitable than non-JIT plants, as measured by
profit margin and contribution margin. Plants that had adopted JIT earlier were significantly

6

Eighty-five percent of the plants had adopted JIT in the three years prior to 1990, with over 46% adopting JIT in
1988.
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more profitable than those that had adopted JIT more closely in time to 1990, the single year
examined.
Mia (2000) found an interaction between a company’s JIT adoption and its provision of
management-accounting-system (MAS) information to managers upon the company’s ROI
(calculated as the previous one year’s EBT ÷ total assets). The final sample of this Australian
study compared 28 JIT and 27 non-JIT survey participants. The measure on the provision of
MAS information to managers was the aggregate score collected on four personal-interview
questions, answered on seven-point Likert scales, regarding performance targets, actual
performance, and performance benchmarking.
Howton et al. (2000) found that while the market reacted positively to JIT adoption (in
terms of expected changes in cash flows), analysts did not react to the JIT-adoption
announcement (in terms of expected changes in earnings). 7 The results were not entirely
consistent with either the costly-capital hypothesis or the change-in-inventory-accounting
hypothesis.8 It is noteworthy that the authors: (a) characterized JIT as having a large up-front
expenditure, which is not necessarily true for a lean transformation; and (b) stated that firms that
had been using LIFO-inventory accounting at the time of JIT was adopted should have
experienced an increase in short-term earnings as a result of the costing of cheaper layers of
inventory, which would not necessarily be true of manufacturing companies (i.e., due to a
manufacturer’s having to expense previously capitalized fixed overhead cost when inventory
manufactured in a previous period is sold in a subsequent period).
7

One-year earnings revisions were shown to be directly related to the firms’ LIFO reserves. Abnormal current-year,
following-year, and five-year growth forecast revisions were dependent variables. The announcement day standardized abnormal return and the inventory measure based on the firm's LIFO reserve were explanatory variables. Control variables were the average ROI three years before JIT adoption and the change in ROI from three years prior to
three years after JIT adoption.
8

The authors stated that if JIT adoption was viewed simply as an inventory-accounting change, the market should
react neutrally and analysts should have a neutral-to-positive reaction to the announcement.
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Using a single year of financial data, 2001, Fullerton and Wempe (2009) found that the
utilization of non-financial performance measures (NFPM) was positively associated with return
on sales. Further, the extent of utilization of NFPM mediated the association between financial
performance and the implementation of the lean-manufacturing activities of setup-time
reduction, cellular manufacturing, and quality improvement. The authors suggested that this
finding sheds light on the inconsistent results of prior studies that examine the relationships
between financial performance and lean strategies without considering the corresponding
alignment of NFMP measures. The mediating effect for the quality-improvement lean activity
was supported at α = 0.10. The respective direct relationships between both setup-time reduction
and profitability and cellular manufacturing and profitability were significant when no NFPM
variable was included in regression-based tests. There was no direct relationship between quality
improvement and profitability. The study used data provided by 121 US manufacturing
executives that had been identified from a 1997 questionnaire.

Brief Management-Accounting History
Management-accounting systems can be traced back to the early nineteenth century
(Johnson and Kaplan p. xx). Before then, almost all business exchanges took place between an
owner and individuals who were not a part of that business organization, including raw-material
suppliers, piecework labor (i.e., not long-term employees), and customers. That is, all
transactions were external to the business. Hierarchical organizations as we know them did not
yet exist (Johnson and Kaplan p. 6). The Industrial Revolution saw the proliferation of
companies trying to achieve economies of scale. Nineteenth-century businesses not only
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committed significant capital to production, but also hired workers on a long-term basis (Johnson
and Kaplan p. 6 – 7).
With the development of hierarchical businesses, a need arose for those businesses to
determine the price of output from internal processes. Previously, it had been easy for a business
to determine if it had collected more cash from sales to customers than it had paid to the external
suppliers of the basic production inputs of contract labor and material. The Industrial Revolution,
however, created significant overhead costs that now needed to be factored into companies’ cost
calculations (Johnson and Kaplan p. 6). Furthermore, the inventions of the railroad and the
telegraph provided additional opportunities, including the acquisition of raw materials and the
distribution of products over vastly larger geographical areas (Johnson and Kaplan p. 8). Processtype industries – particularly textiles, steel, transportation, and distribution – drove the
development of management accounting. However, “these organizations really had to do only
one activity well: convert raw materials into a single final product such as cloth or steel, move
passengers or freight, or resell purchased goods (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 9).”
Previously, if owners and creditors had needed periodic financial statements, those could
be produced. At that time, management and financial accounting systems operated independently
of one another (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 9). There were few to no demands for external
financial reporting (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. xx). “Unit costs were calculated to aid
managerial decisions…not to produce external financial statements. Therefore, there was little
demand for having the unit cost information be ‘consistent’ with the books of transactions used
to prepare summary financial statements (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 10).”
The early twentieth century saw substantial growth of multi-activity, diversified
corporations. To improve management accounting and control, senior managers of Du Pont
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developed operating and budgeting methods, most notably the return-on-investment (ROI)
measure (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 10 – 11).
The decentralized, multidivisional corporation developed to
capture economies of scope - the gains from sharing common
organizational functions across a broad spectrum of products… It
was no longer possible for the corporate-level departments of
marketing, purchasing, and finance to have the requisite
information to function effectively or efficiently in all the markets
served by their organization. Decentralization was necessary. Each
operating division required its own staff functions to support its
activities. Thus, central managers were now in the position of
providing capital to diverse operating units and attempting to
coordinate, motivate, and evaluate the performance of their
divisional managers (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 11 – 12).
Thereafter, a stagnation in management-accounting occurred that can be attributed to the
dominance of the external financial accounting statements. Publicly traded corporations
proliferated as did the demand for audited financial statements (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 13).
Sixty years of literature emerged advocating the separation of costs
into fixed and variable components for making good product
decisions and for controlling costs. This literature, very persuasive
when illustrated in the simple one-product settings used by
academic economists and accountants, never fully addressed the
question of where fixed costs came from and how these costs
needed to be covered by each of the products in the corporations'
repertoire. Nor did the academic researchers attempt to implement
their ideas in the environment of actual organizations, with
hundreds or thousands of products and with complex, multistage
production processes (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 15).
Whereas until the 1920s, corporate managers almost exclusively had relied on information about
the processes, transactions, and events (i.e., management-accounting information), by the 1960s
and 1970s, managers commonly relied on financial-accounting numbers alone (Johnson and
Kaplan 1987 p. 125 – 126). Technological advances notwithstanding, most of the substantive
management-accounting practices still used in the late twentieth century already had been
developed by 1925 (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 12). These management-accounting practices
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included: cost accounts for labor, material, and overhead; budgets for cash, income, and capital;
flexible budgets, sales forecasts, standard costs, variance analysis, transfer prices, and divisional
performance measures (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 12).
In the early 1980s, quality, again, became a major focus for U.S. manufacturers. Japanese
manufacturers were making products of significantly higher quality than their American
counterparts. Japanese manufacturing “secrets” were (re)introduced to American industry,
including “statistical process control to reduce variation, quality at source instead of inspection,
PDCA (plan, do, check, act) problem solving, design for manufacture, and certified suppliers
delivering on time with zero defects (Maskell 2009 p. 2).”
At first, US manufacturers believed that the inroads being made in
their traditional markets by foreign, particularly Japanese,
manufacturers could be attributed to lower overseas wage costs.
Only with some delay did they recognize the onset of a revolution
in manufacturing operations. The revolution was triggered by
innovative practices developed by Japanese manufacturers during
the 1970s and by the availability of new technology that greatly
reduced the direct labor content of manufactured goods. Leading
the revolution were new practices emphasizing total quality
control, just-in-time inventory systems, and computer-integratedmanufacturing systems (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 210).
Compared to American manufacturers, these Japanese competitors introduced new
products faster, were more responsive to their customers, had shorter lead times (i.e., from order
to delivery) and much lower costs. To return to competitiveness, American (and European)
manufacturers implemented lean-manufacturing techniques: “short cycle times, small batches,
[machine] changeovers of less than 10 minutes, cellular manufacturing, synchronized production
flow, kanban, and low, low inventories.” These techniques were a substantial departure from
what had become traditional batch-and-queue manufacturing (Maskell 2009 p. 2). In addition to
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these changes, American manufacturers began to understand that traditional costing methods that
had not changed substantively in over half a century were no longer appropriate.
The patterns of product costs had changed over the years as
technology, production methods, and the market had changed.
Studies showed that the standard product costs generated by the
cost accountants were misleading and wrong. There were
fundamental flaws in the tried-and-true accounting practices
(Maskell 2009 p. 3).

Lean Operations and Accounting
Value
A Lean company focuses primarily on value creation rather than cost reduction. When a
traditional organization focuses primarily on cost, it can continue to do the wrong things more
efficiently or inflict irreparable injury upon itself through across-the-board mandated cuts (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 143). Value is defined not only from the perspective of the ultimate customer,
but also it is expressed in terms of a specific product or service that meets the customer's needs at
a specific price at a specific time (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 16). It is hard to define value
correctly since most companies want to continue to produce what they already are producing and
a lot of customers do not know enough to ask for more than a limited variant of the product or
service that they already are receiving.
They simply start in the wrong place and end up at the wrong
destination. Then, when providers or customers do decide to
rethink value, they often fall back on simple formulas – lower cost,
increase product variety through customization, instant delivery –
rather than jointly analyzing value and challenging old definitions
to see what's really needed (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 31)

Everything that a company does is a process. Although traditional business organizations
manage themselves through functional departments, an organization's processes frequently cross
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many departmental barriers (Maskell 2009 p. 119). To improve its processes, a Lean company
identifies and eliminates the wasteful activities that are entrenched within the processes (Maskell
2009 p. 35). In Japanese, the term, muda, means waste. Muda is “any human activity which
absorbs resources but creates no value” (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 15). All business activities
can be classified in one of three categories: (a) value-added; (b) non-value added, but required;
and (c) non-value added, not required (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 46). A value-added
activity transforms a product or service toward what a customer wants or needs. Value-added
activities include sales activities and the manufacturing of a product and/or the performance of a
service for a customer (Maskell 2009 p. 123). A Lean company strives to eliminate its non-valueadded activities and to improve its value-added activities, including by eliminating the nonvalue-added elements of value-added activities (Maskell 2009 p. 125). Initially, Lean companies
should focus on eliminating the non-value-added activities, rather than improving the valueadded activities. Since a manufacturing company spends substantially more time on non-valueadded activities, a focus on the elimination of non-value-added activities has a much more
significant impact on the enterprise as a whole (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 123).
Waste occurs in every process that an organization performs (Cunningham and Fiume
2003 p. 70). Wasteful actions, however, do not contribute to the transformation of a given
product and/or service (Maskell 2009 p. 124). Waste consists of:
mistakes which require rectification, production of items no one
wants so that inventories and remaindered goods pile up,
processing steps which aren't actually needed, movement of
employees and transport of goods from one place to another
without any purpose, groups of people in a downstream activity
standing around waiting because an upstream activity has not
delivered on time, and goods and services which don't meet the
needs of the customer (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 15).
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Toyota identified seven major types of wastes that exist in commercial processes. These
wastes apply not only to manufacturing processes, but also to product development, order taking,
and office processes:
1. Overproduction. Producing items for which there are no orders,
which generates such wastes as overstaffing and storage and
transportation costs because of excess inventory.
2. Waiting (time on hand). Workers merely serving to watch an
automated machine or having to stand around waiting for the
next processing step, tool, supply, part, etc., or just plain having
no work because of stockouts, lot processing delays, equipment
downtime, and capacity bottlenecks.
3. Unnecessary transport or conveyance. Carrying work in process
(WIP) long distances, creating inefficient transport, or moving
materials, parts, or finished goods into or out of storage or
between processes.
4. Overprocessing or incorrect processing. Taking unneeded steps
to process the parts. Inefficiently processing due to poor tool
and product design, causing unnecessary motion and producing
defects. Waste is generated when providing higher-quality
products than is necessary.
5. Excess inventory. Excess raw material, WIP, or finished goods
causing longer lead times, obsolescence, damaged goods,
transportation and storage costs, and delay. Also, extra inventory
hides problems such as production imbalances, late deliveries
from suppliers, defects, equipment downtime, and long setup
times.
6. Unnecessary movement. Any wasted motion employees have to
perform during the course of their work, such as looking for,
reaching for, or stacking parts, tools, etc. Also, walking is waste.
7. Defects. Production of defective parts or correction. Repair or
rework, scrap, replacement production, and inspection mean
wasteful handling, time, and effort (Liker 2004 p. 28 – 29).
Liker identified another waste: “Unused employee creativity. Losing time, ideas, skills,
improvements, and learning opportunities by not engaging or listening to your employees (Liker
2004 p. 28).”
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The most significant waste is overproduction (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 37). The
obvious consequences of overproduction are excess inventory and the money tied up therein.
Overproduction, however, has other significant negative costs, including those for storage of
excess inventory, as well as and the people and equipment necessary to handle, sort, and rework
it. Overproduction of a given product also causes shortages of other items, since processes are
kept busy making the wrong things, requiring the use of extra operators and equipment capacity.
Furthermore, overproduction lengthens lead times, thereby impairing an organization’s flexibility
to respond to its customers (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 37).
In addition to muda (waste), Lean companies strive to reduce two additional operational
situations that inhibit productivity. In Japanese, the terms are muri and mura. Muri is the
overburdening of people beyond their natural limits – resulting in safety and quality problems –
or the overburdening of equipment, causing breakdowns and defects (Liker 2004 p. 114). Muri
leads to stress, mistakes, rework, and poor morale (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 34). Mura is
unevenness in production levels – whether externally or internally driven – that is due either to
there being more work than people or machines can handle, or alternatively, not enough work.
Mura causes an organization to keep on hand the equipment, materials, and workers necessary to
perform at its highest production level, even if the organization’s typical production level is
much lower (Liker 2004 p. 114). Reduction of variability (mura) can be achieved through proper
market selection, product design, and pricing. Reduction of overburden (muri) can be achieved
through implementing flow, quality, and standardized work into processes, cross-training
employees, and balancing resources (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 36). By reducing overburden (muri)
and variability/unevenness (mura), a Lean company levels its production and frees-up capacity,
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giving workers greater opportunities to eliminate waste and continuously improve value streams
(Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 36).9
In his book Office Kaizen, William Lareau refers to easily seen wastes as surface
wastes. 10 Lareau warns that surface wastes create a large blind spot for management who
mistakenly believe that they are addressing serious underlying problems when instead they are
grabbing the low-hanging fruit (Lareau 2003 p. 12). Particularly in an office setting, significant
waste can hide beneath the surface. Examples of significant wastes include: requirements for
superfluous approvals, delays of responses to phone or electronic mail inquiries, having multiple
people performing the same work on different systems (perhaps even with different data), poorly
run meetings, and employees working without direction (Lareau 2003 p. 20). Lareau described
four categories of surface wastes: (a) people wastes, the failure to harness the potential within
work groups; (b) process wastes, poor process design and execution; (c) information waste,
resulting from less than optimum information; and (d) asset waste, poor utilization of material
and property (Lareau 2003 p. 21 – 37). Specifically, Lareau identified 26 specific subcategories
of waste:
People Wastes: goal alignment waste; assignment waste; waiting
waste; motion waste; processing waste. Process Wastes: control
waste; variability waste; tampering waste; strategic waste;
reliability waste; standardization waste; sub-optimization waste;
9

Even technological improvements that were accepted and implemented throughout American industry contributed
to waste. The computerized Material Requirements Planning systems (MRP) that were introduced to U.S.
manufacturers in the 1970s are one example: "MRP had a number of problems. If even one part was not properly
logged into the system as it proceeded from one production station to the next, errors began to accumulate that
played havoc with the reorder ‘triggers’ telling a department when to switch over to the next type of part. As a result,
downstream manufacturing operations often had too many parts (the muda of overproduction) or too few parts to
meet production schedule (producing the muda of waiting)…MRP systems which were very simple in concept
therefore became exceedingly complex in practice… In the end, most MRP applications were better than manual
systems, but they operated day-to-day at a level of performance far below what was theoretically possible and what
had been widely expected when MRP was first introduced (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 57 – 58)."
10

Office Kaizen is a service mark of the Kaufman Consulting Group, LLC.
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scheduling waste; work-around waste; uneven flow waste;
checking waste; error waste. Information Waste: translation waste;
missing information waste; hand-off waste; irrelevancy waste;
inaccuracy waste. Asset Waste: inventory waste; work-in-process
waste; fixed asset waste; moving things waste (Lareau 2003 p. 21 –
37).
Whether or not they are aware of it, all customers pay for a significant amount of waste
(Lareau 2003 p. 139). Although they may not identify it as waste, many workers accept wasteful
activities as the normal business practice. In order to eliminate waste, a Lean company must
change its culture by not only admitting that all processes contain waste, but also by putting the
appropriate tools in place to identify and allow employees to eliminate it (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 45). Conceptually, value-added activities are those for which customers would be
willing to pay, if they knew about the activity. Alternatively, customers would find a product or
service to be less valuable if the activity were not performed. Businesses have a tendency to
misclassify most of their non-value-added activities as required activities. If a “requirement” to
perform an activity is internal to a business, it is likely to be a changeable policy rather than a
necessity. Even external “requirements” may be changeable (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p.
46). Once an enterprise removes the non-value-added and not-required activities from its
processes, it can work to improve the non-value-added-but-required steps through the use of
flow, pull, and perfection techniques (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 38). Through the elimination of
all forms of waste, Lean companies can become time-based competitors (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 8).
A critical task in specifying value is the determination of target costs that are based on the
resources available and the effort required to make a product (or provide a service) of a given
specification, if all the currently visible waste were to be removed from the process (Womack
and Jones 2003 p. 35). Lean companies determine target costs for products, sub-assemblies,
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processes, and materials. The establishment of target costs then leads to the “development of
action plans and continuous improvement initiatives designed to change the company's products
and processes to meet or exceed the customer's requirements for additional value (Maskell and
Baggaley 2004 p. 20).” This process requires a collective effort from all value-stream areas –
including, marketing, sales, design, production, engineering, and purchasing – focusing
everybody upon the creation of customer value (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 20). If a company
achieves success in their lean transformation, its target costs should be far below its competitors’
costs, thereby allowing a Lean company to:
reduce prices (another way to increase sales volume and utilize
freed-up resources); add features or capabilities to the product
(which should also increase sales); add services of the physical
product to create additional value (and jobs); expand the
distribution and service network (again increasing sales, although
with a time lag); or take profits to underwrite new products (which
will increase sales in the longer term) (Womack and Jones 2003 p.
35 – 36).
Traditional companies, however, typically determine target selling prices based on what they
believe the market will bear and then work backwards to determine what costs would ensure an
adequate profit margin (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 35).

Value Streams
Every product that has a customer also has a value stream (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 91).
A value stream consists of all of the processes necessary to bring a product and/or service from
its concept to the ultimate customer throughout its life cycle. In a production context, a process is
a series of actions that bring about an end or a result (Maskell 2009 p. 120). Complex processes
involve many functional areas of a business. Through a process, inputs are transformed into
output. Maskell identified eight mechanisms, or the eight Ms, that can be applied to inputs to
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create an output: machines; material; manpower; methods; measurement; maintenance;
management; and money (Maskell 2009 p. 121). Naturally, one’s first image of converting an
input into an output might be the conversion of a raw-material input into a finished-product
output. An input, however, could be a product idea or a sales order, and the corresponding output
a product design or a customer invoice (Maskell 2009 p. 120).
There are two primary categories of value streams: (1) order-fulfillment value streams;
and (2) new-product-development value streams. An order-fulfillment value stream follows the
flow of material through the production and distribution processes: “from the sales process,
through customer service, to configuration, to purchasing, to production (together with all the
processes supporting production, like maintenance, quality, materials handling, etc.), to shipping,
to installation, to invoicing, and finally to cash collection (Maskell 2009 p. 73).” A new-productdevelopment value stream follows the flow of information required to design and launch new
products: “from the identification of customer or market needs, through the understanding of
those needs and the value of the new product, to the design and testing of the product, to the
introduction of the product into the market (Maskell 2009 p. 73 – 74).”
Businesses have both internal and external customers (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 33). In
fact, a product or service might have several internal customers before it ever reaches an external
customer. A value-stream perspective is a holistic perspective. Instead of locally optimizing the
performance of individual processes, a value-stream perspective focuses on improving the whole
(Rother and Shook 2009 p. 1). A Lean company continually seeks to improve the quality of its
products and services. It achieves this through a detailed understanding of its processes, coupled
with the continuous elimination of waste within those processes. In defining their value streams,
Lean companies stop looking at aggregate activities. Instead, Lean companies focus on all of the
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specific actions required to produce specific products, as well as how they interact. Upon doing
so, Lean companies then can confront those actions that do not create or optimize value, whether
individually or in combination with one another (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 44). To save cost, a
Lean company’s management and employees must have committed focus upon process
improvement, zero defects, and customer satisfaction. Maskell refers to this focus as a step of
faith. Through taking care of the right things, the costs will take care of themselves. Costs should
not be ignored, but rather have a lower relative priority than quality and customer service
(Maskell 2009 p. 88).
Value-stream analysis exposes waste, but also requires changed behavior from both
management and employees (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 91). To best understand an enterprise’s
value streams, one physically should walk the actual path of the flow of material and/or
information and calculate the time and distance traveled (Liker 2004 p. 29 – 30). Gemba is the
Japanese term for “real or actual place.” In a Lean company, gemba or gemba walking
emphasizes the need for management and/or office personnel to leave the comfort of their office
or workspace to see how internal and/or external customers are using the company’s products or
services. Personal observation is critical (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 42). To be effective, the
practice of gemba-walking should begin with top management and then work its way down
through the organization once management learns enough to teach others (Mann 2010 p. 124).
Learning through gemba walking requires patience and tolerance
for frustration. It is not fast. One of the main ways of learning is
from experience as you work to make the corrections and
refinements you find necessary…as you try new things. There is
no good alternative to gemba walks as the method to learn lean
management. That is because lean management is a mindset, and
mindsets necessarily change and develop over time through
personal experience (Mann 2010 p. 125).
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To facilitate its lean transformation, a Lean company continually prepares value-stream
maps. Value-stream mapping is a detailed flowcharting technique that uses symbols to depict
both the flow of material and the flow of information as a product and/or service makes its way
through a value stream. Through the mapping methodology, an enterprise quantifies its wastes,
both of time and of quality (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 37). It pays particular attention to cycle
times, lead times, and queues (Lareau 2003 p. 118) – where flow is stopped and material or
information inventory accumulates and waits to be processed (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 16).
Information flow is treated with equal importance as material flow (Rother and Shook 2009 p.
3).
[Companies should] immediately form teams to rethink the value
stream and flow of value for every product in the plant, and then
every step in order-taking and product development… Lineup
essential activities required to design, order, and manufacture…and
perform them in sequence, one machine, one design, one order at a
time. Batches, queues, backflows, and waste – muda of all sorts would be banished. The value stream - the irreducible minimum
set of activities needed to design, order, and make a [product] would flow smoothly, continuously, and rapidly (Womack and
Jones 2003 p. 112).
In value-stream mapping, a Lean company first carefully draws a current-state map of
every process in both the material and information flows. Then, it draws a future-state map based
upon data-supported predictions on the improvements that will yield the greatest results (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 40).11 The future-state map is derived from the current-state map (Bell and
Orzen 2011 p. 40). Physical production processes, administrative processes involving the
movement of documents, and logical processes performed by computers and people all should be
11

For each process step, Womack and Jones suggest that managers ask: “Does the step create value for the customer? Is the step capable? (That is, does it produce a good result every time?) Is available? (That is, can it produce the
desired output, not just the desired quality, every time?) Is it flexible? (Can it be changed over quickly from one
product to the next so that items can be produced in small lots or even lots of one?) Is capacity for the step adequate
so the product doesn't need to wait on the process? Or is there too much capacity (due to designing equipment in
large increments of capacity based on demand forecasts that are often wrong)?” Womack and Jones 2003 p. 316
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mapped (Maskell 2009 p. 127). The more complex a value stream, the more functional areas it
crosses. Accordingly, accurate and practical value-stream maps require input from each of the
people involved (Maskell 2009 p. 125). Value-stream mapping forces a Lean company’s
employees to become aware of each other’s needs and constraints, as well as the enterprise’s
future path, which by the nature of lean, may necessitate frequent modification (Womack and
Jones 2003 p. 326).
A future-state vision should include: (a) work centers aligned with the value streams to
support (as near as possible) one-piece flow; (b) cross-functional, co-located teams to avoid
handoffs; (c) quality built into processes, rather than inspection of output after the fact; (d)
standardized and clearly documented work to be performed for a given process; (e) elimination
of redundant systems; and (f) visual displays and controls to make work status easy to see and
understand (Liker 2004 p. 281 – 282). As once future-state value streams become a reality, a
Lean company continually draws new future-state maps (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 7). Futurestate maps should be designed so as to eliminate the sources of the waste within the value
stream. Ad hoc teams improve processes to achieve the lean goals of service to its customers,
trimming costs, reducing cycle times, and eliminating quality problems (Maskell 2009 p. 134).
Root cause analysis of waste and value-stream problems is critical to process improvement
(Maskell 2009 p. 134). A Lean company seeks to build a production sequence whereby the
individual processes not only are linked to their customers, but produce only what their
customers need when they need it, or as close to that goal as possible (Rother and Shook 2009 p.
49).
Well-drawn maps alone, however, are not enough. There needs to be an implementable
plan and an individual with the responsibility and authority for managing, improving, and
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perfecting the value stream. 12 It is important for companies striving to achieve a lean
transformation not make the mistake of delegating the process of value-stream mapping to
managers of various areas with the intention of later stitching together separately created maps of
individual company segments. Lean companies do not map their organization. Instead, they map
the flow of products through the organization (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 6). Furthermore, it is
important for a company striving for a lean transformation not to specify value stream that
consists of either too small or too large a part of the company’s products or services. Recall that
value streams typically are made up of groups of products or services (i.e., families) that share
common processes. A good rule is that a value stream should neither represent less than ten
percent nor greater than 60 percent of a company’s output. Frequently, Lean companies have two
or three primary value streams and one value stream for the remainder of the output (Maskell and
Baggaley 2004 p. 108).

Flow
After an enterprise has implemented the first two lean principles, precisely specifying
value by product/service from the customer’s perspective and identifying the value streams
(through value-stream mapping and waste-elimination techniques), a Lean company strives to
make the remaining value-creating steps flow (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 21). Flow is a
particularly challenging lean principle because it is counterintuitive to the ways most managers
and employees have been educated or trained.
12

"We found overwhelming acceptance of this [value-stream mapping] tool across the world and we now find many
managers with beautiful Current State maps and with equally beautiful Future State maps indicating the potential for
major leaps in performance. But, when we take a walk along the value stream, there is no actual Future State. The
promised leap in performance has never occurred or has been achieved to only a fraction of the extent
possible…And this is the great problem: usually there is no real plan, or at least no implementable plan, because no
one has the responsibility. There is no value stream manager to perfect the process (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 319
– 320).”
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According to the cost-accounting rules that everybody has used in
the past, we’re supposed to balance capacity with demand first,
then try to maintain the flow…But instead, we shouldn't be trying
to balance capacity at all; we need excess capacity. The rule we
should be following is to balance the flow with demand, not the
capacity (Goldratt p. 259).13
In creating flow, Lean companies link together operations that otherwise are disjointed, thereby
increasing teamwork, rapid feedback on quality problems, control over processes, and pressure
for people to solve problems (Liker 2004 p. 101). Flow is the continuous development of the
materials, services, and information for a value stream. A value stream that has not achieved flow
experiences interruptions, delays, rework, and increased costs (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 29).
Whether it is in the form of materials, services, or information, work-in-process inventory
“causes congestion, confusion, and delays; hides problems; must be managed and tracked; often
becomes obsolete; and is often reworked or discarded.” In turn, this causes additional
interruptions, delays, rework, and cost (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 29). Traditional businesses hide
problems with inefficient processes and high inventories. In contrast, Lean companies (through
the creation of flow) “lower the water level” and expose inefficiencies that demand immediate
solutions (Liker 2004 p. 88).
Any activity within the creation, ordering, or provision functions for any product or
service can be made to flow by lining up all of the essential steps with no wasted motions,
stoppages, expediting, batches, or queues (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 51, 61). To achieve
continuous flow, a Lean company must ensure that every machine and every worker be
13

Although Goldratt’s book, The Goal: a Process of Ongoing Improvement, is a novel – and thus its messages are
delivered from the mouths of fictional characters – its introduction of the Theory of Constraints has made great contributions to both manufacturing and cost-accounting thought.
Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints: “1. IDENTIFY the system's constraint(s). 2. Decide how to EXPLOIT the
constraint(s). 3. SUBORDINATE everything else to the above decision. 4. ELEVATE the system’s constraint(s). 5.
WARNING!!!! If, in a previous step, a constraint has been broken go back to step 1, but do not allow INERTIA to
cause a system's constraint (Goldratt p. 307).
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completely “capable.” In other words, every machine and every worker always must be ready to
run precisely when needed. Furthermore, every process must be performed exactly as it was
designed (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 60). With flow systems, Lean companies have an
everything-works-or-nothing-works mentality. Every worker in a production team should be
cross-trained in many tasks in case someone is absent or needed for another task (Womack and
Jones 2003 p. 60). Process steps are arranged in a sequence and typically organized within a
work cell. Products, services, and/or information moves from one step to the next with no buffer
of work-in-process in between.
Many traditionally massive machines should be replaced by “right-sized” machines that
frequently are simpler, less automated, and slower, but often are more accurate and repeatable.
Right-sized machines typically can be converted very quickly from one product specification to
the next (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 60). This approach necessitates having excellent tools and
equipment, as well as a maintenance system that keeps them in perfect condition and ready for
use (Maskell 2009 p. 44). Through empowerment and cross-training initiatives, total productive
maintenance (TPM) gives shop-floor operators the responsibility for machine, equipment, and
tooling maintenance. The maintenance department becomes responsible for training, coaching,
and handling the more complex and specialist repair tasks (Maskell 2009 p. 44).
Products, services, and/or information do not live in just one department. Instead, a
process must move through numerous functional areas, including for example, production,
engineering, purchasing, and accounting. A company that organizes itself by functional
department can cause delays each time that a value-stream process enters into a new functional
area (Liker 2004 p. 92). This is especially true where different value streams each have to cross
multiple functional departments and compete for shared resources. This causes backlogs,
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inventory build-up, confusion, interruptions, quality problems, cost overruns, and delays (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 152). Accordingly, Lean companies locate entire value-stream teams together.
A lean manufacturing cell is comprised of all of the personnel and equipment necessary to
produce a product, part, or subassembly, including the team leader, engineer, buyer, maintenance,
and the operators (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 63).
The goal of continuous flow is to eliminate any and all stoppages in a complete
production process (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 61). Machine changeovers that stop production
and machines that run at rates far outside of the remaining production sequence create waste
(Womack and Jones 2003 p. 61). Another lean goal is the elimination of production expediting.
To achieve these goals, a Lean company produces according to takt time (Womack and Jones
2003 p. 55). In order to produce to takt time – the optimum cycle time – Lean companies take
great pains to plan and organize their production layout and cellular-manufacturing teams
(Maskell 2009 p. 40). In German, takt means rhythm or meter. Takt time precisely synchronizes
the rate of production (i.e., cycle time) to the rate of sales to customers at a given point in time
(Womack and Jones 2003 p. 55). If an enterprise produces faster than takt time, it will
overproduce. If it produces slower than takt time, it will create at least one bottleneck (Liker
2004 p. 94). As the volume of customer orders increases or decreases over time, takt time is
adjusted so that production always is synchronized with customer demand (Womack and Jones
2003 p. 56). Takt time is calculated by dividing the daily per unit customer demand rate into the
available working time per day in seconds (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 38).
Some of the steps and effects of converting to cellular organization are:
Improved factory layouts also greatly reduced the need to hold and
move large quantities of inventory. Grouping machines according
to expected sequence of operations, rather than the traditional
grouping according to similarity of function, reduced a product's
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total travel distance (incoming materials to finished goods
shipment) from several miles to several hundred yards, an orderof-magnitude reduction (Johnson and Kaplan p. 215).
According to Maskell, a Lean company’s cellular organization offers the following advantages
over a traditional business’ functional department organization: (a) it eliminates the movement of
materials since all of the work is done within the relatively small area; (b) it reduces work-inprocess inventories since production is in small batches with short cycle times and minimal
inventory queues; (c) it creates teamwork due to the interdependency, responsibility, and
authority among the people; (d) it eliminates the complex recording of transactions since
materials are only in a cell for a short period of time and the production process is more
predictable; and (e) product quality is improved both due to the responsibility of the workers for
quality and the use of the product immediately by the next process, thereby resulting in
identification and immediate correction of problems without large numbers of reject product ever
being made (Maskell 2009 p. 39 – 40).
In continuous-flow manufacturing, a customer order triggers a company to obtain only
those raw materials needed. Workers immediately acquire the ordered components and then
assemble the order. The completed order then flows immediately to the customer (Liker 2004 p.
90). Implementing flow is essential to reducing the production time (from raw material to
finished good or service), which also leads to the achievement of the lean goals of highest
quality, lowest cost, and shortest delivery time (Liker 2004 p. 87). Flow also enables a just-intime response to customer requests, based on customer-demand signals. Workers are able to spot
and solve problems quickly. When production is stable, customer production and/or service
agreements can be promised and met consistently (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 104). The
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aspirational/theoretical goal for Lean companies (albeit not achievable by most companies) is
single-piece flow – a batch size of one (Liker 2004 p. 92). Among its benefits are that flow:
1. Builds in Quality. It is much easier to build in quality in one-piece
flow. Every operator is an inspector and works to fix any problems
in station before passing them on. But if defects do get missed and
passed on, they will be detected very quickly and the problem can
be immediately diagnosed and corrected.
2. Creates Real Flexibility. If we dedicate equipment to a product
line, we have less flexibility in scheduling it for other purposes.
The lead time to make product is very short, we have more
flexibility to respond and make with the customer really wants.
Instead of putting in new orders into the system and waiting weeks
to get that product out, if lead times are matter mere hours we can
fill a new order in a few hours. And changing over to a different
product mix to accommodate changes in customer demand can be
almost immediate.
3. Creates Higher Productivity. The reason it appears the productivity
is highest when your operation is organized by department is
because each department is measured by equipment utilization…In
a one-piece flow cell, there is very little non-value-added activity
like moving materials around. You quickly see who is too busy and
who is idle. It is easy to calculate the value-added work and then
figure out how many people are needed to reach a certain
production rate…
4. Frees up Floor Space. When equipment is organized by
department, there are a lot of bits of space between equipment that
are wasted, but most of the space is wasted by inventory - piles and
piles of it. In a cell, everything is pushed close together and there is
very little space wasted by inventory. By making greater use of the
floor space you often eliminate the need to build more capacity.
5. Improves Safety… Smaller batches meant getting rid
trucks, which are a major cause of accidents. It meant
moving smaller containers of material, so accidents
lifting went away. Safety was getting better because of
flow - even without focusing on safety.

of forklift
lifting and
related to
a focus on

6. Improves Morale… In one-piece flow, people do much more

value-added work and can immediately see the results of that
work, giving them both a sense of accomplishment and job
satisfaction.
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7. Reduces Cost of Inventory. You free up capital to invest elsewhere

when it's not invested in inventory sitting on the floor. And
companies do not have to pay the carrying costs of the capital they
free up. Also your inventory obsolescence goes down (Liker 2004
p. 95 – 96).

Standardized Work
After stabilizing a process, a Lean company standardizes it, and then continues to
simplify and improve it (Mann 2010 p. 27). Standardized work is simply a detailed description of
the most effective method to accomplish a task at any given time (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 42).
The implementation of standardized work is necessary to achieve continuous flow since all jobs
are linked directly, without buffers. Through its standardized work, a Lean company seeks to
produce a product (or provide a service) in accordance with cycle time and do it right the first
time, every time (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 113). Variation in work practices and procedures
causes undesired variation in time, quality, and cost (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 42). A value-stream
team decides upon the current standard to which they all agree to adhere. Through its
improvement process, a value-stream team seeks continuously to establish a newer version of the
standardized work (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 42). Toyota President Cho identified three elements
of standardized work: takt time, the sequence of processes, and the specific quantity of inventory
on hand that an individual worker needs to have in order to produce to standard (Liker 2004 p.
142).
It is important that the work be standardized by the value-stream team and not by a
remote, industrial-engineering team (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 60). A value-stream team knows
the intricacies of its processes and will be the ones charged with continually improving them.
Standardized work also helps to build-in quality. If a defect is discovered, the first inquiry should
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be whether or not the standardized work was followed. If standardized work has been followed,
but defects still occur, then the standardized work needs to be changed (Liker 2004 p. 142 –
143). In addition to standardized work for associates, leader standard-work provides supervisors
and management with clear expectations of their own performance (Mann 2010 p. 37). Leader
standard-work facilitates the stability and continuity of lean management during personnel
changes and either improves the management performance, or highlights those managers who
are not making the grade (Mann 2010 p. 38).

Pull
Cunningham and Fiume identify flow production and takt time as two of the three tenets
for eliminating waste. The third tenet, pull scheduling, means that a Lean company produces
only what the customer is buying right now, instead of producing to a long-range forecast
(Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 8). A process that cannot be made to flow by design should be
connected to a subsequent process (that does flow) through the use of a pull mechanism.
Through a customer-demand signal, a pull mechanism triggers work to be performed just-in-time
for the subsequent steps in the process (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 30).
In Japanese, kanban means sign, sign board, poster, billboard or card. In a Lean company,
a kanban is taken more broadly as a signal of some kind. For example, if a downstream process
sends an empty bin to an upstream process, it is a signal for the upstream process to refill the bin
with a specific number of parts (Liker 2004 p. 106 – 107). A pull system allows an upstream
process to receive accurate production instructions from a downstream process without having to
try to predict downstream demand and schedule upstream production (Rother and Shook 2009 p.
41). Implementing pull regulates work activity and eliminates the possibility of overproduction
(Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 30). Rather than pushing frequently unwanted products onto customers,
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a Lean company lets the customer pull the product as needed. Customer demand also becomes
more stable when customers know that they can get what they want when they want it.
Furthermore, producers can stop running promotions on unwanted inventory since significant
quantities do not accumulate (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 24).
“Supermarkets” on a factory floor supply a pull system. By locating supermarkets near a
supplying process, visual control of customer usage and requirements can be maintained.
Remember that a company has internal customers as well as external customers. When a
customer goes to its supplier's supermarket and withdraws what it needs, that withdrawal triggers
the supermarket to convey a kanban to the supplier process. The kanban is the sole production
instruction for that process (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 41). Although a kanban is usually a card,
it can be a container, a tote, or a square painted on the floor (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 36).
According to Bell and Orzen 2011, the kanban system has several purposes: (a) it triggers work
only when it is ordered by the customer; (b) it specifies the work to be done, both in description
and sequence; (c) it limits the amount of work-in-process inventory; (d) it buffers against
production interruptions by keeping a small, carefully measured safety stock (a supermarket);
and (e) it orchestrates the pace of work (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 104 – 105).

Heijunka (Level Scheduling)
Although Lean companies tend to do a good job of identifying and eliminating waste,
many organizations struggle with creating evenness in their production flow. In Lean companies,
evenness is created by the practice of level scheduling, or heijunka, in Japanese. Liker believes
that heijunka may be the Toyota Way's most counterintuitive principle. In order to eliminate muri
(overburden) and muda (waste), a Lean company needs to eliminate mura (variability or
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unevenness). But to eliminate mura, a Lean company needs to achieve heijunka (Liker 2004 p.
115). Heijunka levels both the production volume and the product mix. Instead of building
products in strict adherence to actual customer orders, a Lean company looks at the total volume
of orders for a short-term period, divides that by the available time, and then produces the same
quantity and mix each day (Liker 2004 p. 116).
Customer orders can vary dramatically from week to week and month to month.
Accordingly, an organization that follows a strict make-to-order model could produce large
quantities one week, incur significant overtime costs, and overburden workers and equipment,
but then have little to do the following week. This variation in customer orders can cause
organizations to overcompensate when ordering from vendors, which results in excess inventory
(materials, work-in-process, and finished goods), hidden problems, and poorer quality (Liker
2004 p. 113 – 114). Unevenness and overburden hinder quality, standardized work, productivity,
and continuous improvement (Liker 2004 p. 115). Level scheduling requires more frequent
equipment changeover; however, the overall benefits to a Lean company outweigh this localized
burden in the production cell (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 44). A common way to practice level
scheduling is through the use of a load-leveling (or heijunka) box that has a column of kanban
slots for each batch size and a row of kanban slots for each product type. The kanban indicates
both the quantity of product to be produced and the takt time to produce them. After having been
loaded into the box based on the desired product mix, the kanban are withdrawn and brought to
the “pacemaker” process one at a time, based on the batch size (Rother and Shook 2009 p. 47).
The causes of high WIP inventories are large batch sizes, long
cycle times, and production queues. Production queues are caused
by a lack of balance throughout the plant so that the next work
center is unavailable when a batch of product has been completed
in the previous work center… When production is synchronized
through the plant, the materials and products flow evenly through
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the production cells and never stop for a moment. The various cells
and activities within the cells are carefully planned so that there is
a similar cycle time at each step in the process. This
synchronization ensures that the material flows through the
production facility according to a fixed and planned “drum beat” or
takt time… This synchronization is achieved through careful
planning and cell design, and by heijunka scheduling to ensure
synchronization and level loads (Maskell 2009 p. 41 – 42).

Visual Controls
Kanban and heijunka are both examples of the lean technique of visual control. At a
glance, visual controls tell management and employees how work should be performed and
whether the work is deviating from its standard (Liker 2004 p. 152). Lean companies desire
prompt feedback on whether actual results differ from expected results. Remember that lean
operations focus on processes: stabilizing, standardizing, and improving them by repeatedly
exposing and eliminating problems. Visual controls provide quick status updates of the processes
and the problems within the processes (Mann 2010 p. 86). Both factory and office employees
perform better when they can see and understand what is going on. Accordingly, Lean companies
gather, report, and display cell-level and value-stream-level performance measurements on
highly visible boards right where the work is performed (Maskell 2009 p. 142). Furthermore,
having employees spend a few minutes per shift, or process cycle, recording performance data
can cost a Lean company substantially less in hardware, software, and support than an automated
data-collection system (Mann 2010 p. 83). Beyond the cost savings, operators that record
performance measurements in a timely manner are more involved in observing, analyzing, and
improving the value streams (Mann 2010 p. 83).
Frequently production personnel ignore computer-generated reports, even if they are
posted in work or common areas and particularly if the information is contained within tables or
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graphs. We tend to forget that it often takes a trained eye to understand information presented in
this format. Mann believes that the “fingerprint factor” is important. People are more likely to
read and interpret information that they helped to create than they would for impersonal,
computer-generated information, even if it had fancy graphics (Mann 2010 p. 81). Since office
work resides and moves hidden within the information-technology network, visual controls may
be even more critical for office processes (Mann 2010 p. 53). Office “misses,” actual results that
fall short of the standard, can be tracked just like production misses and, thereafter be the subject
of root-cause improvement analysis (Mann 2010 p. 111). Accordingly, it is important that
operators be involved either in the recording of performance measurements or working through
the measurements with their team leader (Mann 2010 p. 81).

Perfection
Lean thinking goes beyond its first four fundamental principles. It requires progressive
continuous improvement, root-cause analysis for problem solving, and an efficient response
thereto (Mann 2010 p. 163).
The four initial principles interact with each other in a virtuous
circle. Getting value to flow faster always exposes hidden muda in
the value stream. And the harder you pull, the more impediments
to flow are revealed so they can be removed (Womack and Jones
2003 p. 25).
Perfection, the fifth fundamental principle of lean thinking, is “the process of reducing effort,
time, space, cost and mistakes while offering a product which is evermore nearly what the
customer actually wants (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 25).” In pursuing perfection, a Lean
company recognizes that processes, standards, and value-stream maps are temporary. Change is
constant, and new ideas are sought continuously. All workers and management should see their
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respective jobs as having two inseparable components: daily work and daily improvement (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 22).
Our earnest advice to lean firms today is simple: to hell with your
competitors; compete against perfection by identifying all
activities that are muda and eliminating them. This is an absolute
rather than a relative standard which can provide the essential
North Star for any organization (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 49).
Quality-at-the-source is a lean goal. It means doing things right the first time, every time.
Higher quality does not come from having more inspectors. Work that does not meet the standard
is not sent on to the next process or ultimately, to the customer (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 27). Lean
companies instill with the people who do the job both the responsibility for quality and the
authority to effectuate change (Maskell 2009 p. 36 – 37).
In order to maximize the impact of their pursuit of perfection, Lean companies need to set
and follow timetables for their progress. Womack and Jones note that the biggest difference
between companies that have great success in a lean transformation and companies that have
accomplished very little is that successful companies set specific timetables by which to
accomplish difficult tasks and then routinely met or exceeded them. Unsuccessful companies on
the other hand “asked what would be reasonable for their current organization and disconnected
value streams to accomplish, and generally defeated themselves before they ever set out
(Womack and Jones 2003 p. 95).” In applying the lean technique of policy deployment (hoshin
kanri in Japanese), top management must agree on a few simple goals for transitioning from
traditional to lean production. That is, top management selects only a few projects at a time,
specifically identifies the people and resources that will achieve these goals, and importantly,
establishes quantitative improvement targets to be achieved within a specific time frame
(Womack and Jones 2003 p. 95). Furthermore, the most successful Lean companies learn how to
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deselect projects in order to align projects with available resources (Womack and Jones 2003 p.
97).

Kaizen
The principal means through which Lean companies perform continuous improvement
are kaizen activities. In Japanese, kai means little, ongoing, and good. Zen means both good and
“for the better” (Lareau 2003 p. 5). Kaizen is a systematic methodology whereby Lean
companies make many incremental improvements to their processes or value streams (Bell and
Orzen 2011 p. 40). Cunningham and Fiume refer to Lean as a game of singles, not of home runs
(Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 70). There are two broad categories of kaizen activities: system
(or flow) kaizen and process kaizen. System (or flow) kaizen – which management performs – is
a more holistic approach that focuses on improving overall value through improvement of both
material and information flows. Process kaizen – which individuals and value-stream teams
perform – focuses on reducing the waste in specific areas within a value stream (Bell and Orzen
2011 p. 40). Both system (flow) and process kaizen activities are necessary in a Lean company.
Improvement through one type of kaizen facilitates improvement through the other (Rother and
Shook 2009 p. 6). Regardless of the category, a kaizen has three phases: (a) preparation; (b) the
kaizen itself; and (c) sustaining the achievements and continuous improvement afterwards (Liker
2004 p. 276 - 277).
Using this methodology, a Lean company identifies a target process for improvement and
forms a small team of employees from several of the functional areas through which that target
process travels. A kaizen team includes the manager responsible for the target process, who
serves as the team leader, and several people from other functional areas who actually perform
the work within the process (i.e., not a bunch of managers). Liker recommends that the kaizen
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team include both customers and suppliers of the targeted process (Liker 2004 p. 276 – 277).
Liker has stated that a kaizen team should be limited to no more than 15 people (Liker 2004 p.
277). Mann believes that the composition usually should be seven or fewer persons, plus the
leader (Mann 2010 p. 172). Lareau believes in a range of 7±2 persons (Lareau 2003 p. 56). A
kaizen team focuses on the targeted process for a relatively short window of time – usually
between two and five days (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 10).
The results of kaizen activities are cumulative and gradual. Through kaizen activities,
Lean companies improve production flow, ease the physical demands upon their workers, reduce
inventory, shorten machine setup times, improve equipment, and increase quality (Mann 2010 p.
172). Examples of kaizen activities include:
Re-layout of work areas to facilitate one-piece flow; workplace
organization (5S and visual displays); creation of standard work
instructions; revision of corporate procedures; redesign forms and
documents; problem-solving activities to uncover root causes of
quality problems; specifications or even some changes for any
information technology required to support the improved process;
training people in the new process (Liker 2004 p. 282).
As with most lean tools and methodologies, kaizen activities do not need to be limited to the
factory. Office processes can benefit from kaizen activities, including those within: “human
resources; sales; purchasing; materials management; product design engineering; marketing;
contract; accounts payable/receivable; records/document administration; government affairs;
customer service; engineering support; research; software engineering; loan processing; order
entry; quality; sales support; legal; regulatory compliance (Lareau 2003 p. 6 – 7).”
A common lean technique is industrial housekeeping, also known as 5S. 5S improves an
enterprise’s efficiency and safety by promoting a clean and efficiently ordered workplace.
Through 5S, all plant employees are responsible for everyday cleaning, maintaining and
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inspecting all equipment, and systematically arranging all of the tools and materials necessary for
their respective jobs (Maskell 2009 p. 45). The purpose of industrial housekeeping is to eliminate
the wastes that contribute to errors, defects, and injuries. Like much of lean thinking, 5S has its
origins in Japan. In Japanese, the five S’s are: seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu, and shitsuke. Roughly
translated into English, the 5Ss are: sort, straighten, shine, standardize, and sustain (Liker 2004 p.
150).
1. Sort - Sort through items and keep only what is needed while
disposing of what is not.
2. Straighten (orderliness) – ‘A place for everything and everything
in its place.’
3. Shine (cleanliness) - The cleaning process often acts as a form of
inspection that exposes abnormal and pre-failure conditions that
could hurt quality or cause machine failure.
4. Standardize (create rules) – Develop systems and procedures to
maintain and monitor the first three S’s.
5. Sustain (self-discipline) - Maintaining the stabilized workplace
is an ongoing process of continuous improvement (Liker 2004 p.
150).
Not feeling compelled to translate five Japanese s-words into five English s-words,
Maskell describes 5S as the Japanese words for the five concepts of: organization, orderliness,
cleanliness, standardized cleanup, and discipline (Maskell 2009 p. 200 – 201).The fifth element
of 5S, sustain (or discipline), is similar the fifth fundamental lean principle, perfection. It also
may be the most difficult. To sustain its industrial housekeeping benefits, a Lean company needs
to train and reward its workers not only to maintain its progress, but to improve continuously
(Liker 2004 p. 36). As with much of lean operations, some of the reasons underlying industrial
housekeeping are grounded in industrial psychology. If their workspaces are well-organized and
supplied, employees work more effectively and efficiently. Safety is improved (Maskell 2009 p.
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201). Human beings respond better to visual information and 5S is another example of visual
control (Maskell 2009 p. 45 – 46).
There is also a psychological benefit to performing kaizen activities. Since kaizen are
visible to the workforce and can require a large commitment of time and resources, they send a
strong message to employees that change is expected (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 61).
Becoming a Lean company requires a change in culture. One type of process kaizen also known
as daily kaizen (or a kaizen blitz) is a spontaneous improvement activity performed by an
individual or a small group as a need is identified. The highest proportion of problem-solving in
a Lean company occurs as a result of daily kaizens (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 41). In addition to
kaizen (incremental improvement) activities, some Lean companies engage in strategic
breakthrough initiatives called kaikaku. Kaikaku activities, which strive for radical improvement,
are typically initiated by senior leadership (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 42).
Another common lean technique is the use of A3-sized piece of paper (11.69 x 16.54
inches or 297 x 420 millimeters) for root-cause analysis. A3 is an international standard (ISO)
paper size. The A does not stand for anything. There are 11 A paper sizes (A0 to A10), 11 B
paper sizes (B0 to B10), and even more C paper sizes. Each successive paper-size number is half
of the size of the previous number. For example, an A1-sized paper is half the size of an A0sized paper, and so forth. In Lean companies, A3 has come to mean much more than a paper size.
The A3 technique uses the scientific method for solving problems: observation, the development
of a tentative hypothesis of cause and effect, a prediction of results, testing, and evaluation (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 37). In business, some also refer to this as the Deming Cycle, or Plan-DoCheck-Act (PDCA). The A3-technique constrains people to using a single piece of paper to
communicate the definition, scope, discovery process, findings, proposed countermeasures, and

57

results of a problem. The implication being that if people need more than a single A3-sized piece
of paper to communicate the pertinent information, then they have not honed the information
down to only its essential elements (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 36 – 37). "Benefits from applying
A3 thinking include fact-based decision-making, consensus building, clearly documented
assumptions, defined targets, fast results, and follow-up to ensure that improvements are
sustained (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 37).” Lean companies should begin with only a handful of
lean tools, sharpen their process-improvement skills, and then learn and apply additional tools, as
needed (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 36).
Frequently, the most difficult step in a lean transformation is simply getting started.
You'll need a change agent [typically an outsider] plus the core of
lean knowledge (not necessarily from the same person), some type
of crisis to serve as a lever for change, a map of your value
streams, and a determination to kaikaku quickly to your valuecreating activities in order to produce rapid results which your
organization can't ignore (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 247).
It is often best to start a lean transformation with an activity that is very important to the
company, but which is performing poorly. “That way, you can't afford to fail, the potential for
improvements is very large, and you will find yourself drawing on resources and strengths you
didn't know you had in order to ensure success (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 253)." Furthermore,
it is critical in a lean transformation not only to produce some dramatic results quickly, but to do
so in an area that is visible to everyone in the company (usually in a production area). Then once
the first round of improvements has been achieved, the company should focus on linking the
different parts of the value stream for a family of products or services (Womack and Jones 2003
p. 254).
The amount of human effort, time, space, tools, and inventories
needed to design and provide a given service or good can typically
be cut in half very quickly, and steady progress can be maintained
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from this point onward to cut inputs in half again within a few
years (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 52).

Partnerships
Lean companies see their customers and suppliers as business partners so much so that
they include these third-party organizations in value-stream, process-improvement, and wasteelimination planning and activities (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 21). To produce high-quality
products just-in-time with no significant inventory, a Lean company needs to receive its raw
materials and components just-in-time for production. Accordingly, it is beneficial for a Lean
company to develop close relationships with a limited number of suppliers, who will work
together with the company for mutual benefit instead of as adversaries trying to outwit each
other (Maskell 2009 p. 46 – 47).
Vendor single-source privileges for certain items and vendor-certification programs that
establish strict requirements are among the means for building partnership relationships.
Certified suppliers can deliver directly to the factory floor, bypassing inspection and receiving
and eliminating the corresponding non-value-added invoicing and receipt transactions (Maskell
2009 p. 47). The elimination of non-value-added activities is fundamental to lean operations.
Visual controls in the plant eliminate what otherwise would be more formal, time-consuming,
and costly control transactions. Similarly, reliable daily delivery of high-quality materials by
certified suppliers eliminates additional quality-control and inspection transactions. Control then
occurs on the shop floor when and where the transactions are initiated. Control is built into the
production process, rather than waiting to inspect products after significant production costs
already have been incurred (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 88). Partnerships that extend beyond

59

the four walls of the enterprise are especially important in an environment where businesses are
outsourcing more and insourcing less (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 21).14
Businesses need to have a relationship orientation, as opposed to a transaction
orientation. To Johnson, a sale is simply one moment in a (hopefully lengthy) buyer-seller
relationship, not just a one-time moment of truth. Relationships involve time. The connection
neither begins nor ends when the sale is made. In fact, it can intensify after the sale (Johnson
1992 p. 76). By seizing the opportunities to learn and inform that exist in every customer
encounter, Lean companies can create a relationship advantage in the market and turn customers
into loyal advocates (Johnson 1992 p. 81). A commitment to building customer loyalty requires
not only an underlying belief that profits will result from finding, satisfying and keeping loyal,
recurring customers, but also by focusing every process toward those goals and ensuring that all
employees understand how their work contributes to the achievement of those goals (Johnson
1992 p. 75). While it is critical to attract new customers, more resources should be spent on
drawing existing customers back again and again. Numerous studies show that it costs five to ten
times as much to attract a new customer as it does to keep an existing one. Furthermore, the costs
of displeasing an existing customer can go beyond simply the loss of that customer, but also
include that customer’s driving away other potential customers (Johnson 1992 p. 86).

Freed Capacity
The implementation of lean principles frees up large amounts of resources that can be
used for other value-creating activities. Lean companies that empower their employees to
eliminate waste and continuously improve processes should not as a consequence, terminate
employees when they free-up capacity. Otherwise, a lean initiative will be short-lived.
14

This is not to suggest that lean thinking encourages the practice of outsourcing.
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Employees will not commit to improvement projects if the result will be their termination or that
of their friends (Maskell 2009 p. 107). “The reluctance to ensure employment is a major barrier
to successfully implementing lean, and amounts to an admission by senior managers that they
cannot grow the business fast enough to absorb significant productivity gains (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 115).”
If they are to defend their employees and find the best economic
use for their assets as they strike out on a new path, they need to
find more sales right now. Beginning with a better specification of
value can often provide the means (Womack and Jones 2003 p.
35).
By eliminating recently freed-up resources, an organization also forfeits significant
potential benefits that could result from using those resources in more creative and profitable
ways (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 315). Instead of terminating employees, immediate
responses to freed-up manpower include reducing overtime, cutting the work week for everyone,
and/or employing the freed-up workers on kaizen teams (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 140). A
Lean company also can in-source some components from marginal suppliers with whom it
otherwise would have discontinued business (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 140). Ideally, a Lean
company can increase its revenues by producing and selling new products or services (Maskell
2009 p. 107). If freed capacity – both in manpower and machines – can be used elsewhere, the
only additional costs incurred for new sales will be those for variable costs, most significantly,
materials. Labor – although treated as a variable cost by many businesses (and accounting
academics) – is actually a fixed cost for most businesses. Accordingly, there is no incremental
labor cost for new sales (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 68 – 69).
That being said, lean proponents estimate that roughly ten percent of the management in
a company striving for a lean transformation will be unwilling, or flat out will refuse, to adapt to
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the lean methodology. In lean circles, these people have been referred to as “anchor draggers”
and “concrete heads.” They are the exception to the guaranteed employment of a lean
transformation. “They are poison. It is bad enough to try to change an organization with all the
normal mistakes that well-intentioned people make. Allowing a ‘concrete head’ to remain makes
the journey 10 times more difficult (Lareau 2003 p. 146).”
Lean thinking is profoundly corrosive of hierarchy and some
people just don't seem to be able to make the adjustment. It's
essential that these anchor-draggers find some other place to work
- after all, there's still plenty of hierarchy on the world - or the
whole campaign will fail (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 132 quoting
Art Byrne of the Wiremold Company).

Office Processes
Although office processes do not involve the physical transformation of products, lean
concepts should not be confined to the plant (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 8). In office
processes, the progression of work typically cannot be seen (Mann 2010 p. 107). People work at
computers, on the telephone, and in conference rooms. They move about from task to task.
Projects can vary greatly in size, complexity, number of people, and lead time. There may be
hundreds, if not thousands, of activities or transactions (Liker 2004 p. 270 – 271). Office
processes cross many internal functional boundaries, have competing priorities, and frequently
do not have specialized performance measurements or budgets (Mann 2010 p. 115).
In office (and service) processes, waste typically is information waiting in queues for
someone to act upon it. A lack of coordination between processes causes batches of information
and other inventory to build up before being moved along to the next process where it may sit
and wait again. Information inventory is often more difficult to determine and quantify than
tangible inventory (Liker 2004 p. 271). Office work-in-process inventory is comprised of paper
62

and electronic documents, including electronic mail. Similar to tangible inventory, the more
office work-in-process inventory there is, the less it flows and the more slowly it is finished (Bell
and Orzen 2011 p. 29). Approximately half of office time is spent on non-value-added activities,
including rework, correction of errors, requesting information, seeking clarifications, waiting for
authorization, or waiting for responses (Mann 2010 p. 107). Although the value-stream mapping
of office (and service) processes presents some different challenges than the mapping of
production processes, a similar methodology can be used to make an information-flow map
(Liker 2004 p. 275 – 276).
The overwhelming majority of office processes has an internal customer (or a series of
internal customers) and does not touch an external customer directly. Most office and
administrative workers have no direct contact with external customers. If external customers do
not complain, substantial quantities of waste can remain hidden within internal processes.
Accordingly, big potential savings are also hidden within those internal processes (Lareau 2003
p. 139 – 140). Similar to mapping production processes, office- (and service-) process mapping
starts with defining value from the customer’s perspective and then mapping the processes that
add value for the customer (Liker 2004 p. 270 – 271).

Lean Accounting
"Lean accounting applies the principles of lean thinking (value, value streams, flow, pull,
empowerment, perfection) to the accounting processes themselves (Maskell and Baggaley 2004
p. 19).” As an enterprise progresses in its lean implementation, all categories of inventory – raw
materials, work-in-process, and finished goods – should decrease dramatically (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 87). When a manufacturing company significantly reduces inventory, however, it
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also decreases the profits reported under traditional financial accounting with absorption costing
of inventory. That is, when finished-goods inventory is reduced significantly, that portion of
inventory is “de-capitalized” from the balance sheet to the income statement as cost of goods
sold (an expense), which in turn reduces the reported profits (Maskell 2009 p. 24). Unfortunately
for both lean operations and managerial accounting in general, traditional financial-accounting
methods frequently will show negative results when good things actually are occurring.
When lean pilots are introduced, it is unusual to see significant
improvement to the company's financial reports. There can be
some inventory reduction that leads to beneficial cash flow
improvement, but this often takes some time to be realized. There
is rarely any short-term improvement in cost or profitability, and,
almost always, lean changes have a negative impact on the major
financial variance reports… It is important in the early stages of
the lean implementation to calculate the financial benefits of the
changes being made. Most companies make the mistake of trying
to identify the financial benefits of lean changes using the old mass
production measurements… This inevitably leads to conflict and
wrong decisions (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 16).
Due in large part to the external financial and tax reporting authorities that mandate U.S.
accounting practices, including the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), management
accounting has become subservient to financial accounting and reporting (Johnson and Kaplan p.
198). Accordingly, corporate management fundamentally needs to comprehend that traditional
financial-accounting statements – with absorption costing of inventory and standard-cost,
variance-analysis reports – are not designed to address lean issues (Maskell 2009 p. 24). The
measurement of factory variances comparing actual cost versus standard cost detrimentally
focuses an organization on maximizing the efficiency of individual resources (local optimums) at
the expense of the enterprise as a whole. "We must not seek to optimize every resource in the
system… A system of local optimums is not an optimum system at all; it is a very inefficient
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system (Goldratt p. 211).” Accordingly, variance-analysis reports need to be eliminated as early
as possible in a lean transformation (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 83).
Traditional accounting practices provide a misleading understanding of a product’s cost
and can lead corporate management to make incorrect decisions on critical issues, such as
whether to make or buy a component, the profitability of sales orders, and the rationalization of
products or customers (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 2). Production cost, however, is an
estimate that is dependent upon the allocation method used (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p.
101). When standard cost accounting was established in the early twentieth century, the
breakdown of a typical manufacturer’s production cost was approximately 30 percent for
materials, 60 percent for direct labor, and 10 percent for manufacturing overhead (Cunningham
and Fiume 2003 p. 87). Since overhead cost was proportionally small compared to direct labor
cost (1:6 in that example), the practice of allocating overhead as a function of direct labor
typically did not create a significant product-cost distortion. Today, however, a manufacturer
might have a cost structure that is 60 percent for materials, 10 percent for direct labor, and 30
percent for overhead (3:1, overhead to direct labor). For other capital-intensive manufacturers,
the overhead-labor disparity may be even more dramatically lopsided toward overhead, even as
high as 10:1 (Johnson and Kaplan p. 188). Under such a structure, traditional allocation methods
lead to potentially significant product-cost distortions (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 87).
When organizations use direct-labor hours (or machine hours) to allocate overhead, they
often create enormous cross-subsidies between products (Johnson and Kaplan p. 2). That is,
companies systematically over-cost high-volume, commodity-type products that are massproduced using older labor-intensive technologies. Conversely, companies systematically undercost low-volume, custom-made products that use more expensive equipment and require more
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design, scheduling, and rework, but that do not have a proportionally high direct-labor content
(Johnson 1992 p. 143). These cost distortions cancel each other out at the company level – since
they do not affect reported total income or assets directly. These cost distortions, however, can
lead to inappropriate organizational actions, including both: (a) the abandonment of incorrectly
over-costed, commodity-type product lines (i.e., that if properly costed, would reveal their
profitability); and (b) a focus upon incorrectly under-costed, high-tech product lines (Johnson
1992 p. 143). For most companies, however, accounting reports arrive too late to be of practical
use. This is especially true where a problematic job order was completed in the early part of a
month, but the financial reports were completed weeks after the end of the month. In those
circumstances, it is virtually impossible to perform root-cause analysis on the conditions that
created a standard-costing variance, much less to take successful remedial action (Cunningham
and Fiume 2003 p. 92).15
According to Johnson, many American and European manufacturers that continued to
follow traditional overhead-allocation practices (i.e., despite the dramatic product-cost
composition changes), not only experienced depressed earnings, but many times, “generated a
‘death spiral’ that led companies to the edge of bankruptcy” (Johnson 1992 p. 143). Often,
companies believe that costs will be lower if they outsource the production of parts or
components (often overseas). Frequently misunderstood, however, is that much of overhead cost
is not driven by direct-labor hours (Johnson and Kaplan p. 189). Overhead costs actually tend to
increase with subcontracting due to the increased demands placed upon the purchasing,
scheduling, receiving and inspection, materials-handling, and accounts-payable departments.

15

Companies that perform lot identification, such as the pharmaceutical industry, are better able to perform rootcause analysis after-the-fact (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 92).
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Subcontracting imposes additional demands on the purchasing
department to generate specifications for the components and
investigate qualified vendors; on the scheduling department to
provide delivery schedules to the vendor; and the receiving and
inspection department to process incoming items; and materials
handling departments to place purchased components into storage
and bring them out to production when needed; and on the
accounts payable department to pay the vendor (Johnson and
Kaplan p. 189).
A purchased component has no direct-labor content. Accordingly, these additional overhead
costs that are incurred frequently are not traced to the purchased component, but instead are
shifted onto other non-outsourced, labor-intensive products (Johnson and Kaplan p. 189).
Since traditional financial accounting and a significant amount of traditional cost
accounting practice are not appropriate for lean operations, it is critical that Lean companies
implement lean accounting practices, including value-stream costing. Proponents of lean
manufacturing and lean accounting believe that it is more important for management to
understand the profitability of a portfolio of related products rather than the profitability or unit
cost of individual products (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 101).
The routine decisions related to quoting, profitability, make/buy,
sourcing, product “rationalization,” and so forth are best made by
looking at the impact on the value-stream as a whole, rather than
the individual product. The value-stream statements will give you
accurate information about what will happen financially as you
make changes to revenues, material costs, employee costs,
machine cost, and other operations costs. And this information is
calculated in simple and understandable ways (Maskell 2009 p.
111).
Similar to value-stream mapping, which facilitates the elimination of non-value-added
operations, value-stream costing facilitates the elimination of non-value-added productioncontrol, inventory, and product-costing transactions (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 17). In
value-stream costing, there is no allocation of indirect product costs (overhead) to activities or
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job orders. Instead, all costs are treated as direct costs of a specific value stream (to the extent
possible). Only those indirect product costs (including indirect labor, rent, and utilities) that
easily can be identified and traced to multiple value streams are treated as shared costs (Bell and
Orzen 2011 p. 142). All production wages, machinery, outside processing costs, and supplies
should be assigned directly to a value stream. Any other cost should be assigned to an
administration and overhead category (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 221). A Lean company
need not make a distinction between direct and indirect costs. All costs other than those for
materials are classified as “conversion costs,” which costs are identified by value stream.
Through value-stream costing, a Lean company can produce “plain-English” financial
statements that address lean issues.
The income statements are largely cash-based and show the
financial information in a way that is straightforward and clear.
Anyone in the company would be able to understand these income
statements and use them for controlling costs, reducing costs, and
making decisions. They involve none of the opaque accounting
methods like standard costs, variances, or absorption (Maskell
2009 p. 101 – 102).
The value-stream P & L does not include changes in inventory level when calculating valuestream profit, since Lean companies want to provide the proper motivation for value-stream
teams. Reductions in inventory from selling a greater number of units than were produced for a
given period of time will show higher profits and lower average unit costs, whereas increases in
inventory over a period will show the opposite (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 144). Of course,
detailed information is recorded in the books of original entry, including the cash receipts,
disbursements, payroll, purchases, and sales journals, as well as the asset and liability ledgers
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 221 – 222).
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For lean accounting to work, it is critical that lean processes be stable and under control.
Maskell and Baggaley refer to this as a chicken-and-egg situation. Lean accounting both requires
and enables lean operations. Accordingly, lean accounting needs to be implemented in parallel
with the implementation of lean operations (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 13). Lean operations
enhance controls. Therefore, the implementation of lean operations eliminates the need for many
traditional accounting processes, including standard costing (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 13).
The introduction of lean methods brings inventory levels down and
creates short production cycle times. The kanbans, the pull system,
the standardized work, and the performance measurements create
operational control. It is not necessary to have separate financial
control, because the operational control has been built into the
process, and detailed inventory records are no longer necessary
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 13).
The financial information generated by value-stream costing supports sound business decisions
consistent with lean operations (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 142). It may be necessary for a newly
Lean company to perform a limited parallel run of traditional financial accounting practices and
lean accounting changes. For that limited period of time, additional work will be necessary to run
the old and the new systems. It is critical that the parallel run be short, purposeful, and carefully
planned (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 311). If the parallel run continues for any length of time,
however, it will undermine the lean transformation as many employees will continue to rely on
the old familiar information (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 311).

Box Scores
Maskell and Baggaley have developed a three-dimensional way to present operating
performance, financial performance, and value stream’s resource utilization in one report – the
box score – thereby enabling managers to plan and evaluate lean results (Maskell and Baggaley
2004 p. 52). The box score has three categories of data listed down the left-hand margin:
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operational, resource capacity, and financial (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 53). “In the
operational section, six items of data are included to monitor the value-stream's performance and
drive continuous improvement”: dock-to-dock days; first time through; on-time shipment; floor
space; sales per person; and average cost per unit (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 55, 105). The
resource-capacity section reports the breakdown of the respective productive, non-productive,
and available capacity of both workers and machines used in the value-stream production cells
(Maskell 2009 p. 105, 109). "Five items make up the financial data to be included in the box
score. These are the items that are most often the concern of both accounting and finance and the
senior officers of the company": inventory value; revenues; materials costs; conversion costs;
and value stream profit (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 57 – 58).
Usually the box score reports weekly information, as well as several weeks of prior
history (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 138). Also, a box score can present information in terms
of four columns: (1) current state (“the status of the items measured prior to completion of any
planned initiatives”); (2) future state (“the status of measured items if the planned initiatives
provide the expected benefits; usually the time horizon is six months or less”); (3) change from
the current state (“the difference between the current and future states”); and (4) long-term future
state (“an estimate of the business benefits that are expected to accrue over the long term”)
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 54, 59).

Performance Measurements
"If you measure the right things, people will do the right things. Traditional measures
measure the wrong things for companies striving toward a lean transformation (Maskell 2009 p.
139).” It is critical for lean accountants and executives to ensure that measurements are aligned
with company goals. “Experience teaches us that when goals are set, people will do whatever
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they can to achieve the target, even if it results in dysfunctional behavior (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 38).” Measures should be simple and limited to the most important aspects of the
business, instead of combining many aspects into a single measurement. Complex measures only
serve to confuse people (Maskell 2009 p. 144). For example, the ubiquitous and often the
dominant business measurement, return on investment (ROI), attempts “to capture many
complex and interrelated events, thus creating one monster of a metric that few people can relate
to their daily activities (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 40)." Lean companies do not use too
many measures. Traditional production companies, however, measure too much; they work on
the false assumption that more measuring creates more control. Instead, overuse of
measurements creates confusion and lack of focus (Maskell 2009 p. 145).
[The] seven common, deadly sins of performance measures
(paraphrased below): 1. Measuring only what you are good at; 2.
Measuring departmental process, not the entire process; 3.
Measuring corporate goals, not customer satisfaction; 4. Not
investing adequate effort to determine what should be measured; 5.
Measuring only small pieces of the process; 6. Not considering the
impact of measurements on behavior; 7. Not taking measurements
seriously (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 85 quoting Michael Hammer).
"Many short-term measures are appropriate for motivating and evaluating managerial
performance. It is unlikely, however, that monthly or quarterly profits, especially when based on
the practices mandated and used for external constituencies, would be one of them (Johnson and
Kaplan p. 3).” Instead a company should utilize a variety of nonfinancial indicators that are
focused upon achieving the company's strategies (Johnson and Kaplan p. 256).16 Lean companies

16

“The company emphasizing quality could measure internal-failure indicators - scrap, rework, part-per-million
defect rates, unscheduled machine downtime - and external-failure indicators - customer complaints, warranty
expenses, and service calls...
Measures that support this [just-in-time production and delivery] objective include average set-up times, throughput
times, lead times, and average number of days’ production in inventory. Other measures of success in a more
responsive manufacturing system are average distance traveled by products in the factory and percentage of delivery
commitments met each period…
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should incorporate measurements at least three different company levels (if not four, depending
on the size of the company): (1) the production-cell level; (2) the value-stream level; and (3) the
plant-level and/or the company-level (if separate, the latter would be a fourth level) (Maskell and
Baggaley 2004 p. 8). Cell-level measurements focus on the daily activity of the operations
people. They are tracked visually and often hourly (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 8). Cell-level
performance is measured in both the production cells and those non-production departments that
support production cells. These cell-level measurements “reflect the primary issues of lean
thinking: making to takt time, standardized work, flow, and pull (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p.
15 – 16).”
Lean measures for manufacturing performance should adhere to
the following principles: Principle 1: Measures should encourage
desired behavior by the front lines. Principle 2: Measures should
provide information for senior managers to make decisions.
Principle 3: Principle 1 takes precedence over Principle 2 (Rother
and Shook 2009 p. 89).

Transaction Elimination
Lean companies seek to eliminate complex and wasteful processes from their operations
(Maskell 2009 p. 3). Financial accounting processes contain a significant amount of waste, much
of which can be removed in the early stages of a lean transformation (Maskell and Baggaley
2004 p. 17).
Traditional accounting systems are expensive and complex to
operate. They require a lot of recording of data, entry of data,
validation and checking of data, as well as analysis of reports and

Measures such as absenteeism, turnover, recruiting success, morale, skills, and promote ability seem to be relevant
for evaluating trends in the organization's human resources…[Safety] indicators include number of consecutive days
without an injury or accident and number of workdays lost due to accidents (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p. 256 –
258)."
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results. The production, distribution, and clerical support staffs are
forever filling out forms, typing in data, and reviewing reports…
Couple these problems with the dubious assignment of overhead
costs and the complex, time-wasting, and spurious variance
reporting, and you have a system that is an appalling burden to
organization (Maskell 2009 p. 70).
Budgeting, inventory valuation, labor reporting, accounts payable, and cost accounting are
among the most complex and wasteful processes and systems (Maskell 2009 p. 4). "Transactions
are to lean accounting as inventory is to lean manufacturing.” They are pure waste (Maskell and
Baggaley 2004 p. 77). Companies transitioning to lean operations may find that their transaction
volumes initially increase, since vendor deliveries, production batches, and customer shipments
occur more frequently, but in smaller lots. Purchase orders, receiving reports, vendor invoices,
work orders, batch tickets, shipping documents, and customer invoices are among the
transactions that initially could see volume increases (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 77).
One significant transaction-reduction technique is the elimination of detailed job-step
tracking on work orders through tracking only the starts and completions of jobs (and none of the
steps in between). Previously, work orders were important costing documents that traveled
throughout the entire production process and on which an organization recorded the labor
incurred in each production step. As an enterprise progresses in its lean transformation, causing
shorter production lead times, very low work-in-process inventories, and predictable production
cycle-times, it can calculate its product costs by production flow rather than by the resources
added to an individual product (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 82). If there is operational control
of the steps in between, tracking the starts and stops is sufficient to calculate product cost
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 83). Furthermore, after implementation of cellular
manufacturing, it can eliminate from work orders the detailed posting of materials used (Maskell
and Baggaley 2004 p. 84).
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Another transaction-laden, time-consuming accounting process is the accounts payable
three-way match, which consists of the inspection of vendor invoices and matching them with
the corresponding purchase orders and receiving reports. Lean proponents suggest that there is
no need for an accounts payable department at all. Consistent with the Pareto principle, strict
vendor certification programs can build-in control for as much as 80 percent of total dollar
purchases. The remaining 20 percent of purchases likely are comprised of the vendors that create
the greatest number of transactions, including purchase orders, approvals, invoices, receiving
reports, and three-way matches, most of which can be eliminated by authorizing key employees
to make purchases with company credit cards. When a Lean company has close working
relationships with a small number of vendors that deliver the correct quantity of high-quality
items directly to the lean cells on a daily basis, invoices become unnecessary. A Lean company
can eliminate vendor invoices by paying for materials contemporaneously with their use through
an electronic transfer of funds. Invoices now represent the materials used for one day’s
production. Using the backflushing technique, payment amounts can be determined from bills of
materials (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 90 – 91).
Similar to accounts payable, a Lean company strives to simplify its accounts receivable
by eliminating transactions and building-in controls. It can seek to become a certified vendor to
key customers. Invoicing can occur automatically with shipment. Where a Lean company has
been designated as a certified vendor, it can encourage invoice elimination through automated
wire transfer receipts from customers and the use of shipping information to post to accounts
receivable (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 92).
Yet another complex, transaction-intensive accounting function is the monthly closing of
the books to create financial statements. The length and complexity of an organization’s closing
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process increases with the number of its functional departments and the size of its chart of
accounts. Charts of accounts typically grow over time, but rarely shrink again, even if the
reason(s) for having certain accounts have been satisfied. Similarly, internal reporting
“requirements” also tend to grow over time, even if the manager who previously required them
has moved on (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 92 – 93). A substantial amount of unnecessary
time – waste – is spent by traditional organizations maintaining accounts and preparing reports
that do not benefit the organization as a whole (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 93). Accordingly,
Maskell and Baggaley recommend that a Lean company dramatically reduce the number of
general-ledger accounts, specifically eliminating all accounts below the value stream level (by
plant). Furthermore, a move to a cash-basis of accounting eliminates the need for end-of-period
accruals and allocations (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 218 – 219).
Maskell and Baggaley further recommend that inventory accounting be eliminated.
Instead, a Lean company simply can record an end-of-period adjustment to account for changes
in the value of inventory (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 223). To convert from cash-basis
income (for internal, management purposes) to accrual-basis income (for external, financialreporting purposes in accordance with GAAP), a Lean company needs only to make a simple
inventory adjustment. The change in units in each value stream from the beginning of the period
to the end is multiplied by the average cost per unit manufactured in its respective value stream
(Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p. 223). Mature Lean companies have only one or two weeks of
work-in-process inventory on hand that requires direct labor/overhead allocations. At a macro
level, direct labor and overhead are relatively easy to estimate for a monthly adjusting journal
entry (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 102). Even if this estimated adjustment were wrong by an
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entire week, it still may not be a significant financial-reporting misstatement (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 102).
[In a mature lean company], we no longer need to report or
backflush the labor and overhead costs... As companies progress
with lean manufacturing, they replace the work orders with kanban
and other pull systems to authorize and control production. At this
point, product-oriented costing using standard costing can be
replaced by a process-oriented method called value stream costing.
When value stream costing is introduced, we can stop backflushing
the labor and overhead costs. They are no longer needed because
costs are not collected by production job; they are collected for the
value stream as a whole. Thus, very few transactions are required
to support value stream costing (Maskell and Baggaley 2004 p.
133).

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles/Audited Financial Statements
None of the lean accounting practices discussed herein violates generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Recall that the four basic tenets of accounting are materiality,
conservatism,17 consistency,18 and matching (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 29 – 30).
Materiality is where precision and accuracy get confused.
Precision is nailing the answer down to the third decimal point.
Accuracy is the answer that is correct for the decision you're trying
to make... When defining materiality, ask if you would change the
business decision you're about to make if you knew the answer to
the question within plus or minus 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10
percent? This will tell you materiality threshold for that issue, and
where the borderline is between precision and accuracy
(Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 32).

17

"In plain language, conservatism means that you should not over-emphasize the good news or under-emphasize
the bad news. Anticipate your losses but not your gains (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 32).”
18

"Consistency guides us to present facts in the same manner each time they occur. By presenting or reporting them
consistently, the trends presented over time will have meaning because they are based on a common method of presenting similar facts. It is all about providing information that is helpful to interpret the situation” (Cunningham and
Fiume 2003 p. 34).
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With respect to the matching principle, all manufacturing costs must be recognized as an expense
(cost of goods sold) in the month that the corresponding revenue is recognized. Costs of
materials, labor, and manufacturing overhead are kept on the balance sheet as inventory until the
products are sold – which can be months later, even the next fiscal year. However, as lead times
shrink and products are made and shipped within the same month, Lean companies can simplify
their accounting procedures. In such circumstances, Lean companies can expense these costs
directly as they occur while still complying with the matching principle (Cunningham and Fiume
2003 p. 35).
Another initial concern that companies have with lean accounting is the acceptance of
their procedures by their external auditors. However, the standard unqualified audit opinion uses
phrases such as “free of material misstatement,” “assessing significant estimates,” and “presents
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company.” These statements
acknowledge that financial-statement items, including inventories, are based on estimates and
also give recognition to the materiality principle (Cunningham and Fiume 2003 p. 101 – 102).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The focus of this study was whether Lean companies experienced better results on
various financial-performance measures than Non-Lean companies did. Recall that the four
classifications of hypotheses were: (1) three return/profit measures; (2) three cash-flow
measures; (3) six working-capital measures; and (4) five inventory measures. Each of the
hypothesis compared Lean companies to Non-Lean companies by using individual company
averages for a given financial-performance measure for three fiscal years of data: 2008, 2009,
and 2010. For 16 of the 17 hypotheses, the study also compared the Lean companies to NonLean companies by examining the financial-performance measures for each of the three fiscal
years studied. Hypothesis 2c, the financing-assets ratio, was tested only through the three-year
average of the financial data. It was excluded from the individual-years analysis since the metric
is appropriate only for those companies that were in an investing position, as opposed to a
disinvesting position, and companies can fluctuate between investing and disinvesting positions
year to year. Due to the lengthy period of time that lean transformations take, companies that
were in the earliest stages of their respective lean transformations were not included in this study.
"Three years is about the minimum time required to put the rudiments of the lean system fully in
place and two more years may be required to teach enough employees to see so that the system
becomes self-sustaining (Womack and Jones 2003 p. 148)." Accordingly, no company was
classified as a Lean company for the purposes of this study if it had not publicly articulated its
adoption of lean operations by fiscal year 2008 in a 10-k annual report.
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Matched-Pairs Design
The study used a matched-pairs design. Matched-pairs designs are appropriate where the
sample size is relatively small and heterogeneous for the dependent variable (here, the various
financial-performance measures). “In the matching design, we are trying to make each pair of
participants as though they were the same participant by matching on a criterion relevant to the
dependent variable (Gliner and Morgan 2000 p. 186).” Since financial-performance accounting
ratios vary systematically by industry and firm size, each Lean company was matched with a
Non-Lean company on two measures: (a) their four-digit SIC code; and (b) company size, based
on total assets for the three-year period. Choice-based and matched-pairs samples are not random
samples. Accordingly, it is necessary to perform different statistical analysis upon them than
would be appropriate for random samples, so that results can be generalized to the larger
populations (Cram et al. 2007). Matched-pairs designs are considered to be repeated-measures
designs and accordingly, use similar statistical procedures (Gliner and Morgan 2000 p. 240).

Wilcoxon Ranks Tests
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is appropriate for matched-pairs where, as here: (a) there
is one independent variable with two levels (here, Lean company or Non-Lean company); (b) the
pairs of participants have been matched on one or more relevant variables (here, both the fourdigit SIC code and total assets); and (c) the dependent-variable data are at least ordinal (here,
continuous data) and not normally distributed (Gliner and Morgan 2000 p. 245). The main
inferential question for Wilcoxon tests for each of the hypotheses was whether of the respective
financial-performance measures for Lean companies, the treatment (T) group, significantly
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differed from those financial-performance measures for the Non-Lean companies, the control (C)
group:
H0: T = C. The alternative hypotheses were: HA: T ≠ C.

Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
Conceptually, consider a simplified case of where there is a significant difference on the
values of some measure between members of two different groups. As an example, assume that
the respective values on some measure are generally lower for the observations in one group than
the values are for the observations in a second group. If the individual values were to be ranked
from lowest to highest (1 to N) without regard to the group from which the observations
originated, one would expect that the lower ranks generally would have come from group one
and that the higher ranks generally would have come from group two. Then, if one were to sum
the ranks of the observations from group one and group two, respectively, one would expect the
sum of the ranks in group two to be significantly higher than the sum of the ranks from group
one (and thus, reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups). This
is the basic logic behind the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Howell p. 649).

Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test
Since the pairs for this study were matched on two relevant variables, a within-subjects
repeated-measures design is appropriate. Where there is a matched-pairs design, the samples are
treated as dependent. Now imagine this study as a comparison between the pre-test control
group, Non-Lean companies, and the post-test treatment-group, Lean companies. This design
tests the differences between the respective values within each matched pair. That is, for each

80

matched pair, the observation value for a company from the treatment group is subtracted from
the observation value for the company from the control group. For this design, the basic
Wilcoxon rank-sum test is not appropriate. Instead, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test – which
incorporates the direction (or sign) of the differenced observation – is appropriate.
In the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, the respective sign for each differenced observation,
positive (+1) or negative (-1), is multiplied by the rank of its value among each of the values for
all of the differenced observations, going from the smallest difference to the largest difference (1
to N). Thereafter, the signed and ranked differenced observations are separated into two groups,
negative ranks and positive ranks, that correspond with: (a) the number of times that the
observation value for treatment group was greater than the observation value for the control
group (i.e., from the same matched pair); and (b) the number of times that the observation value
for the control group was greater than the observation value for the treatment group. Then, the
absolute values of each of the signed ranks are summed within each of the negative-ranks group
and the positive-ranks group. For hypothesis testing, the absolute-value sums of the signed ranks
generate a score that is compared to a critical value, based on the sample size and significance
level.
Any matched pair for which the differenced observation has a zero value is excluded
from further statistical analysis. Where two or more sets of matched pairs have the same
differenced-observation value (i.e., there is a tie between two or more sets of matched pairs, [(C1
– T1) = (C2 – T2)]), the rank assigned to each differenced observation is the average of the ranks
spanned by the differenced observations. For example, assume that after ranking all of the
differenced observations from the smallest difference to the largest difference, two separate
differenced observations had the same value and were the sixth and seventh values in the total-
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ranking order. In that case, each of those differenced observations would be given a rank of 6.5
(i.e., the average of the two ranks spanned). Thereafter, those ranks of 6.5 would be multiplied by
the appropriate positive or negative sign (as would all of the other ranks) and the remaining
steps, as hereinabove set forth, would be performed.
As the sample size increases, the sampling distribution for the test statistic, W,
approaches a normal distribution (Howell p. 651). If the number of pairs, N, is greater than or
equal to ten, a z-score can be measured where:
z=

and

σw =

If the z-score for the hypothesis test is greater than zcritical, then reject the null hypothesis, H0, that
there is no difference between the observations in the control group and the observations in the
treatment group.

Lean/Non-Lean Variable
Lean Companies
No reliable and thorough database of publicly traded companies exists that identifies
companies by their Lean status or Non-Lean status. Therefore, the Lean/Non-Lean variable for
this study had to be hand-collected. The identification process for the Lean/Non-Lean variable
was a multi-step process. The preliminary sample of companies that were tested for “Leanness”
consisted of: (a) each company that was listed on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index (at
the time of the data collection); (b) each company that was listed on the Russell 2000 (SmallCap) Index (on June 27, 2011) and was classified within 38 of the 154 sub-industries within the
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Global Industry Classification (GIC) Codes that were deemed most likely to identify Lean
companies (hereinafter, “Russell 2000/Select GIC”); and (c) each of the publicly traded
companies that had been represented by one or more registrants at each of the 2005 through 2010
annual Lean Accounting Summits, an annual conference that began in 2003, the participants in
which include representatives from industry (particularly, executive, operations, and accounting
functions), business consultants, vendors of lean and related products, and academics (among
others).
The following 38 GIC sub-industries were selected as a filter that was most likely to
identify Lean companies (i.e., from the Russell 2000 index): eight Industrials (20101010 through
20106020, in ascending numerical order), nine Consumer Discretionary (25101010 through
25203030), nine Consumer Staples (30201010 through 30302010), two Health Care (35101020
through 35102010), and ten Information Technology (45201010 through 45205020).
The Russell 2000 Index measures the performance of the small-cap
segment of the U.S. equity universe. The Russell 2000 is a subset
of the Russell 3000® Index representing approximately 10% of the
total market capitalization of that index. It includes approximately
2000 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their
market cap and current index membership.
The Russell 2000 Index is constructed to provide a comprehensive
and unbiased small-cap barometer and is completely reconstituted
annually to ensure larger stocks do not distort the performance and
characteristics of the true small-cap opportunity set (Russell Index
Website).

For each company within the preliminary identification sample, every 10-K, Annual Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for the twelve fiscal-year
period from 1999 through 2010 was examined for the keywords: “lean,” “just-in-time,” and
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“sigma” (i.e., for the business-management strategy, Six-Sigma, that originally was developed by
the telecommunications company, Motorola).
The EDGAR database supplied the 10-Ks. Each appearance of one of the three keywords
in a company’s 10-K and the corresponding fiscal year in which the keyword(s) appeared were
noted. Where a company used the keyword, “lean,” as an adjective that was not in a leanproduction or service-provider context, it was disregarded. For example, if a company used the
term, “lean,” as an adjective only to describe a company’s having a small number of employees,
that company was not considered to be Lean. Implementing the Lean business methodology is
not synonymous with having a small staff. Also, where a company used either of the keywords,
“lean” or “sigma,” but only within an executive’s brief biography and not to describe the
company’s operations anywhere else within that company’s 10-K, the use of the keyword alone
was not sufficient to designate that company as a Lean company. Furthermore, where a company
used the keyword, “just-in-time,” but only when specifically referring to delivery activities – as
opposed to production activities – that keyword reference alone was not sufficient to designate
the company as a Lean company. For example, there were numerous instances in 10-K reports
where a company merely referred to its having to maintain high inventories – a decidedly nonlean practice – in order to make just-in-time deliveries to their customers, but made no further
reference to the company’s practice of just-in-time production activities. Ultimately, in order to
have been designated as a Lean company for this study, a company within the preliminary
identification sample of public companies (i.e., from the S&P 500, Russell 2000/Select GIC, and
Lean Accounting Summit lists) specifically had to refer to its lean operations (as hereinabove
defined) within its 10-K reports using the keyword, “lean:” (a) at least once within fiscal years
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2006 through 2010; (b) for at least two consecutive fiscal years over the 12-year period from
1999 through 2010; and (c) with the first such reference being no later than fiscal year 2008.
Of the 500 companies then on the S&P 500, only 34 companies met the Lean-company
criteria of the 10-k keyword search. Of the 411 companies that were on the Russell 2000/Select
GIC list, 38 companies met the Lean-company criteria. And, of the 129 publicly traded
companies from which at least one representative had attended at least one of the annual Lean
Accounting Summits from 2005 through 2010, 45 companies met the Lean-company criteria.
Ten Lean companies (as defined herein) were on both the S&P 500 and Lean Accounting
Summit lists. No Lean companies were on all three preliminary identification lists. Furthermore,
no Lean companies appeared on both of the Russell 2000/Select GIC list and either of the other
two preliminary identification lists. After eliminating the duplicates, there were 107 potential
Lean companies which to attempt to match with a Non-Lean company, based on the industry and
size criteria.

Six-Sigma
The respective Lean and Six-Sigma business methodologies have many similarities,
including a focus on customer-defined value, the reduction of non-value-added work, and a
“disciplined closed-loop [continuous] improvement methodology (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 313).”
Six-Sigma is a process-improvement methodology emphasizing
data analysis with the primary objective of reducing process
variation to improve quality. The Greek letter sigma (σ) represents
variability. The sigma level of a process indicates the probability of
defects; the higher the sigma level, the more stable and the reliable
process and the lower the likelihood of defects. A process
functioning at Six-Sigma level equates to 3.4 defects per 1 million
opportunities, which is equivalent to 99.9997 percent defect-free
work (Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 313).
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Although the respective Lean and Six-Sigma business methodologies have many similarities,
they also have many differences. The Six-Sigma methodology focuses on improving value-added
processes (“e.g., find the source of the quality problems or downtime on the machine center and
put in countermeasures to fix it.” The Lean methodology focuses on creating flow within the
whole value stream in (Liker 2004 p. 296).
A major difference between Lean and Six Sigma is the principal
focus: Six Sigma emphasizes quality control and process variation,
while Lean's primary focus is flow attained from eliminating nonvalue-added activities (waste). In most organizations, the vast
majority of improvement opportunities are found in wasteful
business practices. It is not surprising that many companies
discover that focusing on waste (not process variation) is the best
place to begin their improvement efforts. Lean quickly prepares
organizations to address obvious low-hanging fruit improvement
opportunities that are relatively easy to achieve and deliver a
noticeable impact. Harvesting these opportunities creates early
wins, preparing employees for more challenging projects. After
non-value-added activities are removed from the process, it is
easier to identify high-value problems deserving rigorous attention
(Bell and Orzen 2011 p. 315).

Non-Lean Companies
After Lean companies had been identified, the Non-Lean companies to be matched, one
to each Lean company, were identified. First, all of the publicly traded companies that had the
same four-digit SIC codes (as identified in the Compustat database) as every previously
identified Lean company were sorted by their total assets (AT) for the fiscal years 2008 through
2010. Companies that had the lowest squared differences in aggregate total assets between
themselves and the previously identified Lean companies for the three fiscal years then went
through a series of filters to test the companies for “Non-Leanness.” Company that: (a) passed
the remaining Non-Lean identification tests; and (b) had substantially the same total assets as
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one of the Lean companies for the three-year fiscal period; were matched to Lean companies.
Unlike previous studies, this study was not limited to the manufacturing sector. Serviceproviding companies that were members of the three categories of the preliminary identification
sample also were analyzed.
For the Non-Lean-company identification process, the study utilized a four-step filtering
process to maximize confidence that the companies ultimately identified as Non-Lean matches
had not implemented either substantial Lean practices or Six-Sigma practices. That is, while a
company from the preliminary identification sample had to refer directly to its Lean practices in
its 10-K, a reference to Six-Sigma practices (as hereinafter set forth) would disqualify a company
from being designated as a Non-Lean company, due to some similarities between the business
methodologies.
There is an obvious case for a harmonious marriage between Six
Sigma, which fixes individual processes, and Lean, which fixes the
connections among processes (Liker 2004 p. 296).
Each of the preliminarily identified potential Non-Lean companies first went through the
identical 10-K keyword search for the same twelve fiscal years, 1999 through 2010, and also
using the keywords, “lean,” “just-in-time,” and “sigma.” For a company to move on to the next
stages of Non-Lean classification, however, it first could have no references in any of its 10-K
reports to any of the three keywords for the 12-year period. Second, each of the potential NonLean match companies that passed the first classification stage went through a newswire search
within the Lexis-Nexis® Academic database. 19 Companies’ names were searched in various
forms, including those of predecessor entities. Third, each of the potential Non-Lean match

19

Power Search, Source: All News (English), for the search terms: “(“[COMPANY NAME]") /p ("lean manufacturing") OR ("lean production") OR ("lean operation") OR ("lean practice") OR ("six sigma") OR ("lean sigma") OR
("lean principle") OR ("kaizen") OR ("cellular manufacturing") OR ("cellular production") OR ("continuous flow")
OR ("just-in-time manufacturing") OR ("just-in-time production") OR (“one-piece flow”).”
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companies that passed the first two filtering stages was Google-searched for the company name,
together with the terms, “lean” and “six-sigma.” Each link within the first five pages of search
responses was examined for evidence of significant lean and/or six-sigma activity by that
company. Significant activity was deemed to be an article describing the Lean and/or Six-Sigma
operations of the company. A mere reference to Lean and/or Six-Sigma on a person’s LinkedIn or
other resume by itself was insufficient to disqualify a company from being designated as a NonLean company.
Lastly, the Benchmarking Community of Practice Coordinator for the Association of
Manufacturing Excellence (AME) circulated a list of the Non-Lean match potentials that
remained after the first three Non-Lean-company identification filters to benchmarking-practice
group members, soliciting from them comments with respect to their knowledge of any
significant Lean and/or Six-Sigma practices having been performed by any of those potential
Non-Lean companies. All of these steps were performed to minimize the possibility that a
company that had performed significant Lean and/or Six-Sigma activities was not misclassified
as a Non-Lean company for its failure to make public reference to those business methods.
There were multiple reasons for eliminating potential Non-Lean companies from further
analysis (i.e., from matching with a Lean company and ultimately, hypothesis testing), including:
(a) the reporting of the select keywords in their 10-K reports; (b) direct references to significant
Lean and/or Six-Sigma activities found through a Lexis-Nexis search; (c) direct references to
significant Lean and/or Six-Sigma activities found through a Google search; or (d) confirmation
from a member of the AME’s benchmarking-practice group that the company had practiced
significant Lean and/or Six Sigma activities. Ultimately, 78 of the 107 potential Lean companies
did not have an acceptable Non-Lean company within the same four-digit SIC code and of
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substantially the same size with which to be matched. Certain four-digit SIC codes were replete
with Lean companies, but only the Lean companies closest in size with a Non-Lean company
could be matched together. Non Non-Lean companies were matched with more than one Lean
company. For example, there were many prominent Lean companies, such as 3M, Boeing,
General Electric, and Harley-Davidson, that did not have an appropriate Non-Lean company
with which to be matched. Due to the small sample sizes, companies from certain industries were
excluded from analysis despite their having been identified as Lean companies through the
aforementioned criteria: (1) conglomerates, due both to the uncertainty of industry comparability
to any potential matched company, as well as the uncertainty of the company’s having extended
lean production across its varied enterprises; (2) home construction, due both to the extreme lack
of comparability of its inventories and assets to those of any of the other Lean companies and the
effects it could have on statistical tests based on measures of central tendency; and (3) insurance
and financial services, due to their being highly regulated industries, the inclusion of which
likely could result in unknown and uncontrolled-for effects of potentially omitted variables.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Samples for Hypothesis Testing
The final sample of this study consisted of 29 matched pairs of companies, or 58
companies in total. Each matched pair was comprised of one Lean company and one Non-Lean
company that was matched together based first, by four-digit SIC code and second, by total
assets over the three-year fiscal period from 2008 through 2010. The final sample contained
matched pairs from 19 different four-digit SIC codes.
Twelve different SIC codes each had a single matched pair of companies: 1600, Heavy
Construction Other than Building Construction – Contractors; 2670, Converted Paper and
Paperboard Products (No Containers/Boxes); 2780, Blank Books, Loose-Leaf Binders and
Bookbinding and Related Work; 3559, Special Industry Machinery, NEC; 3560, General
Industrial Machinery and Equipment; 3577, Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC; 3743,
Railroad Equipment; 3823, Industrial Instruments for Measurement, Display, and Control; 3826,
Laboratory Analytical Instruments; 3842, Orthopedic, Prosthetic, and Surgical Appliances and
Supplies; 3843, Dental Equipment and Supplies; and 5961, Retail-Catalog and Mail-Order
Houses. Four different SIC codes each had two matched pairs: 3312, Steel Works, Blast Furnaces
and Rolling Mills (Coke Ovens); 3350, Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding of Nonferrous Metals;
3690, Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies; and 8071, Services Medical Laboratories. Lastly, three different SIC codes each had three matched pairs: 3714,
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Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories; 3841, Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus;
and 3990, Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries.
In addition to excluding Lean companies from statistical analysis due to the absence of an
appropriate Non-Lean-company match, two other circumstances removed one or more matched
pairs from the statistical analysis for certain individual hypotheses: (1) insufficient financial data
for one-half (or both halves) of a matched pair; and (2) very small denominators for a given
financial ratio. First, in order for a particular matched pair to have been analyzed for a given
hypothesis, the requisite financial data for that hypothesis had to have been reported in the
Compustat database for both companies of that matched pair. If the necessary financial data to
test a given hypothesis had not been reported for one-half of a matched pair of companies, the
matched pair had to be excluded from the analysis of that hypothesis, even if the corresponding
financial data had been reported for the other half of the matched pair. For example, recall that
the fourth set of hypotheses includes five hypotheses related to inventory measures. Not all
companies that maintain inventories report values for all four of the common inventory
categories: total inventory, raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods. Additionally,
companies that primarily provide services may not have traditional inventory. Accordingly, as a
hypothesis classification, the inventory hypotheses generally tested fewer matched pairs than the
returns/profit margin, cash-flow, or working-capital hypotheses.
Second, this study complied with practice of excluding from statistical analysis any
financial ratio that had a denominator of less than one (i.e., due to its propensity to create
extreme outliers and disrupt statistical analyses based upon measures of central tendency,
particularly those with small sample sizes). Accordingly, if one-half of a matched pair of
companies had a financial-ratio denominator of less than one for a given hypothesis, that pair
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was excluded from the analysis for that hypothesis, regardless of whether the other half of the
matched pair had a denominator of greater than or equal to one. That being said, 11 of the 17
hypotheses utilized between 27 and all 29 of the matched pairs in their respective analyses, with
five hypotheses utilizing all 29 matched pairs. Two hypotheses utilized 25 of the matched pairs.
The inventory hypotheses (set four) utilized the fewest matched pairs in their statistical analysis,
most frequently due to companies’ failures to report values for all of the inventory categories.
Most notably, H4c tested only 16 matched pairs for work-in-process inventory turnover, the
fewest number for any hypothesis. H4d and H4e each tested 19 matched pairs for finished-goods
inventory turnover and days’-sales in inventory (which is based on finished-goods inventory),
respectively, together the second fewest number for any hypothesis. The total number of matched
pairs utilized in the statistical analysis for each of the 17 hypotheses is as follows: H1a: Return
on Net Operating Assets (25); H1b: Return on Total Assets (29); H1c: Profit Margin (29); H2a:
Operating Cash Flows (29); H2b: Cash-Adequacy Ratio (29); H2c: Financing-Assets Ratio
(25); H3a: Net Working Capital (28); H3b: Working Capital Turnover (27); H3c: Current Ratio
(28); H3d: Acid-Test Ratio: (28); H3e: Accounts-Receivable Turnover (28); H3f: Days'-Sales
Uncollected (29); H4a: Total Inventory Turnover (27); H4b: Raw-Materials Turnover (22);
H4c: Work-in-Process Turnover (16); H4d: Finished-Goods Turnover (19); and H4e: Days'Sales in Inventory (19). For hypothesis testing and due to the small sample sizes, observations
were winsorized at three standard deviations.

Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of averaged balance-sheet, income-statement, and statement-of-cash-flows
summary-account values revealed some interesting differences between Lean companies and
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Non-Lean companies, despite the pairs’ having been matched by total assets and four-digit SIC
code. Not surprisingly due to design, the Lean and Non-Lean companies had three-year average
total assets of $1.883 billion and $1.706 billion, respectively, a difference of ten percent from the
perspective of the control group, Non-Lean companies. From the perspective of the treatment
group, Lean companies, the difference between the Lean companies and the Non-Lean
companies in terms of average total assets was nine percent. Similarly, the Lean and Non-Lean
companies had three-year average total liabilities of $1.036 billion and $1.025 billion,
respectively, a difference of one percent.
The respective differences in asset composition and liability composition between the
two groups for the three-year period, however, were striking. Lean companies had average
current assets 77 percent higher and average long-term assets 19 percent lower than Non-Lean
companies. Lean Companies had average current assets of $932 million and average long-term
assets of $951 million. On the other hand, Non-Lean companies had current assets of $527
million and average long-term assets of $1.179 billion. Similarly, Lean companies had average
current liabilities 66 percent higher and average long-term liabilities 28 percent lower than NonLean companies. Lean Companies had average current liabilities of $530 million and average
long-term liabilities of $506 million. On the other hand, Non-Lean companies had current
liabilities of $319 million and average long-term liabilities of $706 million. Whereas the
respective ratios of current-to-long-term assets and current-to-long-term liabilities both
essentially were 1:1 for the Lean companies, the respective ratios for the Non-Lean companies
were less than 1:2 (current: long-term) for both assets and liabilities. That is, Lean companies
had a current-to-long-term asset ratio of 0.98 and a current-to-long-term liability ratio of 1.05.
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Conversely, Non-Lean companies had a current-to-long-term asset ratio of 0.45 and a current-tolong-term liability ratio of 0.45.
The differences between the groups of Lean and Non-Lean companies also were striking
for other select three-year average current balance-sheet accounts. Lean companies had a cashand-cash-equivalents average balance that was 151 percent greater than that of Non-Lean
companies, $384 million to $153 million, respectively. Additionally, Lean companies had an
average accounts-receivable balance that was 52 percent greater than that of Non-Lean
companies, $267 million to $176 million, respectively. For accounts payable, the difference was
even more dramatic. Lean companies’ average accounts-payable balance was 249 percent greater
than that of Non-Lean companies: $299 million to $86 million, respectively.
The differences between three-year average summary income-statement values for the
groups of Lean and Non-Lean companies also were prominent. Lean companies’ average net
sales, cost of goods sold, and net income all were greater than those of the Non-Lean companies.
Lean companies had average net sales 83 percent larger than Non-Lean companies, $2.444
billion to $1.332 billion, respectively. Similarly, Lean companies had average cost of goods sold
89 percent larger than Non-Lean companies, $1.763 billion to $932 million, respectively.
Furthermore, Lean companies had average net income 199 percent larger than Non-Lean
companies, $114 million to $38 million, respectively.
Recall that the inventory hypotheses for this study generally used fewer of the 29
matched pairs than hypotheses from the other three classifications: 27 (for total-inventory
turnover), 22 (for raw-materials inventory turnover), 16 (for work-in-process inventory
turnover), and 19 (for each of finished-goods inventory turnover and days’-sales in inventory),
respectively. Accordingly, some caution should be utilized when interpreting the data and results
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for those hypotheses that utilized the fewest matched pairs. That being said, there are significant
results for multiple inventory categories as set forth later in this section. Additionally, when
looking at the respective three-year average inventory-category balances of Lean companies and
Non-Lean companies, it is also important to keep in mind that Lean companies generated threeyear average net sales that were 83 percent larger than those of Non-Lean companies, despite
having total assets within ten percent of one another. Lean companies had a three-year average
total inventory 17 percent larger than that of Non-Lean companies, $157.3 million to $133.9
million, respectively, and a three-year average finished-goods inventory 22 percent larger than
that of Non-Lean companies, $60.4 million to $49.4 million, respectively. These figures do not
include the total inventory balances of Amazon.com, a large outlier that had a three-year average
total inventory of $2.26 billion, (i.e., compared three-year averages of $157.3 million for Lean
companies and $133.9 million Non-Lean companies), nor its matched company. Additionally,
Lean companies’ three-year average work-in-process inventory was 251 percent larger than that
of Non-Lean companies, $59.5 million to $17.0 million, respectively. Perhaps the most striking
difference between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies with respect to the inventory
categories – given that Lean companies’ net sales approached twice those of Non-Lean
companies – was that Lean companies’ three-year average raw-materials inventory was 35
percent lower than that of Non-Lean companies, $44.8 million to $69.3 million, respectively.
Lastly, Lean companies, had close to twice the three-year average net cash flows for each
cash-flow category – whether inflows or outflows – than their Non-Lean counterparts. Lean
companies had average net operating cash inflows 96 percent larger than Non-Lean companies,
$241 million to $123 million, respectively. Additionally, Lean companies had average net
investing cash outflows 89 percent larger than Non-Lean companies, $152 million to $76
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million, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies had average net financing cash outflows 87 percent
larger than Non-Lean companies, $54 million to $29 million, respectively. Descriptive statistics
for the fiscal 2008 through 2010 three-year average account balances for the Lean companies,
the Non-Lean companies, and the percentage differences from the viewpoint of the control
group, Non-Lean companies, are set forth in Table 1.

Tests of Normality
Frequently when financial-performance measures comprise the sample observations, the
data is not normally distributed. Not surprisingly, that is the case with this study, especially given
the small respective sample sizes for each of the hypotheses. If the samples had been normally
distributed, a dependent-measures t-test would have been appropriate. With non-parametric data,
however, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is appropriate. One uses the Shapiro-Wilk test to test for
normality of distribution with small sample sizes. For each hypothesis, the three-year average
observation values for the Lean companies and Non-Lean companies were tested for normality
both separately as groups and as one combined group, after excluding both observations of a
matched-pair where one or both halves had insufficient data and/or very small denominators. The
combined observations for only two of the 17 hypotheses had a normal distribution, using the
Shapiro-Wilk test at α = 0.05: H3a (net working capital) and H3f (days’-sales uncollected).
Fourteen of the remaining 15 hypotheses were significantly non-normally distributed at a p-value
of less than 0.001. H3c (the current ratio) was significantly non-normally distributed at a p-value
of 0.002. Examining separately, only six of the 34 the Lean and Non-Lean groups were normally
distributed.20 Results for the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality are set forth in Table 2.

20

H2b, Lean: Cash-Adequacy Ratio; H3a, both Lean and Non-Lean: Net Working Capital; H3c, Lean: Current
Ratio; H3f, Non-Lean: Days'-Sales Uncollected; and H4e, Non-Lean: Days'-Sales in Inventory.
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Table 1:

Descriptive Statistics, Three-Year Averages: 2008 through 2010 (in millions)
Lean Companies, Non-Lean Companies, and Differences from Non-Lean Company

Total

Balance Sheet -Assets
LongCurrent
Term
Current/LT

Balance Sheet - Select Current
Cash and

Accounts

Accounts

Assets

Assets

Assets

Ratio

Equivalents

Receivable

Payable

Lean

$1,882.9

$932.1

$950.8

0.98

$384.2

$267.4

$298.6

Non-Lean

1,705.9

527.3

1,178.6

0.45

153.1

176.4

85.5

Difference

10%

77%

-19%

119%

151%

52%

249%

Total

Balance Sheet - Liabilities
LongCurrent
Term
Current/LT

Income Statement

Liabilities

Liabilities

Liabilities

Ratio

Sales

Cost of
Goods
Sold

Lean

$1,035.8

$529.9

$505.9

1.05

$2,444.4

$1,763.2

$114.1

Non-Lean

1,024.8

318.8

706.0

0.45

1,332.2

932.0

38.2

Difference

1%

66%

-28%

132%

83%

89%

199%

Investing
Cash
Flows

Financing
Cash
Flows

Balance Sheet – Inventory a

Net

Net
Income

Statement of Cash Flows

Raw

Work-in-

Finished

Total

Materials

Process

Goods b

Inventory c

Operating
Cash
Flows

Lean

$44.8

$59.5

$60.4

$157.3

$240.9

-$151.8

-$54.0

Non-Lean

69.3

17.0

49.4

133.9

123.0

-76.2

-28.9

Difference

-35%

251%

22%

17%

96%

99%

87%

a

Not every company reported each of the inventory components. For several companies, the sum of
the inventory components reported does not equal the total inventory reported. Accordingly, the
sums of the inventory component averages do not equal the average total inventory.

b

Does not include, General Steel Holdings, which only reported work-in-process for 2008.

c

Does not include large outlier, Amazon.com, that had average total inventory of $2.26 billion
(nor its match, Liberty Interactive Corp.).
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Table 2:

Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality
Combined Companies
n, df

statistic

p-value

H1a

Return on Net Operating Assets

25

0.831

< 0.001

H1b

Return on Total Assets

29

0.731

< 0.001

H1c

Profit Margin

29

0.538

< 0.001

Hypo

Measure

H2a

Operating Cash Flows

29

0.823

< 0.001

H2b

Cash Adequacy

29

0.910

< 0.001

H2c

Financing Assets

25

0.631

< 0.001

H3a

Net Working Capital

28

0.974

0.274

H3b

Working Capital Turnover

27

0.774

< 0.001

H3c

Current Ratio

28

0.927

0.002

H3d

Acid-Test Ratio

28

0.878

< 0.001

H3e

Accounts-Receivable Turn

28

0.640

< 0.001

H3f

Days'-Sales Uncollected

29

0.964

0.082

H4a

Total Inventory Turnover

27

0.613

< 0.001

H4b

Raw-Materials Turnover

22

0.753

< 0.001

H4c

Work-in-Process Turnover

16

0.685

< 0.001

H4d

Finished Goods Turnover

19

0.691

< 0.001

H4e

Days'-Sales in Inventory

19

0.867

< 0.001

Lean Companies
Hypo

Measure

Non-Lean Companies

n, df

statistic

p-value

statistic

p-value

H1a

Return on Net Operating Assets

25

0.866

< 0.001

0.790

< 0.001

H1b

Return on Total Assets

29

0.730

< 0.001

0.772

< 0.001

H1c

Profit Margin

29

0.891

0.006

0.609

< 0.001

H2a

Operating Cash Flows

29

0.903

0.012

0.788

< 0.001

H2b

Cash Adequacy

29

0.976

0.738

0.898

0.009

H2c

Financing Assets

25

0.538

< 0.001

0.875

0.006

H3a

Net Working Capital

28

0.975

0.722

0.949

0.187

H3b

Working Capital Turnover

27

0.792

< 0.001

0.818

< 0.001

H3c

Current Ratio

28

0.959

0.322

0.876

0.003

H3d

Acid-Test Ratio

28

0.939

0.106

0.807

< 0.001

H3e

Accounts-Receivable Turn

28

0.649

< 0.001

0.640

< 0.001

H3f

Days'-Sales Uncollected

29

0.915

0.022

0.984

0.926

H4a

Total Inventory Turnover

27

0.629

< 0.001

0.571

< 0.001

H4b

Raw-Materials Turnover

22

0.810

0.001

0.737

< 0.001

H4c

Work-in-Process Turnover

16

0.777

0.001

0.711

< 0.001

H4d

Finished Goods Turnover

19

0.720

< 0.001

0.622

< 0.001

H4e

Days'-Sales in Inventory

19

0.859

0.009

0.922

0.126
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Hypothesis 1a, Return on Net Operating Assets
For return on net operating assets (operating income ÷ lagged net operating
assets), Lean Companies had a three-year average return of 8.3 percent, while Non-Lean
Companies had a three-year average return of 0.7 percent. Hypothesis 1a utilized 25 matchedpairs in its statistical analysis with four matched pairs having to be excluded: (a) two pairs due to
one-half of each pair’s both having positive operating income (the numerator) and negative
lagged net operating assets (the denominator) – an incongruous result for comparative analysis;
and (b) two pairs due to one-half of each pair’s both having negative operating income and
positive net operating assets – also an incongruous result for comparative analysis. For H1a,
there were 18 negative ranks (totaling 246) and seven positive ranks (totaling 79) for the threeyear average return on net operating assets. For this hypothesis, where a given observation value
was greater for the Non-Lean company than it was for the Lean company, the differenced
observation resulted in a positive rank. Conversely, where a given observation value was greater
for the Lean company than it was for the Non-Lean company, the differenced observation
resulted in a negative rank. The z-score for the three-year differenced average return – based
upon the positive ranks – was -2.247 for a p-value of 0.025. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for
H1a was rejected since there was a significant difference between the respective average returns
on net operating assets for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean companies had
significantly larger returns on net operating assets than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average return on net operating assets was 9.4 percent
for Lean companies and -4.5 percent for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average
returns were 4.0 percent and 1.9 percent for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average return on net operating assets for 2010 was 11.6
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percent compared to 9.2 percent for Non-Lean companies. Of the individual years, only 2008
had a statistically significant difference – a p-value of 0.042 with a positive-rank based z-score of
-2.031. Individually, fiscal 2008 had 18 negative ranks (totaling 238) and seven positive ranks
(totaling 87) for return on net operating assets.21 Results for H1a, return on net operating assets,
are set forth in Table 3.

Hypothesis 1b, Return on Total Assets
For traditional return on total assets (net income ÷ average total assets), Lean Companies
had a three-year average return of 3.9 percent, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year
average return of -1.6 percent. Hypothesis 1b utilized all 29 matched-pairs in its statistical
analysis with no matched pairs having to be excluded. The z-score for the three-year differenced
average return – based upon the positive ranks – was -2.173 for a p-value of 0.030. There were
20 negative ranks (totaling 318) and nine positive ranks (totaling 117) for the three-year average
return on total assets. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H1b was rejected since there was a
statistically significant difference between the respective average returns on total assets for Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean companies had significantly higher returns on
total assets than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average return on total assets was 4.9 percent for Lean
companies and -5.3 percent for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average returns on
total assets were 1.6 percent and -2.8 percent for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average return on total assets for 2010 was 5.7 percent

21

For 2009, return on net operating assets had a p-value of 0.288, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.063, 17 negative ranks (totaling 202) and 8 positive ranks (totaling 123). For 2010, return on net operating assets had a p-value of
0.737, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.336, 12 negative ranks (totaling 175) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 150).
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compared to 3.4 percent for Non-Lean companies. Of the individual years, only 2008 had a
significant difference – a p-value of 0.003 with a positive-rank based z-score of -2.93.
Table 3a:
Return on Net Operating Assets (H1a)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

25

Period

3-Year Average

Co. Type

Lean

Mean

2008

Non-Lean

2009
NonLean

Lean

2010
NonLean

Lean

Lean

NonLean

0.083

0.007

0.094

-0.045

0.040

0.019

0.116

0.092

Std. Dev.

(0.128)

(0.162)

(0.172)

(0.255)

(0.141)

(0.184)

(0.123)

(0.102)

Minimum

-0.363

-0.455

-0.506

-0.813

-0.357

-0.662

-0.070

-0.188

Maximum

0.295

0.199

0.401

0.426

0.199

0.375

0.524

0.274

Table 3b: Return on Net Operating Assets (H1a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =
Period
Ranks

25
3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

18a

7b

18a

7b

17a

8b

12a

13b

Mean

13.67

11.29

13.22

12.43

11.88

15.38

14.58

11.54

Sum

246

79

238

87

202

123

175

150

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 3c:
Return on Net Operating Assets (H1a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

25

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.247

0.025

-2.031

0.042

-1.063

0.288

-0.336

0.737

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Results for H1b, return on total assets, are set forth in Table 4.
Table 4a: Return on Total Assets (H1b)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Co. Type
Mean

3-Year Average
Lean

2008
NonLean
Lean

Non-Lean

2009

2010
NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

0.039

-0.016

0.049

-0.053

0.016

-0.028

0.057

0.034

Std. Dev.

(0.073)

(0.132)

(0.106)

(0.185)

(0.086)

(0.143)

(0.057)

(0.079)

Minimum

-0.269

-0.387

-0.434

-0.641

-0.269

-0.448

-0.105

-0.215

Maximum

0.116

0.117

0.149

0.168

0.113

0.141

0.198

0.164

Table 4b:
Return on Total Assets (H1b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

20a

9b

22a

7b

18a

11b

17a

12b

Mean

15.90

13.00

16.05

11.71

15.67

13.91

15.35

14.50

Sum

318

117

353

82

282

153

261

174

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 4c: Return on Total Assets (H1b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

29

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.173

0.030

-2.93

0.003

-1.395

0.163

-0.941

0.347

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Individually, fiscal 2008 had 22 negative ranks (totaling 353) and 7 positive ranks (totaling 82)
for return on assets.22

Hypothesis 1c, Profit Margin
For profit margin (net income ÷ net sales), Lean Companies had a three-year average of
4.4 percent of net sales, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average of -6.4 percent of
net sales. Hypothesis 1c utilized all 29 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with no matched
pairs having to be excluded. The z-score for the three-year differenced average profit margin –
based upon the positive ranks – was -1.697 for a p-value of 0.090. There were 17 negative ranks
(totaling 296) and 12 positive ranks (totaling 139) for the three-year average profit margin.
Accordingly, there was marginal significance for H1c with respect to the difference between the
respective average profit margins for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean
companies had marginally significantly higher profit margins than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average profit margin was 4.8 percent of net sales for
Lean companies and -14.5 percent of net sales for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the
average profit margins were 1.4 percent and -12.0 percent for Lean companies and Non-Lean
companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average profit margin for 2010 was 5.5 percent
compared to 3.3 percent for Non-Lean companies. For the individual years, only fiscal 2008 had
a statistically significant difference – a p-value of 0.003 with a z-score of -3.016.23 Individually,

22

For 2009, return on total assets had a p-value of 0.163, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.395, 18 negative ranks
(totaling 282) and 11 positive ranks (totaling 153). For 2010, return on total assets had a p-value of 0.347, a positiverank based z-score of -0.941, 17 negative ranks (totaling 261) and 12 positive ranks (totaling 174).
23

For 2009, profit margin had a p-value of 0.230, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.200, 16 negative ranks (totaling
273) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 162). For 2010, profit margin had a p-value of 0.888, a negative-rank based zscore of -0.141, 12 negative ranks (totaling 211) and 17 positive ranks (totaling 224).
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fiscal 2008 had 21 negative ranks (totaling 357) and 8 positive ranks (totaling 78) for profit
margin. Results for H1c, profit margin, are set forth in Table 5.
Table 5a: Profit Margin (H1c)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Co. Type
Mean

3-Year Average
Lean

2008

Non-Lean

2009
NonLean

Lean

2010
NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

0.044

-0.064

0.048

-0.145

0.014

-0.120

0.055

0.033

Std. Dev.

(0.062)

(0.263)

(0.079)

(0.389)

(0.093)

(0.440)

(0.067)

(0.121)

Minimum

-0.155

-0.848

-0.271

-1.214

-0.225

-2.066

-0.133

-0.316

Maximum

0.128

0.126

0.142

0.124

0.131

0.117

0.192

0.176

Table 5b:
Profit Margin (H1c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

17a

12b

21a

8b

16a

13b

12a

17b

Mean

17.41

11.58

17.00

9.75

17.06

12.46

17.58

13.18

Sum

296

139

357

78

273

162

211

224

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 5c:
Profit Margin (H1c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

29

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010d

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-1.697

0.090

-3.016

0.003

-1.2

0.230

-0.141

0.888

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Hypothesis 2a, Operating Cash Flows
Lean Companies had three-year average operating cash flows of 11.3 percent of lagged
total assets, while Non-Lean Companies had three-year average operating cash flows of 4.8
percent of lagged total assets. Hypothesis 2a utilized all 29 matched-pairs in its statistical
analysis with no matched pairs having to be excluded. The z-score for the three-year differenced
average operating cash flows – based upon the positive ranks – was -2.281 for a p-value of
0.023. There were 18 negative ranks (totaling 323) and 11 positive ranks (totaling 112) for the
three-year average operating cash flows. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H2a was rejected
since there was a significant difference between the respective average operating cash flows for
Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean companies had significantly higher
operating cash flows than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average operating cash flows were 11.4 percent of
lagged total assets for Lean companies and 2.2 percent of lagged total assets for Non-Lean
companies in 2008. For 2009, the average operating cash flows were 11.5 percent and 5.4
percent for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’
average operating cash flows for 2010 were 10.8 percent compared to 6.5 percent for Non-Lean
companies. Of the individual years, both 2008 and 2009 had statistically significant differences
in operating cash flows between Lean and Non-Lean companies: a p-value of 0.006 with a
positive-rank based z-score of -2.757 for 2008; and p-value of 0.050 with a positive-rank based
z-score of -1.957 for 2009. Individually, 2008 had 20 negative ranks (totaling 345) and nine
positive ranks (totaling 90) while 2009 had had 18 negative ranks (totaling 308) and 11 positive
ranks (totaling 127).24 Results for H2a, operating cash flows, are set forth in Table 6.

24

For 2010, operating cash flows had a p-value of 0.336, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.962, 14 negative ranks
(totaling 262) and 15 positive ranks (totaling 173).
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Table 6a:
Operating Cash Flows (H2a)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period

3-Year Average

Co. Type

Lean

Mean

Non-Lean

2008
NonLean
Lean

2009

2010
NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

0.113

0.048

0.114

0.022

0.115

0.054

0.108

0.065

Std. Dev.

(0.058)

(0.103)

(0.074)

(0.167)

(0.075)

(0.118)

(0.075)

(0.092)

Minimum

0.038

-0.264

-0.078

-0.619

0.008

-0.330

-0.018

-0.187

Maximum

0.297

0.182

0.284

0.236

0.396

0.203

0.367

0.183

Table 6b:
Operating Cash Flows (H2a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

18a

11b

20a

9b

18a

11b

14a

15b

Mean

17.94

10.18

17.25

10.00

17.11

11.55

18.71

11.53

Sum

323

112

345

90

308

127

262

173

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 6c:
Operating Cash Flows (H2a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

29

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.281

0.023

-2.757

0.006

-1.957

0.050

-0.962

0.336

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Hypothesis 2b, Cash-Adequacy Ratio
For the cash-adequacy ratio (operating cash flows ÷ current liabilities), Lean Companies
had a three-year average ratio of 62.2 percent of current liabilities, while Non-Lean Companies
had a three-year average ratio of 33.3 percent of current liabilities. Hypothesis 2b utilized all 29
matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with no matched pairs having to be excluded. The z-score
for the three-year differenced average cash-adequacy ratio – based upon the positive ranks – was
-2.198 for a p-value of 0.028. There were 17 negative ranks (totaling 319) and 12 positive ranks
(totaling 116) for the three-year average cash-adequacy ratio. Accordingly, the null hypothesis
for 2b was rejected since there was a significant difference between the respective average cashadequacy ratio for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean companies had a
significantly higher cash-adequacy ratio than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, the average cash-adequacy ratio was 65.8 percent for
Lean companies and 18.3 percent for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average cashadequacy ratios were 67.1 percent and 40.8 percent for Lean and Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average cash-adequacy ratio for 2010 was 59.0 percent
compared to 45.0 percent for Non-Lean companies. Of the individual years, only 2008 had a
significant difference – a p-value of 0.004 with a positive-rank based z-score of -2.887.
Individually, 2008 had 21 negative ranks (totaling 351) and 8 positive ranks (totaling 84) for the
cash-adequacy ratio. That being said, 2009 was close to having marginal significance, having a
p-value of 0.103, a z-score of -1.633, 19 negative ranks (totaling 293) and 10 positive ranks
(totaling 142).25 Results for H2b, the cash-adequacy ratio, are set forth in Table 7.

25

For 2009, the cash-adequacy ratio had a p-value of 0.103, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.633, 19 negative
ranks (totaling 293) and 10 positive ranks (totaling 142). For 2010, the cash-adequacy ratio had a p-value of 0.567, a
positive-rank based z-score of -0.573, 13 negative ranks (totaling 244) and 16 positive ranks (totaling 191).
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Table 7a:
Cash-Adequacy Ratio (H2b)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period

3-Year Average

Co. Type

Lean

Mean

2008
NonLean
Lean

Non-Lean

2009

2010
NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

0.622

0.333

0.658

0.183

0.671

0.408

0.590

0.450

Std. Dev.

(0.311)

(0.525)

(0.425)

(0.686)

(0.436)

(0.572)

(0.516)

(0.467)

Minimum

0.112

-0.956

-0.192

-1.487

0.023

-1.105

-0.231

-0.922

Maximum

1.329

1.093

1.597

1.428

2.174

1.347

2.503

1.204

Table 7b: Cash-Adequacy Ratio (H2b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period

3-Year Average

Ranks

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

17a

12b

21a

8b

19a

10b

13a

16b

Mean

18.76

9.67

16.71

10.50

15.42

14.20

18.77

11.94

Sum

319

116

351

84

293

142

244

191

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 7c:
Cash-Adequacy Ratio (H2b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

29

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.195

0.028

-2.887

0.004

-1.633

0.103

-0.573

0.567

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Hypothesis 2c, Financing-Assets Ratio
For the financing-assets ratio (cash flows from operating activities ÷ the absolute value of
cash flows from investing activities, but only analyzing those companies that had negative cash
flows from investing activities), Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 3.80, while
Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 1.35. Hypothesis 2c utilized 25 matchedpairs in its statistical analysis with four matched pairs having to be excluded: three pairs due to
one-half of each pair’s having positive net financing cash flows; and one pair due to both halves
of the pair’s having positive net financing cash flows. The z-score for the three-year differenced
average financing-assets ratio – based upon the positive ranks – was -1.735 for a p-value of
0.083. There were 16 negative ranks (totaling 227) and nine positive ranks (totaling 98) for the
three-year average financing-assets ratio. Accordingly, there was marginal significance for H2c
with respect to the difference between the respective average financing-assets ratios for Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies. Here, Lean companies had marginally significantly larger
financing-assets ratios than Non-Lean companies. For this hypothesis only, the individual years
were not compared to one another due to the inappropriateness of comparing fluctuating years of
cash inflows versus outflows. Results for H2c, the financing-assets ratio, are set forth in Table 8.

Hypothesis 3a, Net Working Capital
For net working capital (the difference between current assets and current liabilities,
scaled by lagged total assets), Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 30.0 percent,
while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 26.1 percent. Hypothesis 3a
utilized 28 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with one matched pair having to be excluded
due to one-half of that pair’s failing to classify its balance sheet to enumerate current assets.
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Table 8a: Financing-Assets Ratio (H2c)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =
Period

25
3-Year Average

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Mean

3.80

1.35

Std. Dev.

(5.56)

(2.65)

Minimum

0.61

-6.43

Maximum

22.79

5.84

Table 8b:
Financing-Assets Ratio (H2c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

25

Period

3-Year Average

Ranks

Negative

Positive

16a

9b

Mean

14.19

10.89

Sum

227

98

Number

Table 8c:
Financing-Assets Ratio (H2c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

25

3-Year Average c
Z

p-value

-1.735b

0.083

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

The z-score for the three-year differenced average net working capital – based upon the positive
ranks – was -0.478 for a p-value of 0.633. There were 16 negative ranks (totaling 224) and 12
positive ranks (totaling 182) for the three-year average net working capital. Accordingly, the null
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hypothesis for H3a failed to be rejected since there was not a significant difference between the
respective average net working capital for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.
The sample distribution for H3a was one of two of the 17 hypotheses where one or both
of the Lean-company observations or the Non-Lean-company observations did not fail the
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. Accordingly, dependent-samples t-tests also are an appropriate
method through which to analyze the data. The three-year average of net working capital (as a
percentage of lagged total assets), had a t-score of 0.673 with a p-value of 0.507. Therefore,
under both parametric and non-parametric matched-pairs tests, the null hypothesis for H3a failed
to be rejected since there was not a significant difference between the respective average net
working capital for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Furthermore, the respective tscores and p-values for the individual years were: (a) for 2008, 0.717 and 0.480; (b) for 2009,
0.414 and 0.682; and (c) for 2010, 0.929 and 0.361. That is, none of the individual years had a
statistically significant difference in net working capital between Lean companies and Non-Lean
companies when analyzed using t-tests.
Examining the years individually, average net working capital was 28.4 percent of lagged
total assets for Lean companies and 23.3 percent for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the
average net working capital was 28.3 percent and 25.7 percent for Lean and Non-Lean
companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average net working capital for 2010 was 34.7
percent compared to 29.5 percent for Non-Lean companies. Although Lean companies had
higher average net working capital for each of the three individual years, none of the individual
years had a statistically significant difference between Lean and Non-Lean companies.26 Results
for H3a, net working capital, are set forth in Table 9.

26

For 2008, net working capital had a p-value of 0.633, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.478, 16 negative ranks
(totaling 224) and 12 positive ranks (totaling 182). For 2009, net working capital had a p-value of 0.585, a positive-
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Table 9a: Net Working Capital (H3a)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period
Co. Type
Mean

3-Year Average
Lean

2008
NonLean
Lean

Non-Lean

2009

2010
NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

0.300

0.261

0.284

0.233

0.283

0.257

0.347

0.295

Std. Dev.

(0.195)

(0.265)

(0.178)

(0.323)

(0.237)

(0.260)

(0.206)

(0.283)

Minimum

-0.122

-0.431

-0.096

-0.589

-0.494

-0.488

-0.033

-0.395

Maximum

0.663

0.755

0.655

1.097

0.663

0.663

0.886

0.851

Table 9b:

Net Working Capital (H3a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

16a

12b

16a

12b

17a

11b

19a

9b

Mean

14.00

15.17

14.00

15.17

13.35

16.27

13.00

17.67

Sum

224

182

224

182

227

179

247

159

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 9c:
Net Working Capital (H3a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

28

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.478

0.633

-0.478

0.633

-0.547

0.585

-1.002

0.316

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

rank based z-score of -0.547, 17 negative ranks (totaling 227) and 11 positive ranks (totaling 179). For 2010, net
working capital had a p-value of 0.316, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.002, 19 negative ranks (totaling 247) and
9 positive ranks (totaling 159).
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Hypothesis 3b, Working-Capital Turnover
For working-capital turnover (net sales ÷ average working capital), Lean Companies had
a three-year average of 3.67 turns, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average of 4.25
turns. Hypothesis 3b utilized 27 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with two matched pairs
having to be excluded: one pair due to one-half of that pair’s failing to classify its balance sheet
to enumerate current assets; and one pair due to one-half of that pair’s having an extreme outliercreating denominator of less than one. The z-score for the three-year differenced average
working-capital turnover – based the negative ranks – was -0.096 for a p-value of 0.923. There
were 14 negative ranks (totaling 185) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 193) for the three-year
average working-capital turnover. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H3b failed to be rejected
since there was not a significant difference between the respective average working-capital
turnovers for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average working-capital turnover was 4.53 turns for
Lean companies and 4.80 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average
working-capital turnover was 3.41 turns and 4.49 turns for Lean companies and Non-Lean
companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average working-capital turnover for 2010 was
3.04 turns compared to 0.48 turns for Non-Lean companies. None of the individual years had a
statistically significant difference in working-capital turnover between Lean companies and NonLean companies.27 Results for H3b, working-capital turnover, are set forth in Table 10.

27

For 2008, working-capital turnover had a p-value of 0.866, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.168, 15 negative
ranks (totaling 196) and 12 positive ranks (totaling 182). For 2009, working-capital turnover had a p-value of 0.665,
a negative-rank based z-score of -0.432, 14 negative ranks (totaling 171) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 207). For
2010, working-capital turnover had a p-value of 0.400, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.841, 16 negative ranks
(totaling 224) and 11 positive ranks (totaling 154).
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Table 10a:
Working-Capital Turnover (H3b)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

27

Period

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

NonLean

Mean

3.7

4.2

4.5

4.8

3.4

4.5

3.0

0.5

Std. Dev.

5.4

4.8

6.3

5.4

4.8

5.0

6.1

14.7

Minimum

-14.5

-4.3

-13.2

-5.1

-11.7

-4.0

-22.3

-71.4

Maximum

19.5

22.9

26.0

19.8

16.7

19.6

14.6

12.6

Co. Type

Lean

NonLean

Table 10b: Working-Capital Turnover (H3b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

27

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

14a

13b

15a

12b

14a

13b

16a

11b

Mean

13.21

14.85

13.07

15.17

12.21

15.92

14.00

14.00

Sum

185

193

196

182

171

207

224

154

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 10c: Working-Capital Turnover (H3b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

27

3-Year Average d

2008c

2009d

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.096

0.923

-0.168

0.866

-0.432

0.665

-0.841

0.400

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Hypothesis 3c, Current Ratio
For the current ratio (current assets ÷ current liabilities), Lean Companies had a threeyear average ratio of 2.7 times, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 2.8
times. Hypothesis 3c utilized 28 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with one matched pair
having to be excluded due to one-half of that pair’s failing to classify its balance sheet to
enumerate current assets. The z-score for the three-year differenced average current ratio – based
the negative ranks – was -0.114 for a p-value of 0.909. There were 16 negative ranks (totaling
198) and 12 positive ranks (totaling 208) for the three-year average current ratio. Accordingly,
the null hypothesis for H3c failed to be rejected since there was not a significant difference
between the respective average current ratios for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, the average current ratio was 2.7 times for Lean
companies and 2.8 times for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average current ratio
was 2.9 times and 3.0 times for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies, respectively. Lastly,
Lean companies’ average current ratio for 2010 was 2.9 times compared to 3.0 times for NonLean companies. None of the individual years had a statistically significant difference in current
ratio between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.28 Results for H3c, the current ratio, are
set forth in Table 11.

Hypothesis 3d, Acid-Test Ratio
For the acid-test ratio (the sum of cash, short-term investments, and net receivables ÷
current liabilities), Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 1.83 times, while Non-

28

For 2008, the current ratio had a p-value of 0.802, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.250, 15 negative ranks
(totaling 214) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 192). For 2009, the current ratio had a p-value of 0.964, a negativerank based z-score of -0.046, 7 negative ranks (totaling 49) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 161). For 2010, the
current ratio had a p-value of 0.750, a negative-rank based z-score of -0.319, 12 negative ranks (totaling 189) and 16
positive ranks (totaling 217).
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Table 11a:
Current Ratio (H3c)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Mean

2.74

2.83

2.74

2.83

2.88

3.02

2.89

2.99

Std. Dev.

1.26

1.88

1.35

2.31

1.55

2.08

1.34

1.80

Minimum

0.67

0.36

0.59

0.33

0.30

0.46

0.81

0.33

Maximum

5.06

7.80

5.37

8.74

6.04

8.51

6.47

7.73

Table 11b: Current Ratio (H3c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

16a

12b

15a

13b

7a

13b

12a

16b

Mean

12.38

17.33

14.27

14.77

7.00

12.38

15.75

13.56

Sum

198

208

214

192

49

161

189

217

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 11c: Current Ratio (H3c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

28

3-Year Average d

2008c

2009d

2010d

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.114

0.909

-0.25

0.802

-0.046

0.964

-0.319

0.750

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Lean Companies had a three-year average ratio of 1.91 times. Hypothesis 3d utilized 28
matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with one matched pair having to be excluded due to onehalf of that pair’s failing to classify its balance sheet to enumerate current liabilities. The z-score
for the three-year differenced average acid-test ratio – based the positive ranks – was -0.137 for a
p-value of 0.891. There were 14 negative ranks (totaling 209) and 14 positive ranks (totaling
197) for the three-year average acid-test ratio. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H3d failed to
be rejected since there was not a significant difference between the respective average acid-test
ratio for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average acid-test ratio was 1.76 times for Lean
companies and 1.80 times for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average acid-test ratio
was 1.97 times and 1.95 times for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies, respectively.
Lastly, Lean companies’ average acid-test ratio for 2010 was 1.94 times compared to 1.95 times
for Non-Lean companies. None of the individual years had a statistically significant difference in
acid-test ratio between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies.29 Results for H3d, the acidtest ratio, are set forth in Table 12.

Hypothesis 3e, Accounts-Receivable Turnover
For the accounts-receivable turnover (net sales ÷ average net receivables), Lean
Companies had a three-year average of 8.2 turns, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year
average of 7.4 turns. Hypothesis 3e utilized 28 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with one
matched pair having to be excluded due to one-half of that pair’s failing to report net receivables
29

For 2008, the acid-test ratio had a p-value of 0.682, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.410, 15 negative ranks
(totaling 221) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 185). For 2009, the acid-test ratio had a p-value of 0.733, a positiverank based z-score of -0.342, 15 negative ranks (totaling 218) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 188). For 2010, the
acid-test ratio had a p-value of 0.802, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.250, 15 negative ranks (totaling 214) and
13 positive ranks (totaling 192).
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Table 12a:
Acid-Test Ratio (H3d)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period

3-Year Average

2008
NonLean
Lean

2009

2010

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Mean

1.82

1.91

1.76

1.80

1.97

1.95

1.94

1.95

Std. Dev.

1.03

1.45

1.09

1.72

1.32

1.52

1.02

1.32

Minimum

0.17

0.26

0.21

0.22

0.04

0.33

0.23

0.26

Maximum

3.83

5.88

4.11

6.45

4.85

6.33

4.37

5.72

Table 12b: Acid-Test Ratio (H3d)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =
Period
Ranks

28
3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

14a

14b

15a

13b

15a

13b

15a

13b

Mean

14.93

14.07

14.73

14.23

14.53

14.46

14.27

14.77

Sum

209

197

221

185

218

188

214

192

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 12c:
Acid-Test Ratio (H3d)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

28

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.137

0.891

-0.41

0.682

-0.342

0.733

-0.25

0.802

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

118

for all years studied. The z-score for the three-year differenced average accounts-receivable
turnover – based the positive ranks – was -0.023 for a p-value of 0.982. There were 13 negative
ranks (totaling 204) and 15 positive ranks (totaling 202) for the three-year average accountsreceivable turnover. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H3e failed to be rejected since there was
not a significant difference between the respective average accounts-receivable turnover for Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average accounts-receivable turnover was 8.3 turns for
Lean companies and 8.0 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average accountsreceivable turnover was 7.9 turns and 7.2 turns for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average accounts-receivable turnover for 2010 was 8.6
turns compared to 7.8 turns for Non-Lean companies. None of the individual years had a
statistically significant difference in accounts-receivable turnover between Lean companies and
Non-Lean companies.30 Results for H3e, accounts-receivable turnover, are set forth in Table 13.

Hypothesis 3f, Days’-Sales Uncollected
For days’-sales uncollected (365 x net receivables ÷ net sales), Lean Companies had a
three-year average of 58.7 days, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year average of 59.8
days. Hypothesis 3f utilized all 29 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with no matched pairs
having to be excluded. The z-score for the three-year differenced average days’-sales uncollected
– based the negative ranks – was -0.184 for a p-value of 0.854. There were 14 negative ranks

30

For 2008, accounts-receivable turnover had a p-value of 0.982, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.023, 14
negative ranks (totaling 205) and 14 positive ranks (totaling 201). For 2009, accounts-receivable turnover had a pvalue of 0.909, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.114, 14 negative ranks (totaling 208) and 14 positive ranks
(totaling 198). For 2010, accounts-receivable turnover had a p-value of 0.982, a positive-rank based z-score of 0.023, 12 negative ranks (totaling 204) and 16 positive ranks (totaling 202).
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Table 13a:
Accounts-Receivable Turnover (H3e)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

NonLean

Mean

8.2

7.3

8.3

8.0

7.9

7.2

8.6

7.8

Std. Dev.

5.9

4.6

5.4

5.9

6.6

5.9

7.1

5.4

Minimum

2.8

3.3

3.1

2.9

2.5

2.4

2.9

3.9

Maximum

27.2

27.2

27.1

27.1

29.1

29.1

31.7

31.8

Co. Type

Lean

NonLean

Table 13b: Accounts-Receivable Turnover (H3e)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

28

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

13a

15b

14a

14b

14a

14b

12a

16b

Mean

15.69

13.47

14.64

14.36

14.86

14.14

17.00

12.63

Sum

204

202

205

201

208

198

204

202

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 13c: Accounts-Receivable Turnover (H3e)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

28

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.023

0.982

-0.046

0.964

-0.114

0.909

-0.023

0.982

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

(totaling 208) and 15 positive ranks (totaling 226) for the three-year average days’-sales
uncollected. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H3f failed to be rejected since there was not a
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significant difference between the respective average days’-sales uncollected for Lean companies
and Non-Lean companies.
The sample distribution for H3f was one of two of the 17 hypotheses where one or both
of the Lean-company observations or the Non-Lean-company observations did not fail the
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. Accordingly, dependent-samples t-tests also are an appropriate
method through which to analyze the data. The three-year average of days’-sales uncollected,
had a t-score of -0.167 with a p-value of 0.868. Therefore, under both parametric and nonparametric matched-pairs tests, the null hypothesis for H3f failed to be rejected since there was
not a significant difference between the respective average days’-sales uncollected for Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies. Furthermore, the respective t-scores and p-values for the
individual years were: (a) for 2008, -0.529 and 0.601; (b) for 2009, -0.432 and 0.669; and (c) for
2010, 0.596 and 0.556. That is, none of the individual years had a statistically significant
difference in days’-sales uncollected between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies when
analyzed using t-tests.
Examining the years individually, average days’-sales uncollected was 55.8 days for Lean
companies and 59.3 days for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average days’-sales
uncollected were 60.4 days and 63.4 days for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average days’-sales uncollected for 2010 was 62.3 days
compared to 58.3 days for Non-Lean companies. None of the individual years had a statistically
significant difference in days’-sales uncollected between Lean companies and Non-Lean
companies.31 Results for H3f, days’-sales uncollected, are set forth in Table 14.

31

For 2008, days’-sales uncollected had a p-value of 0.496, a negative-rank based z-score of -0.681, 13 negative
ranks (totaling 186) and 16 positive ranks (totaling 249). For 2009, days’-sales uncollected had a p-value of 0.596, a
negative-rank based z-score of -0.530, 15 negative ranks (totaling 193) and 14 positive ranks (totaling 242). For
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Table 14a:
Days' Sales Uncollected (H3f)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period

3-Year Average

2008
NonLean
Lean

2009

2010

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Mean

58.7

59.8

55.8

59.3

60.4

63.4

62.3

58.3

Std. Dev.

25.8

21.0

24.2

23.7

31.3

25.0

26.4

23.2

Minimum

13.5

8.3

13.5

10.3

0.0

7.1

14.1

7.1

Maximum

132.0

109.3

120.8

131.3

149.8

109.4

136.8

103.8

Table 14b: Days' Sales Uncollected (H3f)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

29

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

14a

15b

13a

16b

15a

14b

16a

13b

Mean

14.93

15.07

14.31

15.56

12.87

17.29

14.69

15.38

Sum

209

226

186

249

193

242

235

200

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 14c: Days' Sales Uncollected (H3f)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

29

3-Year Average d

2008d

2009d

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.184

0.854

-0.681

0.496

-0.53

0.596

-0.378

0.705

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

2010, days’-sales uncollected had a p-value of 0.705, a positive-rank based z-score of -0.378, 16 negative ranks
(totaling 235) and 13 positive ranks (totaling 200).
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Hypothesis 4a, Total Inventory Turnover
For the total-inventory turnover (cost of goods sold ÷ average total inventory), Lean
Companies had a three-year average of 6.1 turns, while Non-Lean Companies had a three-year
average of 4.3 turns. Hypothesis 4a utilized 27 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with two
matched pairs having to be excluded due to one-half of each pair’s not reporting any inventory.
The z-score for the three-year differenced average total-inventory turnover – based the positive
ranks – was -0.240 for a p-value of 0.016. There were 19 negative ranks (totaling 270) and seven
positive ranks (totaling 81) for the three-year average total-inventory turnover. For the totalinventory turnover, hypothesis 4a, there was one differenced observation with a zero value that
the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test excluded. For that differenced observation, both halves of a
matched pair were outliers beyond three standard deviations. Accordingly, both halves of the
matched pair were winsorized to the same value, thereby giving the differenced observation a
zero value. Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H4a was rejected since there was a significant
difference between the respective average total-inventory turnover for Lean companies and NonLean companies. Here, Lean companies had significantly higher total-inventory turnover than
Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average total-inventory turnover was 6.3 turns for Lean
companies and 4.8 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average total-inventory
turnover was 5.7 turns and 5.2 turns for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies, respectively.
Lastly, Lean companies’ average total-inventory turnover for 2010 was 6.4 turns compared to 4.3
turns for Non-Lean companies. All three of the individual years had statistically significant
differences in total-inventory turnover between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies: (1)
for 2008, a p-value of 0.041, positive-rank based z-score of -2.045, 19 negative ranks (totaling
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256), and seven positive ranks (totaling 95); (2) for 2009, a p-value of 0.030, positive-rank based
z-score of -2.172, 19 negative ranks (totaling 261), and seven positive ranks (totaling 90); and (3)
for 2010, a p-value of 0.006, positive-rank based z-score of -2.756, 19 negative ranks (totaling
284), and seven positive ranks (totaling 67). Results for H4a, total-inventory turnover, are set
forth in Table 15.

Hypothesis 4b, Raw-Materials Inventory Turnover
For raw-materials inventory turnover (cost of goods sold ÷ average raw-materials
inventory), Lean Companies had a three-year average of 18.1 turns, while Non-Lean Companies
had a three-year average of 8.8 turns. Hypothesis 4b utilized 22 matched-pairs in its statistical
analysis with seven matched pairs having to be excluded: three pairs due to both halves of those
pairs’ not reporting any raw-materials inventory; and four other pairs due to one-half of each
such pair’s not reporting any raw-materials inventory. The z-score for the three-year differenced
average raw-materials inventory turnover between – based the positive ranks – was -3.165 for a
p-value of 0.002. There were 17 negative ranks (totaling 224) and five positive ranks (totaling
29) for the three-year average raw-materials inventory turnover between. Accordingly, the null
hypothesis for H4b was rejected since there was a significant difference between the respective
average raw-materials inventory turnover between for Lean companies and Non-Lean
companies. Here, Lean companies had significantly higher raw-materials inventory turnover than
Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average raw-materials inventory turnover between was
19.7 turns for Lean companies and 9.8 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the
average raw-materials inventory turnover was 16.7 turns and 8.4 turns for Lean companies and

124

Table 15a:
Total-Inventory Turnover (H4a)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

27

Period
Co. Type

3-Year Average

2008
NonLean
Lean

2009

2010

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

Non-Lean

Mean

6.1

4.3

6.3

4.8

5.7

4.2

6.4

4.3

Std. Dev.

5.6

4.9

5.5

5.7

5.6

4.9

5.9

5.1

Minimum

1.4

0.2

1.3

0.1

1.5

0.1

1.6

0.6

Maximum

26.6

26.6

26.7

26.7

26.1

26.1

28.4

28.4

Table 15b: Total-Inventory Turnover (H4a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

27

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

19a

7b

19a

7b

19a

7b

19a

7b

Mean

14.21

11.57

13.47

13.57

13.74

12.86

14.95

9.57

Sum

270

81

256

95

261

90

284

67

Number*

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

*

There was one differenced observation with a zero value that the Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test excluded from further analysis.

Table 15c:
Total-Inventory Turnover (H4a)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

27

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.400

0.016

-2.045

0.041

-2.172

0.030

-2.756

0.006

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Non-Lean companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average raw-materials inventory
turnover between for 2010 was 18.5 turns compared to 9.0 turns for Non-Lean companies. All
three of the individual years had statistically significant differences in raw-materials inventory
turnover between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies: (1) for 2008, a p-value of 0.001,
positive-rank based z-score of -3.165, 19 negative ranks (totaling 233), and three positive ranks
(totaling 20); (2) for 2009, a p-value of 0.003, positive-rank based z-score of -3.003, 16 negative
ranks (totaling 219), and six positive ranks (totaling 34); and (3) for 2010, a p-value of 0.002,
positive-rank based z-score of -3.036, 17 negative ranks (totaling 220), and five positive ranks
(totaling 33). Results for H4b, raw-materials inventory turnover, are set forth in Table 16.

Hypothesis 4c, Work-in-Process Inventory Turnover
For work-in-process inventory turnover (cost of goods sold ÷ average work-in-process
inventory), Lean Companies had a three-year average of 24.1 turns, while Non-Lean Companies
had a three-year average of 37.7 turns. Hypothesis 4c utilized only 16 matched-pairs in its
statistical analysis with 13 matched pairs having to be excluded: seven pairs due to both halves
of those pairs’ either not reporting any work-in-process inventory or having an extreme outliercreating denominator of less than one; and six pairs due to at least one-half of each such pair’s
not reporting any work-in-process inventory or having an extreme outlier-creating denominator
of less than one. The z-score for the three-year differenced average work-in-process inventory
turnover – based the negative ranks – was -0.517 for a p-value of 0.605. There were nine
negative ranks (totaling 58) and eight positive ranks (totaling 78) for the three-year average
work-in-process inventory turnover.
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Table 16a:
Raw-Materials Inventory Turnover (H4b)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

22

Period

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Mean

18.1

8.8

19.7

9.8

16.7

8.4

18.5

9.0

Std. Dev.

15.1

7.0

16.8

8.4

14.5

7.2

15.6

7.3

Minimum

3.5

0.2

3.0

0.1

2.7

0.1

3.7

0.7

Maximum

62.4

33.9

64.6

35.3

64.5

33.1

62.5

33.2

Table 16b: Raw-Materials Inventory Turnover (H4b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

22

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

17a

5b

19a

3b

16a

6b

17a

5b

Mean

13.18

5.80

12.26

6.67

13.69

5.67

12.94

6.60

Sum

224

29

233

20

219

34

220

33

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 16c: Raw-Materials Inventory Turnover (H4b)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

22

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-3.165

0.002

-3.458

0.001

-3.003

0.003

-3.036

0.002

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.
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Accordingly, the null hypothesis for H4c failed to be rejected since there was not a significant
difference between the respective average work-in-process inventory turnover for Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average work-in-process inventory turnover was 24.6
turns for Lean companies and 39.7 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average
work-in-process inventory turnover was 22.4 turns and 34.4 turns for Lean companies and NonLean companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average work-in-process inventory
turnover for 2010 was 27.0 turns compared to 34.8 turns for Non-Lean companies. None of the
individual years had a statistically significant difference in work-in-process inventory turnover
between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. 32 Results for H4c, work-in-process
inventory turnover, are set forth in Table 17.

Hypothesis 4d, Finished-Goods Inventory Turnover
For finished-goods inventory turnover (cost of goods sold ÷ average finished-goods
inventory), Lean Companies had a three-year average of 17.6 turns, while Non-Lean Companies
had a three-year average of 14.6 turns. Hypothesis 4d utilized 19 matched-pairs in its statistical
analysis with ten matched pairs having to be excluded: four pairs due to both halves of those
pairs’ either not reporting any work-in-process inventory or having an extreme outlier-creating
denominator of less than one; and six pairs due to at least one-half of each such pair’s not
reporting any work-in-process inventory or having an extreme outlier-creating denominator of
less than one.
32

For 2008, work-in-process inventory turnover had a p-value of 0.605, a negative-rank based z-score of -0.517, 9
negative ranks (totaling 58) and 7 positive ranks (totaling 78). For 2009, work-in-process inventory turnover had a
p-value of 0.642, a negative-rank based z-score of -0.465, 9 negative ranks (totaling 59) and 7 positive ranks
(totaling 77). For 2010, work-in-process inventory turnover had a p-value of 0.918, a negative-rank based z-score of
-0.103, 7 negative ranks (totaling 66) and 9 positive ranks (totaling 70).
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Table
Work-in-Process Inventory Turnover
17a:
(H4c)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =
Period

16

Co. Type

3-Year Average
NonLean
Lean

Mean

24.1

Std. Dev.

19.4

Minimum
Maximum

2008

2009

Lean

NonLean

37.7

24.6

45.3

19.0

4.2

5.0

84.8

144.6

2010

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

39.7

22.4

34.4

27.0

34.8

43.3

19.2

42.3

21.4

44.3

4.7

5.0

3.5

4.3

4.4

5.5

82.1

133.6

83.3

138.9

89.5

181.3

Table
Work-in-Process Inventory Turnover
17b:
(H4c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =
Period
Ranks

16
3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

9a

7b

9a

7b

9a

7b

7a

9b

Mean

6.44

11.14

6.44

11.14

6.56

11.00

9.43

7.78

Sum

58

78

58

78

59

77

66

70

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table
Work-in-Process Inventory Turnover
17c:
(H4c)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

16

3-Year Averaged

2008d

2009d

2010d

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-0.517

0.605

-0.517

0.605

-0.465

0.642

-0.103

0.918

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

129

The z-score for the three-year differenced average finished-goods inventory turnover – based the
positive ranks – was -1.771 for a p-value of 0.077. There were 12 negative ranks (totaling 139)
and eight positive ranks (totaling 51) for the three-year average finished-goods inventory
turnover. Accordingly, there was marginal significance for H4d with respect to the difference
between the respective average finished-goods inventory turnover for Lean companies and NonLean companies. Here, Lean companies had a marginally significantly larger inventory turnover
than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average finished-goods inventory turnover was 18.2
turns for Lean companies and 18.1 turns for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average
finished-goods inventory turnover was 15.6 turns and 13.1 turns for Lean companies and NonLean companies, respectively. Lastly, Lean companies’ average finished-goods inventory
turnover for 2010 was 19.4 turns compared to 13.9 turns for Non-Lean companies. Of the
individual years, both 2009 (marginally) and 2010 had statistically significant differences in
finished-goods inventory turnover between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies: (1) for
2009, a p-value of 0.070 with a positive-rank based z-score of -1.328; and (2) for 2010, a p-value
of 0.049 with a positive-rank based z-score of -1.972. Individually, fiscal 2009 had 12 negative
ranks (totaling 140) and seven positive ranks (totaling 50) while fiscal 2010 had 12 negative
ranks (totaling 144) and seven positive ranks (totaling 46) for finished-goods inventory
turnover.33 Results for H4d, finished-goods inventory turnover, are set forth in Table 18.

33

For 2008, finished-goods inventory turnover had a p-value of 0.184, a positive-rank based z-score of -1.328, 11
negative ranks (totaling 128) and 8 positive ranks (totaling 62).
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Table 18a:
Finished-Goods Inventory Turnover (H4d)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

19

Period

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

Non-Lean

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Mean

17.6

14.6

18.2

18.1

15.6

13.1

19.4

13.9

Std. Dev.

14.7

19.3

13.9

27.4

14.2

16.5

16.6

17.4

Minimum

3.5

2.1

3.0

2.4

3.6

1.5

3.9

2.5

Maximum

70.1

83.9

64.6

116.8

68.9

68.9

77.1

77.2

Table 18b: Finished-Goods Inventory Turnover (H4d)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

19

Period

3-Year Average

Ranks

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

12a

7b

11a

8b

12a

7b

12a

7b

Mean

11.58

7.29

11.64

7.75

11.67

7.14

12.00

6.57

Sum

139

51

128

62

140

50

144

46

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 18c: Finished-Goods Inventory Turnover (H4d)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

19

3-Year Average c

2008c

2009c

2010c

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-1.771

0.077

-1.328

0.184

-1.811

0.070

-1.972

0.049

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

131

Hypothesis 4e, Days’-Sales in Inventory
For days’-sales in inventory (365 days x net sales ÷ average finished-goods inventory),
Lean Companies had a three-year average of 32.4 days, while Non-Lean Companies had a threeyear average of 58.2 days. Hypothesis 4e utilized 19 matched-pairs in its statistical analysis with
ten matched pairs having to be excluded: four pairs due to both halves of those pairs’ either not
reporting any finished-goods inventory or having an extreme outlier-creating denominator of less
than one; and six pairs due to at least one-half of each such pair’s not reporting any finishedgoods inventory or having an extreme outlier-creating denominator of less than one. The z-score
for the three-year differenced average days’-sales in inventory – based the negative ranks – was 2.093 for a p-value of 0.036. There were seven negative ranks (totaling 43) and 12 positive ranks
(totaling 147) for the three-year average days’-sales in inventory. Accordingly, the null
hypothesis for H4e was rejected since there was a significant difference between the respective
average days’-sales in inventory between for Lean companies and Non-Lean companies. Here,
Lean companies had significantly lower days’-sales in inventory than Non-Lean companies.
Examining the years individually, average days’-sales in inventory was 33.4 days for
Lean companies and 58.6 days for Non-Lean companies in 2008. For 2009, the average days’sales in inventory were 31.8 days and 61.3 days for Lean and Non-Lean companies, respectively.
Lastly, Lean companies’ average days’-sales in inventory for 2010 was 32.0 days compared to
56.5 days for Non-Lean companies. All three of the individual years had statistically significant
differences (2008, marginally so): (1) for 2008, a p-value of 0.0070, negative-rank based z-score
of -1.811, eight negative ranks (totaling 50), and 11 positive ranks (totaling 140); (2) for 2009, a
p-value of 0.022, negative -rank based z-score of -2.294, five negative ranks (totaling 38), and 14
positive ranks (totaling 152); and (3) for 2010, a p-value of 0.011, negative -rank based z-score
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of -2.535, six negative ranks (totaling 32), and 13 positive ranks (totaling 158). Results for H4e,
days’-sales in inventory, are set forth in Table 19.
Table 19a:
Days' Sales in Inventory (H4e)
Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

19

Period

3-Year Average

2008
NonLean
Lean

2009

2010

Lean

NonLean

Lean

NonLean

Co. Type

Lean

Non-Lean

Mean

32.4

58.2

33.4

58.6

31.8

61.3

32.0

56.5

Std. Dev.

23.7

43.2

28.2

47.0

22.8

44.5

22.3

42.2

Minimum

4.7

2.9

4.9

1.9

4.7

4.6

4.5

2.9

Maximum

102.2

162.2

129.3

173.2

101.3

171.4

79.8

153.2

Table 19b: Days' Sales in Inventory (H4e)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Descriptive Statistics
pairs: n =

19

Period
Ranks

3-Year Average

2008

2009

2010

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

7a

12b

8a

11b

5a

14b

6a

13b

Mean

6.14

12.25

6.25

12.73

7.60

10.86

5.33

12.15

Sum

43

147

50

140

38

152

32

158

Number

a:

Lean > Non-Lean

b:

Non-Lean > Lean

Table 19c: Days' Sales in Inventory (H4e)
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test Results
pairs: n =

19

3-Year Averaged

2008d

2009d

2010d

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

Z

p-value

-2.093

0.036

-1.811

0.070

-2.294

0.022

-2.535

0.011

c:

Z is based on the positive ranks.

d:

Z is based on the negative ranks.

133

Summary of Results
Overall, both returns hypotheses (H1a and H1b) were significant, as were two cash-flows
hypotheses (H2a and H2b) and three inventory hypotheses (H4a, H4b, and H4e). Additionally,
profit margin (H1c), the financing-assets ratio (H2c), and finished-goods inventory turnover
(H4d) all were marginally significant at α = 0.10. With larger sample sizes, it is possible that
each of the three marginally significant hypotheses could have been significant at lower than or
equal to α = 0.05. None of the working-capital hypotheses (set 3) were statistically significant. A
summary of the results for all hypotheses is set forth in Table 20.
Table 20:

Summary of Results
Lean/N-L

Hypo

Measure

statistic

p-value

direction

H1a

Return on Net Operating Assets

-2.247

0.025

Lean

H1b

Return on Total Assets

-2.173

Lean

H1c

Profit Margin

-1.697

0.030
0.090

H2a

Operating Cash Flows

-2.281

0.023

Lean

H2b

Cash Adequacy

-2.195

Financing Assets

-1.735

0.028
0.083

Lean

H2c
H3a

Net Working Capital

-0.478

0.633

Lean

H3b

Working Capital Turnover

-0.096

0.923

Non-Lean

Lean

Lean

H3c

Current Ratio

-0.114

0.909

Non-Lean

H3d

Acid-Test Ratio

-0.137

0.891

Non-Lean

H3e

Accounts-Receivable Turn

-0.023

0.982

Lean

H3f

Days'-Sales Uncollected

-0.184

0.854

Lean*

H4a

Total Inventory Turnover

-2.400

0.016

Lean

H4b

Raw-Materials Turnover

-3.165

Lean

H4c

Work-in-Process Turnover

-0.517

0.002
0.605#

Non-Lean

H4d

Finished Goods Turnover

-1.771

0.077

Lean

H4e

Days'-Sales in Inventory

-2.093

0.036

Lean*

* group had a lower value, where a lower value is a better result
#

interpret with caution: hypothesis tested the fewest matched pairs (16)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Inter alia, Lean companies outperformed Non-Lean companies on several important
financial-performance measures for the three-year period from 2008 through 2010. Over the
period, Lean companies also were more balanced than Non-Lean companies. Lean companies
had current-to-long-term assets and current-to-long-term liabilities ratios that both were roughly
1:1, as compared to Non-Lean companies’ ratios of roughly 1:2 (current: long-term) for the both
assets and liabilities. Despite having substantially the same total assets, the Lean companies and
Non-Lean companies studied herein had strikingly different compositions of assets and
liabilities, as well as different summary-account balances for income-statement and statement-ofcash-flows accounts for the respective three-year average balances for fiscal years 2008 through
2010. For the years and companies studied herein, Lean companies had average current assets 77
percent higher and average long-term assets 19 percent lower than Non-Lean companies.
Similarly, Lean companies had average current liabilities 66 percent higher and average longterm liabilities 28 percent lower than Non-Lean companies. It appears that Lean companies not
only were retaining current assets – particularly cash and cash equivalents – in anticipation of
growth, but also reduced long-term assets to become smaller and more flexible.
For the years and companies studied herein, Lean companies had average net sales, cost
of goods sold, and net income that were 83, 89, 199 percent larger than Non-Lean companies,
respectively. Results suggest that with their sales advantage, Lean companies do not need as high
a contribution-margin ratio to achieve a greater profit. Furthermore, Lean companies had close to
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twice the net cash flows for each cash-flow category than the Non-Lean companies: 96 percent
larger average net operating cash inflows, 89 percent larger average net investing cash outflows,
and 87 percent larger average net financing cash outflows.
Lean companies and Non-Lean companies had significant differences for fiscal years
2008 through 2010 in multiple different measures for each of returns, cash flows, and inventory
turnover. For returns, compared to Non-Lean companies, Lean companies had significantly
higher: (a) returns on net operating assets; and (b) returns on total assets, as well as marginally
significantly higher profit margins. For cash flows, compared to Non-Lean companies, Lean
companies had significantly higher: (a) operating cash flows; and (b) cash-adequacy ratios, as
well as marginally significantly higher financing-assets ratios.
There was no significant difference between Lean companies and Non-Lean companies
on any of six respective working capital measures tested. It appears that after enjoying the
improved cash flows promised by a lean transformation, Lean companies do not necessarily keep
their greater amount of cash in current-asset form and/or have not been shown to be overly
concerned about maintaining current-liability balances. Accordingly, little to nothing negative
should be read into the absence of statistical significance among the working-capital ratios.
There were many significant differences, however, with respect to inventory measures.
Compared to Non-Lean companies, Lean companies had significantly higher: (a) total-inventory
turnover; and (b) raw-materials inventory turnover, as well as marginally significantly higher
finished-goods inventory turnover. Although there was no significant difference in work-inprocess inventory turnover between Lean Companies and Non-Lean companies, that hypothesis
had the fewest number of matched pairs tested – 16 – due to the failure of many companies to
report work-in-process inventory. Accordingly, some caution should be exercised in interpreting
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or extending the failure to reject H4c: that there was no significant difference between Lean
companies and Non-Lean companies insofar as work-in-process inventory turnover. Lastly, Lean
companies had significantly lower days’-sale in inventory than Non-Lean companies.

Limitations and Future Research
The years studied herein, fiscal years 2008 through 2010, were poor economic years in
the United States. Accordingly, some of the results – both the significant results and nonsignificant results – may have been due to omitted variables. The companies that were identified
as Lean throughout this study were done so mostly from self-reported data - 10-K reports and
media mentions. Granted, media mentions are an external source, but their occurrence with
respect to a company’s business methodologies is less likely to have occurred without some selfpromotion on the part of the company. Great diligence was taken to increase confidence that
companies that were designated as Lean companies herein were in fact lean and that companies
that were designated as Non-Lean were in fact Non-Lean. Ultimately, however, there was a
subjective element to the classification.
Due to the need to match Lean and Non-Lean companies on both their four-digit SIC
code and relative total assets, as well as the inappropriateness of matching a given Non-Lean
company to more than one Lean company, 78 of the 107 preliminarily identified Lean companies
did not have an appropriate Lean match. Additionally, proponents of lean operations and lean
accounting state that it takes several years for a company to be considered a mature Lean
company. Companies that had not adopted Lean operations by fiscal 2008 were excluded from
analysis. Even so, the analysis inevitably uses companies at different stages of their respective
lean transformations. Furthermore, many companies involved in lean transformations are nonpublic companies or relatively small public companies that are not included due to unavailability
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of financial data or the scope of the study. Lastly, certain desired and potentially informative
cost/managerial accounting data – the accounting area most related to Lean companies - is not
publicly available and thus not analyzed in this study.
Future research should be performed as an event study, comparing the years before and
years after a commencement of companies’ lean transformations. Future research also could be
done comparing the differences between Lean and Six-Sigma companies, although difficulty
arises in companies that characterize their business method by the amalgam Lean Sigma. Also,
future research could separate Lean Accounting Summit attendees and non-attendees.
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APPENDIX A
THE TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM (TPS)

SECTION I: LONG-TERM PHILOSOPHY
Principle 1: Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the
expense of short-term financial goals.
Have a philosophical sense of purpose that supersedes any short-term decision-making.
Work, grow, and align the whole organization toward a common purpose that is bigger
than making money. Understand your place in the history of the company and work to
bring the company to the next level. Your philosophical mission is the foundation for all
the other principles.
Generate value for the customer, society and the economy - it is your starting point.
Evaluate every function in the company in terms of its ability to achieve this.
Be responsible. Strive to decide your fate. Act with self-reliance and trust in your own
abilities. Accept responsibility for your conduct and maintain and improve the skills that
enable you to produce added value.

SECTION II: THE RIGHT PROCESS WILL PRODUCE THE RIGHT RESULTS
Principle 2: Create continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface.
Redesign work processes to achieve high value-added continuous flow. Strive to cut back
to zero the amount of time that any work project is sitting idle or waiting for someone to
work on it.
Create flow to move material and information fast as well as to link processes and people
together so that problems surface right away.
Make flow evident throughout your organizational culture. It is the key to the true
continuous improvement process and to developing people.
Principle 3: Use “pull” systems to avoid overproduction.
Provide your downline customers in the production process with what they want, when
they want it, and in the amount they want. Material replenishment initiated by
consumption is the basic principle of just-in-time.
Minimize your work in process and warehousing of inventory by stocking small amounts
of each product and frequently restocking based on what the customer actually takes
away.
Be responsive to the day-by-day shifts in customer demand rather than relying on
computer schedules and systems to track wasteful inventory.
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Principle 4: Level out the workload (heijunka). (Work like the tortoise, not the hare.)
Eliminating waste is just one-third of the equation for making lean successful.
Eliminating overburden to people and equipment and eliminating unevenness in the
production schedule are just as important - yet generally not understood at companies
attempting to implement lean principles.
Work to level out the workload of all manufacturing and service processes as an
alternative to the stop/start approach of working on projects in batches that is typical of
most companies.
Principle 5: Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right first time.
Quality for the customer drives your value proposition.
Use all the modern quality assurance methods available.
Build into your equipment the capability of detecting problems and stopping itself.
Develop a visual system to alert team or project leaders that a machine or process needs
assistance. Jidoka (machines with human intelligence) is the foundation for ‘building in’
quality.
Build into your organization support systems to quickly solve problems and put in place
countermeasures.
Build into your culture the philosophy of stopping or slowing down to get quality right
first time to enhance productivity in the long run.
Principle 6: Standardized tasks are the foundation for continuous improvement and
employee empowerment.
Use stable, repeatable methods everywhere to maintain the predictability, regular timing,
and regular output of your processes. It is the foundation for flow and pull.
Capture the accumulated learning about process up to a point in time by standardizing
today's best practices. Allow creative and individual expression to improve upon the
standard; then incorporate it into the new standard so that when a person moves on you
can hand off the learning to the next person.
Principle 7: Use visual control so no problems are hidden.
Use simple visual indicators to help people determine immediately whether they are in a
standard condition or deviating from it.
Avoid using a computer screen when it moves the worker’s focus away from the
workplace.
Design simple visual systems at the place where the work is done, to support flow and
pull.
Reduce your reports to one piece of paper whenever possible, even for your most
important financial decisions.
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Principle 8: Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and
processes.
Use technology to support people, not to replace people. Often it is best to work out a
process manually before adding technology to support the process.
New technology is often unreliable and difficult to standardize and therefore endangers
“‘flow.” A proven process that works generally takes precedence over new and untested
technology.
Conduct actual tests before adopting new technology and business processes,
manufacturing systems, or products.
Reject or modify technologies that conflict with your culture or that might disrupt
stability, reliability, and predictability.
Nevertheless, encourage people to consider new technologies when looking into new
approaches to work. Quickly implement a thoroughly considered technology if it is been
proven in trials and it can improve flow in your processes.

SECTION III: ADD VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION BY
DEVELOPING YOUR PEOPLE AND PARTNERS
Principle 9: Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, and
teach it to others.
Grow leaders from within, rather than buying them from outside the organization.
Do not view the leader’s job as simply accomplishing tasks and having good people
skills. Leaders must be role models of the company's philosophy and way of doing
business.
A good leader must understand the daily work in great detail so he or she can be the best
teacher of your company's philosophy.
Principle 10. Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company's philosophy.
Create a strong, stable culture in which company values and beliefs are widely shared and
lived out over a period of many years.
Train exceptional individuals and teams to work within the corporate philosophy to
achieve exceptional results. Work very hard to reinforce the culture continually.
Use cross-functional teams to improve quality and productivity and enhance flow by
solving difficult technical problems. Empowerment occurs when people use the
company's tools to improve the company.
Make an ongoing effort to teach individuals how to work together as teams for common
goals. Teamwork is something that has to be learned.
Principle 11: Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging them
and helping them improve.
Have respect for your partners and suppliers and treat them as an extension of your
business.
Challenge your outside business partners to grow and develop. It shows that you value
them. Set challenging targets and assist partners in achieving them.
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SECTION IV: CONTINUOUSLY SOLVING ROOT PROBLEMS
DRIVES ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
Principle 12: Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation (genchi
genbutsu).
Solve problems and improve processes by going to the source and personally observing
and verifying data rather than theorizing on the basis of what other people or the
computer screen tell you.
Think and speak based on personally verify data.
Even high-level managers and executives should go and see things for themselves, so
they will have more than a superficial understanding of the situation.
Principle 13: Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options;
implement decisions rapidly.
Do not pick a single direction and go down that one path until you have thoroughly
considered alternatives. When you have picked, move quickly but cautiously down the
path.
Nemawashi is the process of discussing problems and potential solutions with all those
affected, to collect their ideas and get agreement on a path forward. This consensus
process, though time-consuming, helps to broaden the search for solutions, and once a
decision is made, the stage is set for rapid implementation.
Principle 14: Become a learning organization through relentless reflection (hansei) and
continuous improvement (kaizen).
Once you have established a stable process, use continuous improvement tools to
determine the root cause of inefficiencies and apply effective countermeasures.
Design processes that require almost no inventory. This will make wasted time and
resources visible for all to see. Once waste is exposed, have employees use a continuous
improvement process (kaizen) to eliminate it.
Protect the organizational knowledge base by developing stable personnel, slow
promotion, and very careful succession systems.
Use hansei (reflection) at key milestones and after you finish a project openly identify all
the shortcomings of the project. Develop countermeasures to avoid the same mistakes
again.
Learn by standardizing the best practices, rather than reinventing the wheel with each
new project and each new manager. (Liker 2004 p. 37 – 41)
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